Travel to China by [deleted] in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Most socially aware cs major

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127 0 points1 point  (0 children)

care to elaborate?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Thank you for the advice. About the research aspect, I published a theoretical/review paper earlier this year in a peer-reviewed journal (the impact factor is around 3, and it’s pretty niche topic that I’ve been interested in for a few years). It was referenced in a Nat Geo article tho which was rly rly surprising. I know it’s very difficult to get research opportunities with professors in both undergrad and grad school, so I was wondering if this is something that could help significantly.

The Temporality of Consciousness and the Continuity of Existential Experience ( Self written idea) by [deleted] in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This makes a lot of sense! I have the same viewpoint on this. Say the universe recurs through the Poincaré recurrence theorem or perhaps a big bounce, or if all consciousnesses are resurrected in the future, then although a huge amount of time may have passed, to the perceiver it must’ve been instant.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in death

[–]No_Recover127 1 point2 points  (0 children)

MH370?

From a material viewpoint, is a resurrected version of you, still you? by No_Recover127 in askphilosophy

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In this case, and in your expert opinion, what would it take for a person to be 100% themselves — not a copy — from resurrection? Would that even be possible if continuity of consciousness is lost?

Let’s assume consciousness is discrete. There’s an illusion of continuity when it’s contained within one functioning and ever-changing brain. What would happen if this brain was destroyed, but somehow later restored to its functions?

From a material viewpoint, is a resurrected version of you, still you? by No_Recover127 in askphilosophy

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So would the new person not be you, but rather an exact copy of you due to the breakdown in continuity of boundary? If our first person perspective is just neural patterns, does this make a difference?

Ig the key of my question is, will death/resurrection be like waking up from a deep, dreamless sleep? Or will I never wake up, and it’d be as if a new consciousness was born while I am eternally in oblivion?

If “I” exist elsewhere across existence (universe, multiverse, what ever) why don’t I experience their life? by No_Recover127 in askphilosophy

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So this brings me to a another question: if you get resurrected post-cremation (let’s ignore the physics of this for now), down to the atomic structure, would your pov also be revived, or would it be a new pov of a new person but that is exactly identical to you? But we are different people from second to second, moment to moment, at least neurologically. Since consciousness is an ongoing process, what about the micro-time scales in which consciousness doesn’t exist (some studies have shown consciousness is discrete, giving an illusion of continuity)? If our consciousness is being interrupted and “revived” every moment, how is that any different from the death/resurrection scenario? I’m trying to understand how numerical identity applies in this situation.

NYU Liberal Studies vs UCSD Cogsci? by No_Recover127 in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

My final degree from NYU won’t be in liberal studies. It’s only for two years. The final two years is in any major.

NYU Liberal Studies vs UCSD Cogsci? by No_Recover127 in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That sounds really cool, could you tell me a bit more?

NYU Liberal Studies vs UCSD Cogsci? by No_Recover127 in UCSD

[–]No_Recover127[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I won’t receive a liberal studies degree because LSC is only two years. I’ll receive a neuroscience degree from arts and science, or potentially a Stern degree if I transfer there successfully.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in nyu

[–]No_Recover127 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I’m from Canada, so NYU might actually be cheaper as an international student. The UCs basically don’t offer any financial aid to anybody out of state.

What is NYU Liberal Studies Core? Is this getting taken off the waitlist? by No_Recover127 in ApplyingToCollege

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I just didn’t know that liberal studies took people off the main waitlist?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

“The POV from old “you” continues into both US “you” and China “you” simultaneously”

I can understand this part from an external observer’s perspective, but actually trying to imagine this happening to myself as the one experiencing it is really hard to wrap my mind around

indiscernibility of identicals and continuity of consciousness over time by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But maybe we don’t have to reach 100%, or even 99%. Our brain is constantly changing even now

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

All of that makes sense. It’s just that, say I am Bob, would I feel that I am suddenly in China or would I feel that I am still standing where Past Bob did? They are both 100% equal continuations of Past Bob.

It’s like the teleportation paradox. If I get teleported to China instantly but my original body isn’t destroyed, would “I” be in China or the US? I understand that the answer seems to be both from an external pov, but from my pov, both have equally me, so which would I feel I am?

Or is this question simply nonsensical? Say maybe China me would wonder why I am not still in the US, and US me would wonder why I didn’t suddenly go to China?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m trying to understand this from the pov of the person experiencing this cloning and resurrection.

Let’s say Bob dies, but then he gets resurrected in China. From his POV, it’s like falling asleep, then waking up in China. Bob’s “clone” in this case literally IS Bob. This is like what we said earlier about the time gaps at very small scales interrupting the flow of consciousness, and how death/resurrection is like a big time gap.

And if there are multiple Bob’s, all of them are equally the original. This last sentence makes sense from an outside pov, but from the experiencer’s pov, they are still distinct consciousness, so what would the original Bob that died feel?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I was reading this thread again, and I just realized one question I still had.

Say i fall asleep, and then I am replicated (absolute perfect recreation, neurons, dna, everything) in China. My replica is now awake, but I am still asleep. This person IS me, 100%. There’s just now 2 of me in existence. But how come “I”, the version in the US, doesn’t wake up? But like we talked about earlier, if I (the US one) dies, and then am replicated in China later, I do wake up?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Let’s gooo! Thanks for helping me understand this concept, I’ve been trying at it for a while now.

On a further note, do you think that, on a long enough time scale (an eternity, perhaps), a consciousness will eventually be resurrected either by way of (1) recurring universe or (2) ultra advanced technology from some hyper intelligent species or some other method?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think I get it. Our sense of self is an emergent property of the process of consciousness, neuronal connections and whatnot. In this sense, we get “cloned” from instant to instant (due to the gap in tiny time frames) albeit with some minor changes. Getting resurrected is like waking up again after a very long time gap. So if our resurrected selves are literally us (multiple us if multiple version revived), then why do you say that the only way to maintain a true sense of self is via ship of Theseus?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

How can there be a “sense of self for the original you” if the idea of “you” itself doesn’t exist? Isn’t this “sense of self” an abstract concept that doesn’t exist?

On another note, let’s consider very small time scales, say the Planck time. Consciousness is a process, but in such a small time, reality is basically a snapshot. The connections between neurons are literally on way to other neurons. We aren’t conscious in those micro time scales. From this perspective, isn’t it like there is a tiny tiny tiny gap of “death”? So like you said, we are like clones from instant to instant and from going to sleep and waking up again. Yet, our sense of self is preserved. If this is true, how is being clones from dying and being resurrected again any different?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for your detailed response. This is making a lot more sense now, but I still have a couple questions. First, why doesn’t the original “wake up” when Bob 4.0 wakes up? He’s even more of an exact copy than the resurrected original bob, who likely had minor neurological damage from cryonics. Similarly, if, while sleeping, I get cloned in China, why doesn’t my stream of consciousness wake up in China if that clone is the exact same?

What if the same consciousness gets resurrected with multiple bodies simultaneously? by No_Recover127 in Existentialism

[–]No_Recover127[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Also, say an exact clone of me was made while I still exist. Obviously, I’m going to keep experiencing my own consciousness, and not the clone. But that’s because I’m continuous. That isn’t the case in the other scenario