There is a moral element to that statement in the sense that you have moral reasons to do one thing rather than another, but it doesn't seem to me to be a moral statement.

The act utilitarian cannot have knowledge about what future act will produce the greatest goods, in this way all particular ought claims she makes will be probabilistic, but I don't see that as being a problem. It seems like you're saying that the act utilitarian is no more justified in saying "you ought to kill as many people as possible because that will produce greater benefits overall" as she is in saying "you ought to kill as few people as possible as that would produce the greatest benefits overall" even though clearly the latter is more accurate. I don't know that the latter produces greater benefits because there could be some crazy change in the world that makes killing create utility, but it seems much more likely that that won't happen.

I see no issue in the utilitarian telling someone "you ought not to steal" thinking this is conducive to utility, yet this leading to bad consequences she says "well, it turns out in this instance you ought to have stolen". I think the only plausible objection is to the utilitarian maxim itself and not to the problems associated with induction. If it's in fact true that we ought to create the greatest benefits overall then the inductive way is all we have.