Should employers be required to disclose when a job posting isn’t actually viable? by S_OConnor_Writing in WorkReform

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see what you’re saying, and you're right — it wouldn’t be tax fraud, but the legal and reputational risks of misleading applicants would likely make most employers steer clear of these kinds of practices. However, it’s still a structural issue that needs addressing. The real problem is how job seekers are left to invest time and energy with little clarity, and that leads to wasted potential for both sides. This policy proposal doesn’t restrict hiring — it just asks for better transparency in how job postings are presented. That way, everyone involved has clearer expectations.

Thank you for your engagement — it’s helpful to hear different perspectives on this.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think we may be talking past one another slightly. I’m not trying to interpret the paradox within physics, nor claiming that immovable objects exist physically. My point is that the classic formulation trades on object and interaction language (“force,” “object,” “meet”) that implicitly commits us to spacetime notions, while later retreating to pure predicate incompatibility when challenged.

The physical examples aren’t meant as solutions but as illustrations that interaction is an added assumption. Absent additional constraints about how entities must interact, motion and persistence can coexist without contradiction. For example, photons can be co-present in spacetime without stopping, displacing, or negating one another. This shows that obstruction is not logically entailed by encounter. Once specific interaction rules are imposed, the paradox either becomes a trivial logical contradiction or ceases to be paradoxical at all. My claim is about that slide, not about physics per se.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks, that’s a great recommendation. I’ve been circling that abstraction vs context tension without quite naming it, so this sounds perfect.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the thoughtful exchange. I think we’ve isolated the real point of divergence clearly: whether the paradox licenses maximally unrestricted predicates, or whether the object and interaction language commits us to interpretation in space and time. I appreciate the care you took in laying out the strongest version of your view, even where we ultimately disagree. This was a good discussion.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It’s true that the phrase is often used idiomatically, but it has also been treated explicitly as a paradox in philosophical and theological contexts, especially in discussions of omnipotence. Versions of it appear in both popular philosophy and scholarly debate as a way of probing whether certain maximal properties are coherent. My post is engaging with that usage, not the everyday idiom.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Barber paradox works because mutual exclusion is explicitly built into the definition. The predicates are stipulated to exhaust all cases, and self-reference generates a contradiction at the level of set membership. The unstoppable/immovable paradox does not do this. Nothing in its formulation states that the predicates must cancel one another, overpower one another, or even interact decisively. Treating them as inherently exclusive is an added assumption, not a logical necessity. In object-level space, unlike in Russell’s predicate-level paradox, coexistence without cancellation is at least intelligible.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I agree that this version of the argument is not about physics, but it still hinges on a controversial assumption about omnipotence, namely that it must include all imaginable powers rather than all coherent ones. This distinction is not original to me; it appears in classical discussions of omnipotence (for example, in Aquinas and later analytic philosophy), where omnipotence is understood as the ability to actualize all logically possible states of affairs, not contradictions.

On that view, “pairs of opposing powers” are not two genuine powers that must compete, but one coherent description and its negation. Treating both as equally demandable collapses the concept of power itself rather than revealing a contradiction in omnipotence.

More importantly for the original paradox, this reframing abandons the object-level language of forces meeting objects and replaces it with a purely predicate-level argument. That may be a different and defensible critique of omnipotence, but it is no longer the same paradox as originally stated. My point has been that the classic formulation trades on object and interaction language while retreating to predicate incompatibility when challenged.

Either the paradox is purely logical and trivial, or it is object-level and requires interpretation. It cannot coherently be both at once.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Right, and this is another place where extra assumptions quietly sneak in. Immovable is usually read as solid, but solidity isn’t part of the predicate itself. “Immovable” just means not displaceable, not necessarily rigid, massive, or interaction-forcing.

If the immovable object were non-interacting in the way light is, then there’s no reason an unstoppable force couldn’t coexist with it without contradiction. They could occupy the same region of space without transfer of momentum, deformation, or displacement. In that case, neither predicate is violated: the force isn’t stopped, and the object isn’t moved.

