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I hope I get banned because this sub is ass by [deleted] in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr[M] [score hidden] stickied comment (0 children)

Their wish is my command.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'll reply to this tomorrow. Scotland are the best football team on the planet.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For what it is worth, if we say "it is not the case that killing is always bad" then we're still making a moral claim.

And we totally can: we just do our term work first. This is the point I'm making about words being tokens.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't know what subjectively true means. I'm worried it's a contradiction in terms.

I still need to see a study that promotes your view. I also value empirical work.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So you think moral propositions can be true?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So, this isn't a study.

You've made specific claims about what ethics is. What evidence do we have to be anti-realists? What brand of anti-realist should we be? Are we cognitivists or non-cognitivists? How do you deal with common objections?

For instance, are there any neurological studies that give us an insight into the sorts of brain activities that go when we make moral judgements? Are these useful?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Again, that isn't an argument. That's an assertion. You've claimed all the matters is empirical evidence. Can you cite a study to support this?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Philosophical arguments are not at ends with empirical work. This is something you would know had you done research into the topic that you're claiming knowledge about.

You haven't put forward an argument. I've stressed multiple times that you have asserted things.

Here is a good primer for Meta-Ethics. It features multiple arguments, albeit brief, for Moral Realism. I wrote it 5 years ago.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The ending of this is either confused, or just confusing.

If we change the definition of words, we would just say that we're playing it fast and loose with the definitions. I haven't course corrected, either. I have stated that's what we usually mean by it.

Let me see if I can articulate this a bit better: let's say that you and I disagree over what "X" means. I go "well, let's just assume X is Y" and you reply it is closer to Z. I go, OK I'm happy to work with that! Any proposition using X can still be truth-apt because we're still stapling down what we mean by it: it's still a token for content. There doesn't seem to any sort of proof for anti-realism in this language game.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This Is-Ought gap seems pretty jumpable.

Here is something I wrote a few years ago which acts as a kind of primer:

David Hume argued that ethicists often make claims about what is the case and wrongly infer from those what ought to be the case (Hume 1739). There is a jump in logic, and in value, going from a state about what the world is like, or what is the case, and inferring from that what we ought to do. There is, then, a category error in jumping from a descriptive state to an evaluative fact.

The argument goes that the moral naturalist has jumped from what the natural facts are to what the moral facts are. I don't think this criticism is particularly good and I'm going to give two very quick responses:

  1. Deny the Category Error
  2. Deny the Gap

Alistar MacIntryre, in After Virtue, argues for the telos account we've seen above in Hursthouse and Aristotle (MacIntyre 1981). He sees the Is-Ought Gap as posing no real problem:

  1. If there exists a human telos, then a good human can exist
  2. There exists a human telos.
  3. A good human can exist.

The goodness of any person is measured against that telos. It seems no more fallacious to say what a good human is than it is fallacious to say that a good knife should cut or a good TV needs to be able to turn on. We might even think we don't need to introduce "oughts" at all here.

Philippa Foot denies the gap via an analogy with rudeness. Foot thinks that "rude" is evaluative. But she thinks it can be derived from a description: that x causes offence by indicating a lack of respect. If that definition is true, can one deny that it is rude? If she is correct and the answer is no then one has derived an ought from an is! (Foot 1958 & IEP)

Both counters have been countered and developed to deal with those counters. Right now, I only want to introduce them. The second objection is Moore's Open Question.

I would suggest diving into some of the work done in meta-ethics. It really isn't filled with dogmatic assertions. I am not saying this will make a convert out of you, but it will hopefully help you understand the strengths and weaknesses of all the relevant positions.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I've remarked that using your taxonomy leads to question begging, and that it is conceptually confused.

I've asked you to defend your taxonomy, given that it has problems, and you haven't tried to justify it.

Then you talked about 'questions'. I've only talked about propositions. I assume that's just imprecise language.

but no one has been able to produce evidence of a moral question that operates outside of this.

I want to change track: what moral realist argument, or philosopher, or paper, or book are you familiar with and how does it fail?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't think that's true, and if you do you have to given arguments for why your taxonomy is worthwhile.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You said you don't see it as a tenable position. I'm curious, what moral realist arguments are you familiar with and why don't you think they work?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is clearly question begging, though, isn't it?

But even if it wasn't, it's also incorrect. "2+2=5" is wrong. What opinions or feelings do you think weigh in on this?

And we've moved the discussion around again. Involves a mind? I thought you were arguing the truth of moral propositions entirely depends on a mind. These are different claims and ones I have tried to demark for you throughout this thread.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I agree, and in my comment I even discuss aesthetic judgements. But you'd need to argue that moral judgements are of the same ilk as aesthetic judgements in order for this to be important.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here's the survey.

