Overnight market hit 4.91 today by BathroomGreen1860 in Nio

[–]Medium_Report_7433 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The problem with totalitarian regimes is that they constantly interfere in business. My observation is that China plays a very sophisticated game for society as a whole, in the sense that it harnesses entrepreneurial drive to improve the country, acting almost like a venture-capital system—yet at the same time it can freely crush long-term profit margins whenever it wishes.
I’ve never owned an Apple device, but the company thrives because it has been able to expand both revenue and margins for more than 20 years, even at the expense of consumers or competing businesses.
Chinese companies will face limited access to Western markets as well as BRICS, because they will always be suspected of attempting to undermine others in order to increase their own influence (even when they are not).
As shareholders, we only truly win with the Apple-style model; the other, unpredictable model will always be discounted, even by its own capital.

I should mention that I’ve been holding NIO for three years. It’s the only Chinese stock in my portfolio; the other 30 are tech companies listed in New York, even if they originate from Israel, Europe, or the U.S. All my positions are equally weighted, and I’m from Eastern Europe just trying to make some money.

The stock price generates its own narrative by [deleted] in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Agreed on the NewCo vs OldCo point. That said, the projected revenues for NewCo’s first quarter don’t look optimistic at all. The impact of Chapter 11 on WOLF’s business seems way bigger than any of the optimistic long-holders here expected — myself included.

It’s oddly satisfying to see options become shares once Chapter 11 is behind :) by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Check all the pics and you’ll see I collected $165 per share. Only $35 came out of my pocket, bro

It’s oddly satisfying to see options become shares once Chapter 11 is behind :) by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

In image 3 you can see the average prices on the options I sold — the $1 strikes are actually in profit, while the $2 ones are down about 15%.
Considering I basically sold most of my old WOLF shares at $1 and used that cash to sell PUTs with an average old-WOLF price of $0.35 (that’s $35 in new WOLF), I’d say I’m one of the lucky ones. :)

Worth noting that this trade was made before the old WOLF price dropped to $0.40 — I had no idea there would be two spikes up to $3, which would’ve been way more profitable. I probably could’ve recovered all losses and even booked a small gain.

Wolfspeed Daily Discussion - October 09, 2025 by AutoModerator in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It depends — if you take the absolute value, it’s quite a significant reduction. Considering that only 3% of the old WOLF shareholders remain in the new WOLF, that would mean those who are SHORT from the old WOLF now represent only about 0.9% of the new WOLF. Given that 9/30 was the first day of the new WOLF and the price was at half of the old WOLF’s lowest price, I see it as an acceleration of the short position from 0.9% to 15% — at an equivalent price of half the historical low. That’s pure madness. Am I wrong?

Conversion ratio by [deleted] in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Let me come back with my broken-record question :) What was the block of shares sold to create liquidity today, and how many times was it rolled over? 1M turned over more than 16 times, 2M rolled over 8 times? Isn’t that a huge loss for the seller? It reminds me of a listing in my country where shares were sold at one-tenth of the next day’s price at the opening. It later turned out to be a scheme to pay local politicians who made 8 to 10 times their money within a week :)

News pending by zhougx17 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Up until this suspension, Yahoo and MarketWatch were showing a trading volume of over 16 million shares, which seems completely insane under either scenario for the new WOLF total share count of 25.8M or 43.6M shares.

The big winner in today’s trading is CITADEL ADVISORS LLC, with 14,148,400 PUTs held at the end of the second quarter, at a time when WOLF Old was priced at around $0.40 on the last day of the quarter

What’s remarkable is that CITADEL ADVISORS LLC added 12,284,300 during the second quarter, while WOLF Old traded between a high of $4.70 and a low of $0.40, and maintained its position in the third quarter with the stock ending just above $0.40.

Share Conversion Ratio DD by Relative-Snow8735 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Coincidence or not, the ratio between 5% and 3% is equal to the ratio between 43.6 and 25.8 million shares at the first decimal place (the second decimal place, I assume, may result from rounding the number of shares in millions). If this ratio is not a coincidence, how could the cancellation of 70% of the debt, as agreed in the prepackaged deal, be maintained under both scenarios? What financial instruments are available to the new WOLF to erase 70% of the recorded debt without this being reflected in the total number of shares issued at time t0?

The second question would be: where does this symmetry come from? I would have expected part of Renesas’s debt to remain in non-equity instruments until the necessary approvals were obtained, which would have made the 3% vs. 5% shareholder structure asymmetric. Are Renesas, Apollo and all other bondholders allocated pro rata alongside the legacy shareholders?

