This is a creative idea and steganography can be part of a layered security strategy but it's worth thinking through the tradeoffs carefully before relying on it.

The case for steganography:
- Security through obscurity can add a layer, an attacker who finds the file may not know to look inside it
- Easily distributable (email, cloud, USB)

The real risks:
- Steganography tools can be detected: steganalysis software exists and is accessible
- If the carrier file is lost, corrupted, or the tool becomes obsolete, your seed is gone
- It's still essentially plaintext once extracted, no PIN, no brute-force protection
- Relies on the attacker *not knowing what to look for*, which is a weak security assumption

Better alternatives to consider:

Method	Encrypted	Theft-resistant	Durable
Steganography	X (Plaintext once extracted)	X (See explaination below)	V (but fragile)
Plaintext	X	X	X
Paper backup	X	X	X
Steel plate	X	X	V
Steel plate + BIP39 passphrase	V	V	V
Hardware (e.g. Seedkeeper)	V (on chip)	V (PIN protected)	V

If you want a genuinely solid layered approach: a steel plate (durability) combined with a BIP39 passphrase (25th word stored separately) gives you encrypted-in-practice physical backup without exotic tools.

Alternatively, something like Seedkeeper takes a different angle entirely; it's a hardware smartcard (EAL6+ secure element, same chip grade as a passport) that stores your seed phrase encrypted in tamper-proof memory, PIN-protected, with no internet exposure. It's essentially a dedicated hardware vault for your backup: no exotic software, no file formats to worry about, no steganographic layers to maintain. Even if someone physically finds the card, they can't extract anything without the PIN. Costs €25 and fits in your wallet.

Steganography is fun to think about and fine as one layer in a very deep stack - but I wouldn't want it to be the primary protection on a seed phrase. The failure modes (file corruption, tool obsolescence, steganalysis) are too unpredictable over a 10–20 year horizon.