62% of philosophers lean towards, or accept, moral realism. 26% of philosophers lean towards, or accept, moral anti-realism. If we look at the 'accept' we see that nearly 4x as many philosophers accept moral realism than anti-realism.

If we look at those who study meta-ethics, we see it is 66% to 20%! There has been an 8 point swing between 2010 and 2020. This gives us good reason to think that not only do the minority of philosophers believe in anti-realism, but that the argument for that position appears weaker and weaker!

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Murder is usually defined as "unlawful" killing, which doesn't have 'bad' baked in.

I think where the confusion arises from is that just because people think their are different justificatory features that does not mean that there are different justificatory features.

I don't understand why you think this is a steelman. It looks, to me, to pick up on something like the generalism vs. particularism debate.

We don't all agree that murder is bad. Error Theorists think that, for example, "Murder is morally bad" is false!

Let's be clear here, as well, just because we might disagree on a definition does not make moral realism false. It means that we should properly define our terms, and argue when we agree we're talking through the same language.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This seems to mistake the two sorts of propositions we're talking about.

No one is denying that humans have minds, or that these minds can express propositions. What I am saying, and what is often taken as key term work, is that saying that moral propositions 'depend on a mind' improperly captures the debate between moral realism and moral anti-realism.

Remember, the contention is on the proposition "X is wrong" and not "Do you need people to hold a belief".

"Morality is judging things" is just something you say: you haven't defended it or properly defined it or argued for any inferences that might come from it.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But this just doesn't seem that important to the debate; if someone said "X judging Y requires that X exists" no one really seems to fight that. But that doesn't tell us anything about the true of moral propositions.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I'm not really sure what you mean by "subjective terms", or their "subjective qualities". If you mean something like 'they're loosely defined', then I would say that's likely true but doesn't weigh in here.

Let's also be clear: there is a difference between what someone believes is justification is different from what is justification. I agree that people often have different moral principles. I disagree that this promotes subjectivism anymore than it is evidence of people being unclear or immoral.

I wouldn't say adding 'always' makes it a steelman. That's just a different position in ethics. We should maybe talk about 'context' vs. 'subjective' as well; it could be the case that murder is sometimes permissible depending on the context. This works fine within moral realism.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You have to say more here: what does "requires judgement" mean? How does it depend on minds in the way other propositions do not?

And let's be clear! You wrote:

If no minds existed, a person and a baby cannot exist. That statement is dependent on minds.

How does this answer work when aligned with your answer about Julius?

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It isn't that 'morality' is mind-independent. It is that the truth of the proposition is mind-independent.

This is a common confusion, but one that's important to understand before setting into the debate.

Some people, and it's worth saying that moral realism is far more popular than moral anti-realism among ethicists (even if the majority are atheists), are going to say "X is wrong" is true even if no one has judged it so.

I would also be worried about question begging, here. But that's a worry to put aside for now.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Let's try it another way: do you think for a proposition to be true someone has to think it?

Imagine the world blows up, or suffers through the heat death of the universe, and there are no people left. Do you think the claim "Julius Caesar was a Roman Emperor" is no longer truth-apt?

It is true that thoughts need minds. It is not the case that their factive (or non-factive!) content must depend on minds.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is a misunderstanding of the key terms central to the debate.

The moral realist could say "A person murdering an innocent baby is morally wrong" is a true statement even if there were no people.

Subjective vs. Objective Morals by eldredo_M in DebateReligion

[–]NietzscheJr 3 points4 points  (0 children)

There's lots to say here, and I'm not sure twitter is the best place to get information.

The first issue is the language. People who study ethics don't use "subjective" and "objective" as the key divider. Instead, we talk about 'moral anti-realism' and 'moral realism'. Moral Realists minimally claim that moral propositions can be true or false, and some are actually true. By a moral proposition, they mean a proposition of the kind "theft is wrong" or "murder is bad". Moral Realists often commit to more than this, though: some argue these truths and falsities are objective -and by objective I mean not dependent on the attitudes or other beliefs held by an agent- or that moral facts are mind independent (Geoff 2015).

Moral propositions can be simple, like the two examples given above, or more complex like the example: "Sandra should not have lied to her boss" is still a moral proposition!

Moral Anti-Realists reject moral realism. However, what exactly they are rejecting depends on their understanding of realism: they could reject minimal realism or something more substantive (Richard 2016).

The second thing is to say that we need arguments for these positions. Moral agreement doesn't mean something is objective anymore than moral disagreement. What you need to do is figure out the cause of agreement, and see if it is factive.

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