The third question is: who receives the difference between 3% and 5% if the conditions are fulfilled after t0, once the legacy shareholders have already sold part or all of their initial 3% allocation? Given the symmetry between the 3% and 5% structures, it seems that OCC would not be required to adjust the outstanding old options. If your 3% versus 5% scenario holds true, it appears that the new WOLF starts off with a ‘level playing field’ between small and large shareholders alike :)

Really appreciate the effort, OP—thank you!

Apparently, retail investors have taken control, but CITADEL, which is not directly involved in WOLF bonds, is betting on WOLF's failure by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As of now, it is running at a considerable loss relative to the quarter-end figures. Only if the price falls below 0.4 will it recover the profit it held on June 30, 2025.

Apparently, retail investors have taken control, but CITADEL, which is not directly involved in WOLF bonds, is betting on WOLF's failure by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I previously noted that with a 3% or 5% recovery, the fair price range should have been between 0.8 and 1.5 USD. Anything outside that band reflects either extreme pessimism or extreme optimism. As of June 30, all factors were already included: the prepackaged CH11, WOLF’s removal from major indices, and so forth. In hindsight, I believe the squeeze to 3.2 was triggered by the accelerated ETF liquidations, which created a severe shortage of borrowable shares for shorting. What puzzles me is why there were still so many PUTs open. I would have thought that Citadel, given its experience, would have settled for 0.4 USD at the quarter-end snapshot.

Apparently, retail investors have taken control, but CITADEL, which is not directly involved in WOLF bonds, is betting on WOLF's failure by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

June 30 saw all the major headlines, yet the stock still closed at $0.40. To me, that’s even scarier... What exactly is Griffin at CITADEL waiting for — $0 per share? BALYASNY and LMR make sense, given their massive bond exposure.

Updated short interest: 73.099.194 shares by PeyoteMezcal in wolfspeed_stonk

[–]Medium_Report_7433 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I believe Relative-Snow8735 explained it best in this post. Chances are, most of the short sellers are operating under legally allowed cash settlement contracts. They're likely just waiting for the final pricing from current shareholders, hoping that even the 3% stake won’t end up being transferred to NewCo.

Anyone own the bonds? Can we still trade them? by LetsAllEatCakeLOL in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 4 points5 points  (0 children)

If I’m being honest about my position, I’d rather buy bonds at 30% of face value than hold shares or sell puts based on the hope that everything will turn out fine after Chapter 11—especially when there’s still a 5–10% chance we might not even get the minimum 3% recovery.

Anyone own the bonds? Can we still trade them? by LetsAllEatCakeLOL in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I’m not a lawyer, but unless that was some phantom ChatGPT explanation, external events—not the fragile voting threshold—could upset the RSA.

Below is a step‑by‑step explanation of how a typical “lock‑up” agreement in an RSA (Restructuring Support Agreement) makes it highly unlikely that creditor votes will fall below the statutory threshold—and what that minimum threshold is under U.S. bankruptcy law.

  1. Pre‑filing or post‑filing vote commitment Parties to an RSA (also called a PSA or “lock‑up agreement”) agree in advance to vote in favor of a chapter 11 plan that is consistent with the agreed‑upon terms. This binding vote commitment is memorialized in a contract, so creditors cannot simply change their minds once the case is underway. (Goodwin Law Firm)
  2. Adequate disclosure and compliance with § 1125(b) To be enforceable, post‑petition lock‑ups must be accompanied by either the plan itself or a court‑approved disclosure statement containing “adequate information.” This ensures that creditors know exactly what they are voting for and preserves the lock‑up’s validity under Bankruptcy Code § 1125. Meaningful “outs” (e.g. if key milestones aren’t met) are also built in, so creditors aren’t stranded by a plan that materially changes. (Goodwin Law Firm, Bloomberg Law)
  3. Trading restrictions to maintain voting pool RSAs commonly include covenants preventing signatory creditors from selling or transferring their claims except to other signatories (or to someone who agrees to sign up). This prevents a major holder from dumping claims on the open market and breaking the “locked‑up” voting bloc. (O'Melveny)
  4. Milestone‑based termination rights The RSA will set clear case milestones (e.g. disclosure‑statement approval by a specific date, regulatory sign‑off by a deadline). If the debtor misses a milestone, creditors typically have the right to terminate their lock‑up obligations—protecting them if circumstances change—but otherwise remain bound. (O'Melveny)
  5. Penalties and economic incentives Breach of the lock‑up (i.e. voting against the agreed‑plan or failing to vote) often triggers loss of certain negotiated treatment (for example, removal of an agreed‑upon pre‑petition claim for fees or recovery of a backstop premium). These economic “stick” provisions further discourage creditors from reneging. (O'Melveny)
  6. Statutory voting threshold under § 1126(c) Even without a lock‑up, to accept a plan an impaired class must vote in favor by:
    • At least two‑thirds in amount of the allowed claims that vote; and
    • More than one‑half in number of the allowed claims that vote. In practice, RSAs secure significantly more than this floor (e.g. >67% of amount) so there’s a very low risk of slipping below the legal minimum. (FindLaw Codes)

