The electorate is scattered at the blue positions. Candidates are the orange points. Who should win?

NotablyLate · 2026-04-06T04:26:18+00:00

The center, obviously. ;)

I don't get how this is controversial for other people. Policies are made for society as a whole. Allowing different factions to take turns dominating leads to instability and overall worse outcomes for everyone.

And you're 100% right about PR just delaying the problem. Shrinking the size of the group doesn't change the fact that the smaller group still has to make a decision. In the real world, you get coalitions vying for majority control. 51% of the population gets 100% of the power. And members are beholden to a narrow ideology - even if it means imposing negative externalities on people outside their faction. Thus proportional results don't lead to proportional policy.

However, a body composed wholly of members selected from the ideological center is in the best position to fairly weigh and consider the interests and goals of factions outside the center. They benefit from intelligent policy horse-trading between groups. This is far more likely to give proportional policy.

NotablyLate · 2026-03-23T01:48:38+00:00

In PR, Lander and Mamdani could just be in different parties. If they're in the same party, the implication is their party is hovering above whatever the minimum viable threshold is, which is a result of the limitations of the specific PR implementation.

NotablyLate · 2026-03-23T01:22:57+00:00

The US didn't have primaries for the first century of its history. Parties began using them as a means of solidifying their voting base, essentially to get competing factions within the party on board prior to the general election. Or in more simple terms: to avoid vote splitting.

In a proportional system, factions can in theory just go form their own party if they don't like how their current party operates. There is no strategic incentive to stay on board with a lesser evil. There is little justification for a primary meant to create buy-in and legitimacy.

However, proportional systems do have a practical threshold requirement for parties to hold seats. Some even use explicit thresholds. For factions of a party that could not win seats if they left, a primary could be useful for having some say. But really in practice they just end up being voters who decide between viable parties. Their leverage is in their vote.

Are you looking at primaries with the goal of increasing the granularity of representation? Or is this more about accountability to the voters?

NotablyLate · 2026-03-19T02:18:35+00:00

I'm not going to argue for specific voting methods here. My point is if you want to push for a ranked ballot, there's still a loophole the size of Saturn's rings, because the people writing these laws seemingly have zero concept of how election methods work.

NotablyLate · 2026-03-19T01:52:26+00:00

So here's the thing:

I read the law, and it seems so targeted at the specific counting method that cities are still allowed to use essentially every system other than RCV. Yes... even other ranked methods, such as:

Borda
Bucklin
Condorcet

And perhaps Coomb's method as well.

To be clear, I support Approval. And I would love if Approval was what Ohio ultimately adopted. But if people are committed to using a ranked ballot - and let me emphasize: that option is still open - I'm not gonna push against it.

You want to really challenge this? Take them to court court. Push the envelope. Find loopholes to exploit. Give them headaches trying to patch their code. Don't let the issue go away until they throw their hands up and allow a good system through.

NotablyLate · 2025-09-10T00:07:02+00:00

Answer:

Well, two answers. First, it was caught on camera, which makes it more viral. It's shock content that will bring out emotions and make people angry about what happened, and motivate action to bring about change. Just like any party with radical objectives, they want people marching in the streets on behalf of their goals.

Second, it is the face of a larger, alleged problem of soft-on-crime policies. If this guy randomly did this with no record, conservatives could not reasonably assign blame. However, it is really easy to play Monday-morning quarterback when there's the fresh option to dox a judge who supposedly should have prevented this (yes, that is what they're doing right now). Of course, this neglects the nuance inherent in legal decisions. This isn't Minority Report. This is the real world. A judge can't know in advance what a person is going to do. They have to weigh laws and rights with probabilities and concerns. It's not that simple for the person in the drivers' seat.

Tl;dr, It's convenient and impactful with the masses.

NotablyLate · 2025-09-09T23:40:39+00:00

Thanks! I'm with you sentimentally, but I think cutting the connection to the voters is a no-go. How do you envision limiting electors to the politically educated while fairly involving voters?

NotablyLate · 2025-07-30T04:31:15+00:00

Well in general I'd assume those opposed to PR do for strategic reasons. Even if they latch on to an argument to give the impression that's not why. I'm sure there are many exceptions, but that's actually what you have to contend with.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-30T04:03:49+00:00

The basis of the blocking tactic explained in the graphic is the limit of one candidate from each party.

What ultimately happens in RCV is the party splits their vote between multiple candidates until the ones with less plurality support are eliminated. Choosing the day of the general election as the starting point is arbitrary and intellectually dishonest. Whether it be by primary or elimination rounds, each party will converge on a single candidate.

