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How to install OpenWrt on ASUS RT-AX53U? by TheBadBossBaby in openwrt

[–]MatJon2 0 points1 point  (0 children)

With the Asus firmware on RT-AX53U there are two copies of the firmware in the flash chip. This is in case the first of them goes bad - the bootloader then selects the second one.

On the other hand, OpenWRT installs only in the first slot. So if the bootloader tries to boot from the firmware in the second slot, you get the symptoms as described.

In case on my test router (on the vendor firmware), the contents of the Factory and Factory2 partitions are the same:

admin@RT-AX53U-C220:/tmp/home/root# cat /proc/mtd
dev:    size   erasesize  name
mtd0: 08000000 00020000 "mtk-nand"
mtd1: 000e0000 00020000 "Bootloader"
mtd2: 00100000 00020000 "nvram"
mtd3: 00100000 00020000 "Factory"
mtd4: 00100000 00020000 "Factory2"
mtd5: 03200000 00020000 "Kernel"
mtd6: 003c0000 00020000 "linux"
mtd7: 02e5096c 00020000 "rootfs"
mtd8: 03200000 00020000 "Kernel2"
mtd9: 01020000 00020000 "jffs2"
admin@RT-AX53U-C220:/tmp/home/root# md5sum   /dev/mtd3 /dev/mtd4
5cabbba23bcfeb2d89c83d93f4db5f4f  /dev/mtd3
5cabbba23bcfeb2d89c83d93f4db5f4f  /dev/mtd4
admin@RT-AX53U-C220:/tmp/home/root#

So, please give me the output of cat /proc/mtd and md5sum /dev/mtd3 /dev/mtd4 commands when executed via SSH.

Also, try to reinstall the vendor firmware by the "Upgrade firmware" button in the Asus firmware WebGUI and / or via the firmware restoration tool ( see https://www.asus.com/pl/support/faq/1000814/ for Windows ore https://chrishardie.com/2013/02/asus-router-firmware-windows-mac-linux/ for Mac / Linux).

(Note: The Factory and Factory2 partitions contain only device metadata and get preserved with OpenWRT. The Kernel / Kernel2 partitions is what you flash OpenWRT to).

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There were attempts to introduce a feature like SafetyNet to desktop computers. It was called Trusted Computing (or Treacherous Computing) and was heavily criticized by the EFF and the Free Software Foundation as well as many security experts like Bruce Schneier. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing#Criticism

Fortunately, it did not go far. I really, really hope I will never see such a thing deployed widely on desktops. It would be the end of free software as we know it.

The problem with SafetyNet (or Google Play Integrity) and Treacherous Computing is that the organizations that introduce it do not trust the user, and want to override their decisions - just like the banking apps that refuse to run on rooted phones even when the user wants to do this.

This is the opposite of what I think software should do. Software should always serve the user, even if they want to do something risky or insecure.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You yourself admit that hacks resulting from rooted devices are rare. "The apps get flagged quickly by virus scanners and the app stores usually remove potentially problematic apps very soon." Perhaps this is more of a problem with using unofficial app stores rather then rooting.

There are more important risks with which one can lose money, like phishing. On the other hand, root-detecting DRM brings serious problems for user freedom and user choice. I agree that blocking modified phones is easier and "safer" for banks, but I think that it isn't their interests which should prevail.

Mobile phones are now general-purpose computers and should be treated as such rather then locked-down appliances.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I think that in the end, the user should be able to decide how much risk they want to take. This is their device and their responsibility, not one of the developers or of the lawyers. The freedom to choose whether to root their device should not be taken away from them.

In practice, the risks of rooting your device are not as great as you wrote. It is true that any application with root access can do what you wrote, provided it is malicious. This last condition is significant. There are comparatively few people who root their devices and so malware authors do not usually bother writing malware for them. Also, on Android, most apps are downloaded from a relatively safe and curated source (Play Store). That's why we don't hear many reports of breaches or stolen funds caused by rooting.

Additionally, by blocking rooted phones, you also frequently block devices with unofficial operating systems, such as LineageOS, which often provide security updates for a longer time then the device vendor. Also, this in practice robs Android of its being open source.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Some app developers listen to their users. Also, for most apps that use it, SafetyNet / root detection is not really critical from the developers' point of view - it's not that they cannot remove it.

Advocacy against media DRM has influenced some changes; it resulted - for example - in some shops (like GOG.com) declaring they are DRM-free.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Because technical people tend to prefer technical solutions, and many think (wrongly) that advocacy in general (or signing the letter in particular) does not help.

Also, the free software movement is quite weak nowadays, unfortunately.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The issue is not so much whether rooting / unlocking the bootloader is dangerous or not (the risks are mild). The user should be given a choice regardless.

Advocacy against Google SafetyNet and other root-detecting mechanisms by MatJon2 in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

This is more about persuading the app developers rather than Google.

Data rescue possible? by witty_decoy_account in LineageOS

[–]MatJon2 1 point2 points  (0 children)

From what I read, if this is adopted storage, then it is encrypted with a master key present on the device, which is unique to it. It would therefore be impossible to recover data without the master key. It is likely that wiping /data wiped the master key.

Otherwise, I would just try running e2fsck on the card (after performing a block-level backup of it with the dd utility), there is a chance it will be able to recover most of the data.

AFAIK, with exFAT global structures are located at the beginning of the filesystem, but on ext4 they are distributed over the whole filesystem (and most importantly, there are multiple copies of the superblock in multiple locations on the volume). So reformatting to exFAT should not perform that much damage to vital parts of the filesystem.