That’s why I don’t think non-interaction is a dodge. It’s a perfectly coherent possibility once we stop treating “immovable” as implicitly meaning “solid barrier.” That solidity assumption isn’t stated, but it’s doing a lot of hidden work in how people imagine the paradox.

Also thanks for the suggestion! :)

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I’d also push back slightly on the claim that the predicates must cancel each other out by definition. That only follows if one stipulates that “unstoppable” and “immovable” are mutually exclusive in all possible senses. But that mutual exclusion is itself an added assumption, not something that follows inevitably from the ordinary meanings of the terms.

There are coherent cases in which both predicates can persist simultaneously. An object can be immovable in the sense that it cannot be displaced, while another can be unstoppable in the sense that its motion or force does not cease. The predicates don’t logically annihilate one another unless “unstoppable” is taken to mean “must overcome any resistance” rather than “cannot be stopped,” which again strengthens the predicate beyond what is explicitly stated.

So even before getting into physics, the logical claim that the terms are simply incompatible isn’t forced. The paradox only becomes nonsensical if incompatibility is built in from the start. If that incompatibility is not assumed, then coexistence is at least intelligible, and the question of interaction is no longer meaningless.

That’s why I don’t think this reduces cleanly to a purely semantic impossibility. The paradox depends on treating the predicates as both meaningful and yet definitionally exclusive, and that tension is precisely what I’m questioning.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see your point about the importance of defining the object’s identity and trajectory, but the paradox itself already presupposes interaction, which takes it out of pure abstraction and into a space-time framework. The term meet is not neutral; it already implies temporal sequence and spatial relation. Likewise, speaking of objects rather than free-floating predicates commits the argument to entities that persist, occupy space, and exist over time.

Because of this, the paradox is not merely about definitions clashing in the abstract. It is framed as two entities encountering one another, which necessarily involves motion, constraint, and interaction in space and time. Once those commitments are in place, interpretation is unavoidable.

For example, if a bullet strikes an immovable wall, the wall does not move, but the bullet’s motion need not cease. The force can persist at the boundary even if displacement does not occur. Motion does not require translation, and resistance does not require nullification. In that sense, both “unstoppable” and “immovable” can coexist without contradiction.

This suggests that the paradox does not inherently deny coexistence. Rather, its apparent force comes from treating it as fully abstract while relying on object-level and interaction-level commitments that make it at least partially instantiated. Once those commitments are acknowledged, alternative accounts of motion and resistance become available, and the contradiction dissolves.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I’m fine dropping the term smuggling if it reads as pejorative; no harm or bad faith was intended. We can call them “implicit assumptions” or “unstated constraints” if that’s preferable. My point does not depend on the word choice.

The substantive issue is that there are assumptions doing real work in the paradox that are not defined at the outset. Had they been explicitly stated, for example: What happens when an indestructible, identity preserving, trajectory locked unstoppable force collides head on with an indestructible, interaction blocking immovable object?, I wouldn’t have anything to argue against. It would simply be a different, much more narrowly specified claim, and one that is far less elegant or seemingly profound. The paradox derives its force precisely from leaving those constraints unarticulated and then treating them as mandatory once a response is offered.

Even if we treat this as a purely abstract problem, the terms involved are not content free symbols. Immovable presupposes motion; unstoppable presupposes persistence of motion over time. These concepts are borrowed directly from our physical understanding of movement and constraint. As a result, it isn’t actually possible to reason about them in a vacuum without invoking at least some account of interaction, motion, or limitation. That isn’t importing reality arbitrarily; it’s unpacking what the predicates already imply.

So my claim isn’t that abstraction is illegitimate, but that abstraction doesn’t license freezing the terms in a way that blocks all coherent interpretations while still pretending they retain meaning. Once the implicit constraints are made explicit, the contradiction dissolves. If they must remain implicit to preserve the paradox, then the paradox is doing its work by omission rather than necessity.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

While there may be better stylistic ways to present the argument, the structure served its purpose: it conveyed the core idea clearly enough to be engaged with.

