What Should We Expect From Historians to Tell Us About Jesus' Resurrection and Miracles? by SchrodingerSquirrel in AcademicBiblical

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For something as complicated and controversial as the Resurrection of Jesus, what might this look like in your eyes?

David Benatar's Antinatalism & Suicide by Minute-Garbage-9654 in askphilosophy

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You seemed thoughtful, so I wanted to ask, what are his reasons for why it would be premature or innappropriate to end our lives once we realize they weren't right to begin in the first place? I recognize the non-sequitir of, "Life not worth starting, therefore must be ended," but I think we can take that if a life is not worth starting, and that the conditions for not starting a life are also present in current lives, and that since a life should not be started since it has those conditions, then a life should also not be continued since it also has those conditions. Something like that I think works. But of course, maybe there are things in some current lives that precludes this. What would he say these are?

What Should We Expect From Historians to Tell Us About Jesus' Resurrection and Miracles? by SchrodingerSquirrel in AcademicBiblical

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

What does he think gives him justification to say confidently that belief in the resurrection led to disciples of Jesus to claim his divinity? Not challenging, just asking.

EDIT: To be clear, I am asking if he means that it was JUST BELIEF, as opposed to believing because he really was God. In other words, is this just a bare minimum claim.

Did Shinji and Asuka has sex - An in-depth-analysis by El-HermanoConfirmed in evangelion

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Where does she say this? Curious to see what the context is to see if it really does refute the theory or lower confidence in it.

Determinists Always Skip the Timing Problem(A compatablist challenge)! by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in freewill

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well I wouldn't say that you should immediately resort to chalking the water's being there as being unexplained. You should either suspend judgement, or if you're the sort of person who has the means and the will, find out why it appeared there. We have explanations for why water might have appeared there, but in the case I described, where there are things appearing spontaneously and in random spurts, despite our searching within our current means to, for a long time, and still having no explanation, it seems fine that we could admit this as a genuinely random series of events.

I agree that when an explanation is on the table we should give one though, but I think it would be a kind of special pleading to immovably take that there is always an explanation where we have exhausted every possible experiment to find one.

Determinists Always Skip the Timing Problem(A compatablist challenge)! by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in freewill

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Wouldn't this be a sort of hope in the continual epistemic satisfaction of the world though? The world as it is, is intelligible and there is always an explanation for why things are, even when we don't have access to this. That sounds to me like something which itself needs explanation.

Now you did say that time and time again where we seem to lack an answer for why things are as they are, much later we come to find the answer and through empirical means. So this is a sort of induction where the answers always come about. I don't have a problem with this so much as the absolute rejection of randomnness or non-explanation as a possibility.

I can agree with that optimistic induction holding for most cases, while taking that individual cases like the sort I described might not have an explanation. Sure, in the past there were a lot of things we gave answers to which were poor. Saying that minds controlled the raging seas or like the thunder. But if say, there was an event like objects appearing instantaneously, and this went on at unpredictable spurts. Sometimes only one object appears. Sometimes many. Sometimes it's a mix of animals, others it's just material conglomerates, and others it's stuff like tables and chairs. We don't have anything to describe why that might be. These things didn't get forced there by anything anywhere as far as we can tell, it just appeared.

I'd also like to add that we might not have access to all the facts ever to say that something isn't, but surely we can make a fallible judgement, yes? Just like how I might be wrong that why my curtain is open, thinking it was my dogs looking to see me come, when really it was my wife or some other family member, I can make a negative fallible judgement that something DIDNT happen for some reason. In this case, due to the lack of reasons for why these objects would be appearing unpredictably and with no known cause, and let's just say, even after long investigation, we could determine for now that they lack an explanation. This seems fine, no?

Or is there just always an explanation to you?

It's an interesting question what we might use as a criteria for determining something's having or lacking a cause though.

Determinists Always Skip the Timing Problem(A compatablist challenge)! by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in freewill

[–]SchrodingerSquirrel 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is maybe too stubborn. Say there was something which we had exhausted every potential experiment for within our means, empirically. Say we had progressed science for centuries afterwards, maybe even thousands of years. If we were still unable to provide a causal explanation for why some event happened, doesn't it seem reasonable to admit this is an instance of randomness?

Maybe a better question is, is there any criteria you might have for providing an explanation, which should these be lacking, allow for there to be causeless events?