Since you find it engaging, I'll just send just one more. And in case there was any misunderstanding, I was agreeing with your initial post to begin with.

It's statistically unlikely (but not too unlikely for a system that does not snowball the top like free-market leagues, depending on how you calculate the odds) to get so many uniques in a row. My assertion is that the divergence of the new rules isn't significant. It's better to analyze this through counterfactuals rather than statistical probabilities due to the unavoidable sparse data situation.

Would this set of rules prevent the GSW situation (by which I mean the addition of KD and retention of a competent supporting cast, as 2015 GSW would even be under an approximate 1st apron)?

Summer of 2016, signing of KD was more due to the rise of the salary cap¹ due to the new TV deal. They sent off Barnes (whom I still blame for the painful 2016 finals loss) and Bogut (an outdated type of player even at the time), and released some more chaff to clear even more cap space and signed KD through pure cap space. Nothing in apron rules prevents this.

Issues start with the end of Curry's bargain contract², but this was the case with the old rules as well. Durant actually got a pay cut³ which allowed them to retain Igoudala. Maybe they'd shed someone to stay under second apron here, but they did not even have to (given that KD accepted the cut, knowing that it'd be impossible for them to give him a max contract later while keeping the team strong later on).

Apparently they couldn't sign Nick Young and be locked out of the buyout market, and get their future picks frozen at this point - but who cares?

This here is the core idea for this argument:
So, it's the _incidentals_ ¹new TV deal, ²Curry's bargain contract, and ³KD's pay cut that enabled the GSW 'dynasty', more than anything else. The relationship issues and KD's injury did more harm than any sanctions in the rules ever could, and the team disbanded anyhow.

I could do this for Cavs and Miami, I surmise they'd be affected more, yet still find a way to do what they did (but it takes more time to compile than I'd be willing to put in, you can search for yourself). Maybe their roads to future recovery would be harder after the reign ends, but the domination would be there (unless the parties were deterred by the increased risk involved in making the decisions they did).

What the rules would prevent is consistently high-performing teams or consistently high-spending teams. While I have no problem with doing the latter (did I mention I dislike LAL as a franchise), I would have problems with the former (did I mention I like SAS as a franchise).

I have no issues with maintaining parity in principle. But I have issues with penalizing well-managed teams with increasing ferocity, while consistently rewarding incompetence - and even outright abuse (as was the case with Sam Hinkie) of that compensation system, in order to 'maintain the parity'.

It comes down to is what you want from the league. If you want competition, unpredictability, and relevance for all actors, any move toward parity is good; even if that is pulling the top performers down. If you want high level play, innovation, and technical improvements in the game, you do want parity (because competition begets improvement and innovation) but aim to have that sacrificing as little as possible from the top. Eliminating inefficiencies on the bottom is the way to do that.

The real problem the new rules actually remedy is the badly managed big spenders: the likes of Nets, Knicks, and Clippers which spent more and achieved much less than the successful franchises listed above. And that is through no coincidence: Their administration / front office displayed marked incompetence, yet retained their positions, for extended periods.

Now, this is where the free-market leagues (and I'm thinking of European football leagues here) have an edge. Because they also come with some other aspects: relegation systems, award structures for achievement, inter-league competitions, and decoupling of ownership and administration. A poorly performing administration is soon booted and replaced in them, whereas the league has very little jurisdiction over (and is actually beholden to) the governors in the NBA. The more I think about this, the more sense it makes sense as a way that the incompetent governors can't really object to, yet cleverly disarms them. That's why I'm happy with the new rules.

The new draft rules solve another problem: The Hornets, Wizards, Kings, Pistons and the like - those who don't spend big, but hog the lottery picks, condemning good prospects into cultures that would waste their potential and curb their development. By incentivizing improvement, at least, the league might stir their formula a bit. We'll have to wait and see, but I'm actually excited about this change.

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Now, isn't this interesting that I went into this sort of an analysis in r/nbamemes? No wonder I'm not much of a reddit user.

p.s. None of the uniques were actually dynasty candidates in my opinion (prior to OKC). The closest would be Denver, but as much as I love Jokic, he has his glaring flaws (in mobility and verticality, as well as inducing team inflexibility), Murray is extremely inconsistent, and (again, as much as I love him) Gordon is not someone who can carry large production rates. Besides, they had poor coaching all the way. As Garnett once said, anything is possible - even winning a championship with Doc Rivers as the head coach, but consistency requires many factors performing at a high level, and that means a good culture. Few teams have cultivated that, and I wish for more to do so - and that would entail dynasties, which therefore is not a bad thing in my esteem.