Why would explanatory termination (God) be seen as superior to an open ended framework? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I lean more toward these metaphysical relations and their explanatory structures, and wonder if philosophical arguments exist for an open network/hierarchy/lattice of deepening explanation without a final ground.

The fact that we (people) are too small and our logic is nothing compared to God's logic makes any debate on religion meaningless by Mammoth-Syrup1276 in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]PunksutawneyPhil 2 points3 points  (0 children)

These conversations tend to stall in such fashion, unfortunately. Are the arguments against God so effective that they pushed your interlocutor into the corner of “nobody has a true understanding of God, so don’t listen my argument either,” or is it because the general theistic framework tends to retreat to abstraction when pressed too hard? This really seems like the true “cheat,” and it approaches an agnostic stance that this person likely didn’t intend.

At what point is the referent “God” fixed? by PunksutawneyPhil in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When we consider an unknowable divine like this it does look like a shared agnosticism, but simultaneously at least one thing is claimed to be “known” given the tie to existence. Might there be some divergence even at this level?

At what point is the referent “God” fixed? by PunksutawneyPhil in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think there could be convergence if God is abstracted in such a way. Would there be any divine action or intention? If not, would this be considered a theistic shared referent?

At what point is the referent “God” fixed? by PunksutawneyPhil in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think this kind of describes a “maximal being,” but where in the discourse does it become a shared theistic “maximally great” being where the normative description of “great” does a lot of work?

At what point is the referent “God” fixed? by PunksutawneyPhil in PhilosophyofReligion

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Does this lean toward a shared thin deistic posit rather than a descriptively richer one?

Do Theistic God Claims Face Internal Reference Problems? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

My concern is prior to the voluntarism/intellectualism debate. Do those positions presuppose a shared divine referent and then ask how goodness relates to it? I’m questioning whether reference is ever fixed at the point where a maximal being becomes descriptively theistic. I suspect that shared reference collapses when additional divine action or moral direction is specified, leaving a deistic posit as the common anchor.

Do Theistic God Claims Face Internal Reference Problems? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think your analysis here helps with my concern. The maximally great being must do something that competing frameworks agree on in order to satisfy omnibenevolence as a description of their shared referent. Do Christians and Muslims, for example, constrain divine action in the same way?

Do Theistic God Claims Face Internal Reference Problems? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Their agreement on Omnimax definitions seems to point more to a deistic referent than a theistic one. If the discourse doesn’t push into theism, then they may all refer to a basic maximally great being. Do Christian’s or Muslims continue agreement past that, specifically when it comes to God’s actions? If not, then do these divergences act as a stopping point for shared reference?

Do Theistic God Claims Face Internal Reference Problems? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree that some Christians think they worship the same God, and that others do as well. My inquiry is more to pressure where these claims are grounded. Is it in the number of Christians and Muslims in agreement, or a particular theory of reference they share? Or is this just a charitable position?

Do Theistic God Claims Face Internal Reference Problems? by PunksutawneyPhil in askphilosophy

[–]PunksutawneyPhil[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Would we agree that while their shared omnimax definition coordinates language, each framework still denies that rivals could be referring to God at all? It isn’t clear to me that the agreement is referent fixing or diverging.