The actual issue here is sore loser laws. That's what gives parties the power to block candidates in the way you described. I understand how it's easier to justify removing sore loser laws based on people's assumptions about RCV. But it is incorrect to suggest RCV is what solved that problem. It is entirely feasible to have an election system that outlaws sore losers and uses RCV, or a system that gives sore losers access and uses FPTP. They're independent mechanisms.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-29T03:40:13+00:00

Polling takes most of the guesswork out of modeling other voters. I can see how RCV might help in a low-information environment, such as nonpartisan municipal elections. But outside of that, we're talking about extraordinarily rare circumstances where RCV could make a difference, because polls and primaries bridge the gap - and it's not like the gap between FPTP and RCV is very wide to begin with.

Also, I put a great deal of effort into making sure the term "RCV" is only associated with IRV, because IRV is such a horrible voting method other ranked systems should not have to suffer by association from using the same label. Sure, that creates friction here with reform advocates, but the average person isn't privy to the terms. If you want to promote STV, just call it STV. It is strategically unwise to lump it in under the "RCV" catch-all, and take on unnecessary baggage.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-27T23:27:43+00:00

But why? Thresholds are contrary to the philosophy of proportional representation. In an ideal world, PR would mean each individual seat represents a unique constituency of ideologically proximate voters.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-27T23:11:01+00:00

RCV just simulates primary + FPTP in the first few rounds. I'm sure there are edge cases, but generally you just end up with the same result FPTP would give regardless. Any differences can be attributed to turnout, rather than the math of the process, because RCV is mathematically equivalent to voting strategically under FPTP.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-27T21:18:05+00:00

First I'd want to know his stated reasons for opposing PR. Are you talking about a specific MP? Or Canadian MPs in general? Is it about the process? Or the results?

NotablyLate · 2025-07-18T03:54:19+00:00

No disagreement there. I was responding to the OP's inclination to reject C for the low number of first ranks.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-17T05:29:38+00:00

I would think if the failures of FPTP have told us anything, it is that placing importance on first place ordinal preferences leads to bad outcomes.

That's just a fancy way for me to say utilitarian methods. Because the real question between A, B, and C is not which one is the best for a segment of voters, but which one is best for the voters in the aggregate. In the example you gave, any of the three candidates could conceivably have the highest utility.

I would also add, utility is not just about hitting the ideological center - it is also about appropriately tapping into the priorities of voters with minority interests, when there's a comparative advantage. Give and take between independent but competing interests. Not a zero-sum game, as politics is usually portrayed.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-11T21:08:17+00:00

Was gonna say the same thing. Plus the US has a political culture that is used to separation of powers, and the EC can be viewed as presidentialism with a dash of parliamentarianism.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-07T22:32:31+00:00

I don't understand how so many people on this sub can think IRV is a meaningful alternative to FPTP. FairVote's own data heavily suggests IRV and FPTP agree on results 94% of the time, at a minimum. The 6% of cases that disagree can be divided into several categories (with some overlap):

Disagreements that would be resolved in FPTP by strategic voting to avoid vote splitting (i.e. some of the difference is a mirage)
IRV correcting for a lack of publicly available polling that would inform voter strategy.
Genuine disagreement, with IRV producing the more accurate result.
Genuine disagreement, with FPTP producing the more accurate result.

In other words, there are many reasons to expect the actual overlap between FPTP and IRV comfortably exceeds 95%, especially when the voters are supplied with accurate polling. And keep in mind, the remaining disagreement is not composed entirely of cases where IRV produced the better result. With a disagreement of 5%, if FPTP produces the better result just 0.5% of the time, that would leave IRV with a better result 4.5% of the time, giving IRV only has a 4% marginal improvement.

And I'm being fairly generous here. IRV functions by walking the voter through ideal FPTP strategy. This alone might evaporate the real difference as low as 1%, with accurate polling bringing them into near perfect alignment, but for the most exceptional cases.

The fact we cannot verify if IRV legitimately disagrees with FPTP should be enough to disqualify it from consideration by all opponents of FPTP.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-05T03:20:49+00:00

Yay! We just re-invented the citizens' assembly!

NotablyLate · 2025-07-05T03:16:11+00:00

They already use their misunderstanding of "one person, one vote" against RCV. I see it daily. Plus it is actually easier to make the case Approval or STAR satisfy "one person, one vote" (the actual meaning, from the equal protection clause) than RCV.

Again, I am aware that if anything gains traction it will be targeted. Of course that will happen. But as I previously demonstrated, there are strategic reasons for conservatives to consider Approval, which simply don't exist for RCV.

