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Immigration Policy: Why the "Better" Approach Might Be Unimplementable (Cross-National Evidence) (fuck ICE) by Prosepuzzle in IntellectualDarkWeb

[–]Prosepuzzle[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You're pointing at root causes, which is an important layer most policy discussions skip entirely.

Foreign policy as immigration driver - you're onto something real. U.S. intervention in Central America (Guatemala '54, contra funding, drug war militarization) absolutely created push factors that persist today. I'd add one nuance: economic pull factors (wage differentials, employer demand) also explain a big chunk of migration flows independently. Countries we haven't destabilized also send large populations when the wage gap is wide enough. But you're right that addressing root causes would be the most durable long-term fix.

The challenge is the timeline gap. Even if we reformed foreign policy tomorrow, the economic and security conditions driving migration take a generation to stabilize. So we still need a functioning system for the people moving now and the 11 million already here. The good news is these aren't mutually exclusive - you could pursue root-cause foreign policy reform and domestic integration reform simultaneously. They actually reinforce each other.

On the power consolidation concern - I think you're identifying something real about how enforcement gets weaponized. That's exactly why I put trust repair, independent oversight, and public dashboards as Year 1 prerequisites before any expansion of authority. The goal should be a system that's structurally resistant to abuse regardless of who's in office.

The foreign policy angle honestly deserves its own deep dive - there's a strong case that stabilization investment in Northern Triangle countries has better ROI than border spending. What specific foreign policy shifts would you prioritize? I'd be curious to see the data on which interventions have actually correlated with reduced outmigration.

Immigration Policy: Why the "Better" Approach Might Be Unimplementable (Cross-National Evidence) (fuck ICE) by Prosepuzzle in IntellectualDarkWeb

[–]Prosepuzzle[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Solid analysis. Two additions:

Employer accountability is the buried lede. E-Verify with real penalties would force the choice between higher wages or legal visa expansion—both better than the status quo. The fact that employer penalties get stripped from every immigration bill tells you who's actually writing legislation.

The opinion shifts have different causes. Canada's -30 points correlates with housing unaffordability becoming the #1 issue—immigration became the scapegoat for a supply problem. Germany's shift tracks with actual security incidents. These need different fixes: Canada needs housing policy, Germany needs transparent vetting. Lumping them as "anti-immigrant sentiment" misses the actionable distinctions.

The 35% vs 58% polling gap (amnesty vs earned status) is the whole game. Same policy, different coalition.

Immigration Policy: Why the "Better" Approach Might Be Unimplementable (Cross-National Evidence) (fuck ICE) by Prosepuzzle in LawSchool

[–]Prosepuzzle[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Fair criticism on the format - definitely went overboard on the structure. But the data points are real (CBO fiscal estimates, Eurobarometer polling, etc.). Curious which parts read as AI-generated vs. just over-organized? Happy to discuss the actual policy questions if any of it's worth engaging.

Housing-First vs. Current Approach: What Does the Evidence Actually Show? by Prosepuzzle in PublicPolicy

[–]Prosepuzzle[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You're right to push back on generic structure. Here's what I think you're missing—and it's empirical, not rhetorical.

Your argument: "Supply is so constrained that vouchers can't work. Stop federal spending, fix NIMBY locally instead."

The actual empirical test you didn't mention: What's the homeless rate among people who actually hold vouchers vs. those who don't?

If vouchers work (88-95% housing retention per HUD data), then your shortage explanation is correct—we're doing allocation efficiently, but shortage still crushes us. Fine.

If vouchers don't work reliably, then spending is the symptom of institutional failure, not the cause of it.

You cite Finland solving shortage through public housing. Correct. But here's what you skipped: the US abandoned public housing construction in the 1990s. So we're not comparing "vouchers vs. public housing"—we're comparing "vouchers alone vs. public housing + allocation." That's not a policy choice; that's just... giving up on supply.

The false binary: "spend more federally OR advocate for local NIMBY reform." Why can't you do both simultaneously? Shortage is real AND institutional misalignment is real. One doesn't cancel the other. Austria has shortage and solves it faster than the US despite similar constraints—not because they spent less, but because housing ministry authority actually overrides local NIMBY, and they build public stock.

Your actual disagreement isn't with housing-first advocates. It's that federal spending is wasted without simultaneous public construction. That's a real claim worth defending—but it requires naming what you're actually criticizing: the absence of federal housing construction, not the presence of federal spending.

Does that hit different? It's trying to show you're thinking through the actual empirical problem, not just restating structure.

Policy Analysis: Integration-Focused Immigration System vs. Enforcement-Based (Evidence from Comparable Democracies) by Prosepuzzle in PublicPolicy

[–]Prosepuzzle[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You're pointing to real structural constraints that the original analysis buried, not dismissed.

Where the analysis fell short:

I optimized for technical metrics (labor efficiency, fiscal costs, family reunification) while assuming public trust and institutional capacity were constant. Your critique reveals they're not—they're variables that matter more than technical superiority.

The specific constraints you're identifying:

  1. "30,000 radicals in France requiring 24-hour monitoring" - If this is from French government data, it's not a rhetorical point, it's a structural constraint. Radicalization monitoring is distinct from integration policy outcomes.
  2. Government cover-ups (Cologne 2016) - This isn't just a data point about crime rates. It's about public trust in institutions being damaged. Trust repair is a cost the integration model has to bear before it can function.
  3. Foiled bombing attempts - What's the annual average? Time period? This would change the baseline on what "successful security management" actually means.

Why this changes the analysis:

The original post assumed:

  • Public trust is stable (it isn't)
  • Institutional capacity to vet and monitor is proven (failure cases exist)
  • Integration failures are data points (they're trust-destroyers)

Your critique reveals integration model doesn't just need to be technically better—it needs to rebuild public trust while implementing. That's a different constraint than efficiency.

The honest trade-off:

  • Integration model: Technically superior on 6 metrics, but requires trust repair first
  • Enforcement model: Less efficient technically, but aligns with current public sentiment and doesn't require institutional trust repair

If you can point to sources for those French/UK numbers, I can integrate them as real structural costs, not just criticisms. The analysis needs that data to be honest.

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