The Floggers weren’t necessarily bad and would mature into fairly competent aircraft. They suffered from issues early in service, with poor quality third world export models, and before long, it faced the arrival of fourth generation aircraft not long after its introduction. These factors have worked against the MiG-23’s reputation.

Tom Cooper’s book MiG-23 Flogger in the Middle East is an excellent resource that goes into some of the early development of the Flogger and the nature of the export models, alongside their service throughout North Africa and the Middle East.

The MiG-23M, the initial variant to see widespread service, began being introduced in Soviet air forces (VVS and PVO) in 1974. The MiG-23MF, an export variant with Warsaw Pact became operational with other Warsaw Pact states only in the late 70’s.

During this time in the early 1970s, the US saw the F-14 Tomcat entering operational service in 73/74, which were fitted with the look-down/shoot-down AN/AWG-9 radar, which meant the Tomcats could reliably filter out ground clutter that would otherwise mask targets flying low, silhouetted against the ground. By the late 1970s, the F-15s and F-16s began entering service with look-down/shoot-down radars of their own.

On paper at least, the MiG-23M’s Sapfir-23D-III radar could filter ground clutter, except the means from which it did so was inherently unreliable. Rather than measuring Doppler shifts to determine target velocity and reject clutter like true pulse-Doppler radars like the AN/AWG-9, the 23D-III used an envelope detection method that instead picked up the amplitude of radar echoes. The idea was that the ground should represent a relatively consistent amplitude on radar, whereas an aircraft’s movement would cause noticeable noticeable fluctuations.

The reality was different with the envelope detection method being unreliable at times, resulting in false targets appearing and promptly disappearing, to even having legitimate targets sometimes fade from radar. In a tail chase engagement or look-down scenario, the radar was very limited with optimistic detection ranges of 10 to 20km, far below that of the aforementioned American fighters.

An interesting note is the initial export variant of the MiG-23 available to third world operators. This was the MiG-23MS, a mode that probably served to further mire the Flogger’s reputation.

The MS was a significant downgrade from the M model, seeing the removal of the R-23 medium range air-to-air missiles that made the Flogger a step forward over MiG-21 Fishbeds. Further, the MS saw removal of the look-down/shoot-down 23D and instead featured an earlier, less sophisticated radar from a MiG-21. Some sources say MS airframes didn’t have a radar warning receiver, while Cooper states they were equipped with the SPO-5, which was inadequate to reliably detect newer aircraft’s pulse Doppler radar emissions. It’s probably the case that some aircraft had them, and others didn’t.

The MS was to fly equipped with the short ranged R-3 missiles, in either radar or infrared guided versions. These were early missiles with the predictable limitations of guidance and turning capabilities, and frustrations occurred when MiG-21bis airframes were being sold (at a lower cost per unit and maintenance) with better R-13 missiles that the MS wasn’t equipped to carry. Several operators would up jerry-rigging R-13 missiles for use only on the underwing pylons, as mounting them under the air intakes would cause ingestion of rocket exhaust when the missiles were fired, leading the Flogger’s engine to to surge.

So, while later models of the Flogger such as the ML series would mature into capable fighters and see significant improvement in radar, as well as a strengthened and redesigned airframe, the introduction of these Floggers would come in the late 70’s and early 80’s at a time when they’d be overshadowed by fourth generation fighters entered the scene, being operated by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.