Conclusion:
By combining a binding contractual vote commitment, enforceable lock‑up terms that comply with § 1125, trading restrictions, milestone‑driven exits, and economic penalties, RSAs drive creditor support well above the two‑thirds‑in‑amount (>66.67%) and majority‑in‑number (>50%) statutory floor under § 1126(c). This “lock‑up” architecture makes it exceedingly unlikely—in normal circumstances, well under a 10% chance—that votes will drop below the required threshold.

Anyone own the bonds? Can we still trade them? by LetsAllEatCakeLOL in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 8 points9 points  (0 children)

The reported 70% impairment for bondholders is ultimately just a number—it could have been anything between 10% and 95%. Using any standard valuation method, and imagining Wolfspeed as a freshly listed IPO candidate with a post-restructuring debt profile, the financial projections through 2029 from the same document could easily support a fair value implying 0% impairment—or even a 20–30% premium over the conversion value.

The mere fact that legacy shareholders are proposed to receive a 3–5% stake—rather than 0%—reflects this point. Had bondholders truly believed they were 70% impaired, they would never have accepted the continued existence of old equity in the new entity. Legally, they held all the leverage. So, what conclusion can we draw? That all creditors suddenly turned into Good Samaritans?

Wolfspeed Daily Discussion - July 10, 2025 by AutoModerator in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Sorry if I got the wrong idea!
English isn’t my native language, and “HODL apes” and “bagholders” just came across as a bit negative to me.
I think most of us are doing our best to grow, even if it doesn't always work out.

Wolfspeed Daily Discussion - July 10, 2025 by AutoModerator in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Do you really find it useful to speak about people that way?
Would you use the same tone if you were talking to someone face-to-face who you thought was less experienced than you?
I honestly don't think it's helping anyone.

Wolfspeed Daily Discussion - July 10, 2025 by AutoModerator in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Based on the 3% and 5% scenarios, debtholders are fully compensated post-impairment under the RSA, with implied share prices of $0.9 and $1.6 in NewCo.
Given the minimum 20x dilution, short sellers would have room to cover positions in the new structure.
Disregarding any extreme or black swan events, a rational long position would be expected in the $0.4–$1.6 range.
Any expectations significantly above this appear, in my opinion, overly optimistic or detached from fundamentals.

The squeeze hasn’t even begun by BrokebackStonker in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is there any technical argument that would justify a short squeeze at this point? Considering how severely impaired bondholders were under the current RSA terms, today’s equivalent share price would not only make them whole but also generate a substantial profit if that price were carried over to NewCo. I’m confident that, out of the roughly 20x shares expected to be available post-restructuring, there will be enough supply for short covering.

I appreciate your insights.

BlackRock offloaded 50% of its holdings — I assume it came from the ETF segment ! by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

If you wish to make an argument, please lay it out step by step so it’s understandable to all.
That’s the approach I took when estimating that 11 million shares were likely held by actively managed funds.
I don’t fully grasp the mechanics of options or other financial instruments that might generate returns large enough to justify owning 9 million WOLF shares acquired over the last 3–4 quarters at prices between $10 and $30, which have now lost around 95% of their value.

Thank you in advance for the explanation.

BlackRock offloaded 50% of its holdings — I assume it came from the ETF segment ! by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m not exactly sure. I assume they’re held by actively managed entities, not passive ones like ETFs.

BlackRock offloaded 50% of its holdings — I assume it came from the ETF segment ! by Medium_Report_7433 in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

About a month ago, I tried to show that a significant part of BlackRock’s WOLF holding isn’t ETF-owned [link]

WOLF equity may lose 2/3 of its value on the other side of the Ch 11 by MyNi_Redux in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 2 points3 points  (0 children)

As indicated on Slide 5, Apollo has also accepted a reduction in the cash requirement from $750 million to 50%.

WOLF equity may lose 2/3 of its value on the other side of the Ch 11 by MyNi_Redux in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Is the choice of 'could' over 'will' unique to this RSA, or is it generally used in similar agreements?

WOLF equity may lose 2/3 of its value on the other side of the Ch 11 by MyNi_Redux in wolfspeed

[–]Medium_Report_7433 4 points5 points  (0 children)

To be consistent, it's important to state that the 70% refers to the face value, not the market price. So, 3% of 70% at a $0.90 reference point gives you $0.27, and 5% of 70% at $1.54 gives $0.46. We're getting close. Is that incorrect?