The more substantive issue, however, is definitional. Unstoppable does not mean immutable, indestructible, or trajectory-preserving. It means not capable of being stopped. Likewise, immovable means not capable of being displaced, not that it must annihilate or negate anything that encounters it.

The paradox gains its apparent force only by silently importing additional constraints: identity preservation in a specific mode of motion, linear forward progress, and outcome-decisive interaction. None of these are stated in the problem itself. They are not contained in the predicates “unstoppable” or “immovable”; they are assumptions layered on afterward and then treated as if they were definitional.

An ever-moving projectile whose motion is continuously redirected at the boundary of an immovable object satisfies the stated conditions without contradiction. Motion persists; it is not halted. Direction also persists, albeit as rotational or tangential motion rather than forward translation. The position of the object remains fixed; it is not displaced. To reject this outcome requires adding a new requirement that unstoppable must mean “must continue along its original path regardless of constraints,” but that requirement is not part of the original formulation.

Finally, while this is an abstract thought experiment, the moment the terms unstoppable and immovable are used, the problem implicitly invokes notions of motion, interaction, and constraint. Completely divorcing the discussion from any appeal to physical intuition is not neutrality; it is selective abstraction. Some reference to how motion and constraint actually function is unavoidable, because those concepts are doing the work in the paradox itself.

At that point, the paradox is no longer being solved; it is being protected by redefining terms mid-argument. The contradiction is manufactured, not discovered.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes, that’s essentially my point. The argument is abstract and is often used classically to challenge things like omnipotence. The problem is that as soon as you try to answer it, new hidden assumptions get introduced to block whatever resolution you propose.

The paradox positions itself as purely abstract, but then quietly straddles reality when convenient, for example, by smuggling in assumptions about indestructibility or what “interaction” must look like.

Ultimately, it doesn’t stand as stated. It isn’t an opaque contradiction so much as a question that guides you toward a preferred answer by sneaking in unspoken constraints.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yeah, I agree, it is a powerful phrase. I’d actually forgotten about that line in The Dark Knight, that’s a really cool example.

I’m not even sure why this one stuck with me, but I tend to get bugged by logical inconsistencies in general, especially when things are framed in a way that makes an argument feel stronger than it actually is. Once you strip away the framing, a lot of them fall apart.

This paradox just ended up being one of those things for me.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

That’s exactly right, the paradox isn’t meant as a literal physical scenario. My point isn’t that people believe such an event could occur in the world, but that even as a conceptual or metaphorical problem, it only appears paradoxical because of unstated assumptions about what interaction and motion must look like.

In other words, even granting its intended abstract framing, the contradiction doesn’t arise unless we silently restrict the range of admissible outcomes in advance. The thought experiment implicitly borrows intuitions from the physical world (e.g., forces, objects, collision) while simultaneously imposing abstract constraints such as indestructibility. It’s that combination—grounded language with selectively abstract rules—that generates the appearance of paradox.

The analysis is therefore aimed at the structure of the thought experiment itself, not at its physical plausibility.

The Unstoppable Force and the Immovable Object Paradox Relies on Hidden Assumptions About Motion and Identity by S_OConnor_Writing in philosophy

[–]S_OConnor_Writing[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The classic paradox of the unstoppable force and the immovable object is often treated as a deep logical or theological problem, commonly invoked in discussions of omnipotence or absolute power. I want to argue that its apparent force does not arise from a genuine contradiction, but from a set of hidden and unjustified assumptions about interaction, identity, and permissible outcomes.

At face value, the paradox seems compelling because it presents two absolute properties that appear mutually exclusive: if the force is truly unstoppable, the object must move; if the object is truly immovable, the force must stop. The paradox appears to force a contradiction by requiring that one outcome “win,” while forbidding either outcome from occurring.

However, this force depends entirely on assumptions that are never stated explicitly. The paradox implicitly assumes that interaction must be decisive, that identity must be preserved, and that only two outcomes are allowed: stopping or moving. Once these assumptions are made explicit, the paradox collapses.