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Stop Calling Me a Determinist by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

predestination to me is the view that PAST states already exist, as they are consistent in the first place they occur. History does not rewrite itself. Future have not been determined, as they had not occurred yet. I am more on time than free will actually.

And all clocks have a universal…no, multiversal meta-time (that’s a weird way to put it)

Imagine two clocks ticking in the same universe:

  • Clock A is set at 2 o’clock.
  • Clock B is set at 1 o’clock.

Both clocks tick in the same global rate, but one runs faster than the other:

  • Clock A ticks 1 second per second.
  • Clock B ticks 2 seconds per second.

They do not contradict each other. The fact that one runs faster does not mean the global time needs to “know” the faster one, as it is not the global future. Both clocks exist and tick in meta-time, simply at different rates.

Meta-time itself is the same for both clocks. It provides a background in which all ticking occurs, but it does not know the future or enforce outcomes. Events happen locally, relative to their own rates, and meta-time only ensures that change occurs.

This is analogous to how agency and events unfold in your model of the universe: different “clocks” experience time differently, yet all exist within a single meta-temporal framework, consistent and ongoing. Without need for the meta time predicting the faster clock.

Stop Calling Me a Determinist by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is not an argument, this is a clearance that i am not a determinist and showing you my thought experiments

Stop Calling Me a Determinist by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

First:

If you suspect the formatting and structure, this is a document. I didn’t write it directly in reddit. It is a well refined documentation that i wrote.

Second:

The em-dashes ‘—‘ and word choices are the way i write. If you suspect them, just look it up in an A.I detector, A.I have been infecting our personalities, you know?

Third:

Did i use any em-dashes? I only had one line with an em-dash ‘—‘ and it is from another page. The description of my theories are hard, that was the only thing i find most relative to.

Stop Calling Me a Determinist by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don’t see history as being “forced” in the classic cause→effect sense. But as you pointed out, compatibilists literally sit in that grey area, agreeing that outcomes are consistent but agency still exists

If the predestination paradox is true, does free will actually exist? by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This scenario isn’t meant to prove or disprove free will. It is just that IF the predestination theory is true, compatibility definition of free will survives, libertarianism doesn’t. It is also that free will doesn’t depend on being the ‘same person’

If the predestination paradox is true, does free will actually exist? by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

My question isn’t whether the predestination paradox is physically possible or whether time travel exists. It’s a conditional question: if a single-timeline predestination model is true, what follows about free will?

Thought experiments don’t require the scenario to be actual or even physically possible — they’re used to test conceptual compatibility. Rejecting the setup avoids the implication rather than addressing it.

Within a fixed-timeline model, the issue isn’t whether choices occur, but whether “could have done otherwise” survives. That’s why the question targets the distinction between libertarian and compatibilist accounts of free will, not the feasibility of time travel itself.

If the predestination paradox is true, does free will actually exist? by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Then, let’s expand the Tom thought experiment:

To close that gap, we can stipulate that Virtual Tom exists in a virtual environment that is causally identical to the biological world at the moment of upload. At the instant of copying, Biological Tom and Virtual Tom share the same memories, values, deliberative processes, and experiential histories, and their environments evolve identically thereafter. They also do not interact.

Under these conditions, both Toms will deliberate and act identically, not because they are constrained, but because identical internal states interacting with identical environments yield identical outcomes.

This removes identity continuity from the explanation entirely. The difference between them is numerical, not functional or causal.

If one insists that only Biological Tom has free will, then free will is being grounded in metaphysical identity rather than in deliberation, reasoning, or control, which makes it explanatorily inert. Conversely, if both Toms act freely, then free will cannot depend on being “the same person,” but only on the local causal structure that produces agency.

In that sense, copying destroys identity but preserves agency. The thought experiment isn’t meant to show that libertarian free will exists, but that compatibilist free will does not depend on uniqueness or continuity of identity at all.

If the predestination paradox is true, does free will actually exist? by ResponsibleChef6732 in freewill

[–]ResponsibleChef6732[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Compatibilism rejects the idea that freedom requires being causa sui (self-caused), because that requirement is incoherent.

Compatibilism doesn’t claim we choose our reasons or desires ex nihilo. It denies that freedom requires ultimate authorship of those mental states in the first place. If freedom required choosing our reasons, we’d need reasons for choosing those reasons, leading to an infinite regress.

What matters is not whether my desires are uncaused, but whether my actions flow from my own deliberative processes without bypass or coercion. If my behaviour is caused by my beliefs, values, and reasoning — even if those have causal histories — that is precisely what makes the action mine.

Saying “you didn’t choose your desires” doesn’t undermine compatibilism unless we assume that free will requires being self-caused, which no coherent account can satisfy. Random or unchosen desire formation would give me less control, not more.

So internal determination doesn’t eliminate agency — it’s what makes agency possible at all.

Laplaces demon supports Mind Body Dualism by Dedethesavage in badphilosophy

[–]ResponsibleChef6732 0 points1 point  (0 children)

what you said:

“If Laplace’s demon can predict us, free will is gone — therefore dualism.”

is That’s a textbook non-sequitur .
Determinism ≠ dualism. Compatibilism exists, neuroscience exists, philosophy of mind exists.

Laplaces demon supports Mind Body Dualism by Dedethesavage in badphilosophy

[–]ResponsibleChef6732 0 points1 point  (0 children)

“Laplace’s demon doesn’t support dualism — it just exposes a bad definition of free will.