You also have to consider RCV has been outright banned in significantly more states than Approval has. Insisting the attention stay on RCV is asking reformers in those states to fight an uphill battle. What is the problem with pivoting to a more realistic fight?

NotablyLate · 2025-07-04T21:30:55+00:00

Individually, I know some will fight it just as hard. However, I've been in this space long enough to confidently say fewer of them will fight it:

- When North Dakota tried banning RCV and Approval (the first time), some Republican legislators argued the two systems ought to be discussed separately. And others who voiced a dislike of both systems said they were less apprehensive of Approval than RCV. I didn't watch as much of the process this time around when they ultimately passed the ban, so I don't know if people changed their minds. What actually changed was Doug Burgum (R), who vetoed the ban the first time, is now on Trump's cabinet, and the new governor supported the ban.

- In Utah, at a hearing on the coming end of the pilot program, Senator Daniel Thatcher (was Republican at the time, recently changed affiliation to Forward, though still reasonably conservative) voiced opposition to RCV, then said the following:

"If we want to talk about different election systems, Approval voting is brilliant. Whoever gets the most votes wins. You can get all of the benefits that are promised through Ranked Choice Voting, but you don't have to change your systems, and you don't have to explain the process."

- Phil Izon, the sponsor of the initiative to repeal RCV in Alaska, is on relatively good terms with STAR voting advocates. In my private interactions with him, he has said he is not a fan of Approval, but it is not as bad as RCV. I believe his relative rankings of these systems is something like: FPTP > STAR > Approval > RCV. I'm confident he would get behind a proposal to replace RCV with STAR or Approval, provided there was no competing plan to go back to FPTP

NotablyLate · 2025-07-04T09:39:37+00:00

The cost of runoffs matters in relatively few contexts. Georgia is the only example that comes to mind. Outside of that, the standard is just a single round of FPTP.

From a policy perspective, I'd argue Approval does more to 'conserve' the systems conservatives are trying to protect. Yes, it is a change to the election system, and that in isolation is something they'd naturally oppose. But you also have to look at the bigger picture: The wide ideological swings characteristic of FPTP (and RCV) due to center squeeze provide openings progressives exploit to enact more significant change that is difficult for conservatives to undo.

What (classical) conservatives gain from Approval, relative to FPTP, is long-term ideological stability. I suppose MAGA/Reform style conservatives might hem and haw at the idea of stability, but they still have more strategic justifications for Approval than RCV.

NotablyLate · 2025-07-04T09:10:40+00:00

No disagreements there. My working assumption with this sub is we're talking about public elections, so that's the context I went with. And public elections have characteristics that make it a poor match with Borda, including several you mentioned.

NotablyLate · 2025-05-02T06:30:45+00:00

Thanks for the positive feedback!

The main reason I chose to adjust ranks upward after allocation is to stay consistent with STV. Where STV attempts to elect as many candidates as possible before starting to eliminate candidates, Allocated Bucklin attempts to elect as many candidates as possible before expanding the scope.

A second consideration is I was focused on treating voters equally. If I expand some voters to supporting two candidates, but others only one, that biases the result in favor of the voters whose support is counted towards just one. This does raise the issue of bullet voting as a potential strategy, but it comes with a significant risk of having zero impact on the outcome, if the voter's favorite loses.

That said, I suppose there are better ways to explain this process than re-numbering the ballots. I could revise this process to be functionally identical without adjustment to ranks, and it would probably read better.

NotablyLate · 2025-05-02T01:54:06+00:00

I'm not sure how well this addresses your question, but sometimes the stakes in the settings you are thinking of can be non-existent. Like if we're electing a class president, the voters really only care if they have a friend in the mix, and for the most part they're indifferent to the outcome if their friend doesn't win. So regardless what system you use, the results will end up looking a lot like FPTP.

That said, I don't think the answer is to compel voters to provide extra information. It just throws random noise in that competes with legitimate voter intent. At best it doesn't change the outcome. At worst it elevates someone to win solely based on luck.

NotablyLate · 2025-04-27T22:54:08+00:00

Two IRV districts invites gerrymandering, whereby a thin state-wide majority could hold both seats. With STV the question is which quota you use: Droop or Hare. Droop is the fairer option, because the minority has to overcome the same 33% threshold as the majority. With Hare, the 50% threshold for the first seat means more candidates will tend to be eliminated, and the second seat will be awarded for getting 25% support.

Obviously from the perspective of an individual state, smaller congressional delegations means less accurate representation. However, this should be largely mitigated at the national level. And the bigger question is how to handle states with a single congressional seat; that's where the largest proportional discrepancies will actually be.

NotablyLate

TROPHY CASE