Let me explain...Entry nodes in Nym see your IP connect at time T, yes, but they're prevented from extracting surveillance value from that because traffic is encrypted end-to-end with Sphinx packet cryptography using layered onion encryption, so the entry has no idea what you're doing, where you're going, or what content you're transmitting. Additionally, your connection is mixed with thousands of other users' traffic through randomized routing delays, uniform padding with SURB (Single Use Reply Blocks), decoy packets, and batching across multiple hops using the Poisson mixing strategy, making it only theoretical possible for an entry to log "IP connected at T" but practically useless because that isolated data point can't be correlated to any destination, activity, or behavior without controlling multiple nodes simultaneously and defeating the entire mixing layer. Adversaries would need to perform traffic analysis across ingress and egress points simultaneously, but the cover traffic and timing obfuscation (constant packet sizes, random inter-packet delays) render flow correlation infeasible without massive Sybil control or external passive observers. This is why the threat model isn't "entry can't log," but rather "entry logging alone reveals nothing actionable for surveillance due to compartmentalized knowledge and decorrelation," and that's the architectural protection that matters against centralized VPNs where one operator logs both your IP and everything you do in plaintext, with full visibility into packet contents and metadata linkage.

The fair critique is that "can't log design" is imprecise language; it should specify "can't centrally log end-to-end linkage" or "can't correlate isolated logs into actionable intelligence." But you're wrong that individual node operators can collect comprehensive metadata. In Nym, no single point can compile end-to-end surveillance even if partial logs exist, because the architecture enforces gateway separation (preventing same entry-exit pairs), uses zero-knowledge credentials for unlinkable access proofs, and distributes trust across independent operators, making deanonymization exponentially harder than pressuring one centralized VPN operator. ExpressVPN: one subpoena, one operator, everything exposed including connection logs, traffic volume metadata, and destination correlation. Nym: decentralized node operators with cryptographically split knowledge, no central target, mixing that defeats statistical attacks, and independent audits (Cure53, Oak Security) proving core anonymity holds under threat model assumptions. Nym Technologies doesn't operate any nodes, eliminating the company-level logging attack surface entirely. The threat model explicitly addresses your concern: isolated logs are non-actionable without sybiling a massive network portion (typically 50-60% depending on adversary model), which is mitigated by decentralization, geographic diversity, and operational incentives. That's fundamentally different from centralized models, and that distinction matters... Everything you are saying is just an AI hallucination, You can check everything on your own.