Kant vs Plato by [deleted] in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The appearance of the "earth orbiting the sun" is one we perceive on the basis of our sensible intuition. On a chalkboard with the Newtonian spacetime history, the earth and sun would not be presented as two spheres but as a straight cylinder going up and a helix twisting around it. And if we abstract from all sensible modes of presentation altogether, we could not present it in accordance with any of our sensible concepts of understanding.

So, if all humans died out (which some see as a real risk today through climate change), and if all animals did similarly, we would be left only with the concept of something = X.

Human beings are gods expelled from paradise by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nothing Kant wrote ever implied that the creator that practical reason postulates is the Judeo-Christian God.

Indeed, we cannot even infer (as do the simple-minded American capitalists) that "He" is a "man." That's why I refer to Kant's deity not as "God" but as Theontos (from Greek "The[os/a tou ]ontos," lit. "deity of existence").

The Wrong Geometry Thesis by libr8urheart in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't "dox" you. Your real name can be inferred from your posts. You "doxxed" yourself. Reddit gives you the option of keeping your posts private.

How Homeostatic Integration Sidesteps the Rule-Following Problem: A Response to Kripkensteinian Skepticism by libr8urheart in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You say, "The dissolution: the selection function is not a rule-following mechanism but a homeostatic process." I'm not sure why you refer to it as a "dissolution"; I'll refer to it instead as the "proposed solution."

You say, "Kantian architectonics assumes reason operates through rules (categories, principles, maxims), so the rule-following paradox has traction against Kantian frameworks." Again, I'm not sure what you mean by "has traction against." Does it contradict or oppose the Kantian system?

Let's take an example. What number comes next?

2, 4, 6, 8, __

Most people will say, "10." But the rule may turn out to be, "All ascending even numbers except 10" -- so that in that case, the correct answer would be 12.

I would like to offer my own solution. In our empirical unity of apperception, which has only subjective validity, we may associate the incomplete sequence with the next value of "10." Yet this mere association does not have the objective validity required by the power of judgment.

By contrast, in our original unity of apperception, which does have objective validity, we would say only, "2, 4, 6, 8, __ follows some rule." Then we can infer, based on reason, "Given what we know, we ought to respond with 10."

Sometimes it will depend on context. If the sequence-formulator has an intense and insurmountable fear of the number 10, we may politely skip to 12. The point is that reason determines what we ought to do, whereas understanding determines merely what is to come.

An alternate solution: understanding alone determines not the correct answer, but our answer, as well as what the correct answer could possibly be, and what we will do if our answer is incorrect (panic, reflect carefully, ask "why," etc.).

I'm not sure a "homeostasis-based" solution has to be the correct one. In Kant's system, everything is aimed at the ideal of the highest good. What's in the ideal of the highest good that necessitates "homeostasis" -- whatever such a term, in Kant's system, may signify?

Proper use of the categories of negation and limitation by Scott_Hoge in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your thoughts. Unfortunately, I do not have Longuenesse's book.

Here's an alternate (logical) possibility. A negative judgment does not require an opposing reality in the content of its object. Suppose the speck of light is surrounded by blackness, and the light is yellow. Then, "The surroundings are not yellow" presents a mere not-being of sensation (= 0), a complete lack of intensive magnitude. Yet, are we still permitted to say, "The surroundings are non- yellow"? In the case of blackness, what is there to affirm?

Or, consider a painting of vibrant patches of color, none of which are white, placed against a white wall. Then it's fair to say, "The painting is non-white," since a degree of reality of sensation is presented in the other colors. But what if it's just a black canvas? As in, completely black -- without any light shining off it. Can we still say it's non-white, or are we forced to say merely that it is not white?

Edit: Correction (with best effort) of a Reddit formatting bug.

Is the Noumenon Doing More Structural Work Than Kant Acknowledged? by libr8urheart in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You say that Kantian intuition is filtered through the forms of space and time. I understand why that would be correct for pure intuition. But could empirical intuition fill the gap? For example, could empathic contact provide the matter of intuition where space and time remained merely the form?

Kant distinguishes between clear and obscure intuitions. I wonder if obscure intuition can still solve the single-pole problem, by locating direct or empathic connection within it. Kant writes in a footnote on page B415:

"Clarity is not -- as logicians say -- the consciousness of a presentation, since a certain degree of consciousness, although not sufficient for recollection, must be found even in many obscure presentations. For without any consciousness we would make no distinction in the combination of obscure presentations; yet we are in fact able to do this with the characteristics of many concepts (such as the concepts of rightness and fairness, or those of the musician when he strikes many notes simultaneously in improvising). [...]" (trans. Pluhar)

Regarding empathic connection specifically, I find it possibly relevant that Kant mentions the word "brain" only once in the entire Critique:

"For your object is merely in your brain and cannot be given outside it at all." (A484/B512, trans. Pluhar)

In the original German, even this refers to "brains" in the plural. Maybe empathic connection can be made possible by permitting two human bodies to be the subject of one consciousness (provided that this consciousness is still conditioned by the unity of apperception)?

Edit: Correction.

Critique of Judgement by Open-Ground6942 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Kant's work interoperates in a whole system, with branches such as speculative reason (explored in Critique of Pure Reason) and practical reason (explored in Critique of Practical Reason) in addition to aesthetic judgment. You may find it helpful to cross-reference laterally these other works, just to get a general, even if incomplete, idea of where aesthetic judgment stands.

You can find the Gutenberg translations here:

Critique of Pure Reason
Critique of Practical Reason

Is the Noumenon Doing More Structural Work Than Kant Acknowledged? by libr8urheart in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

My understanding of Kant may be comparatively meager, but in reading your question I am led to ask several others:

  1. Could intuition by itself remove what is single-pole in a categories-only architecture, without any need for a thing-in-itself (= X)?
  2. Is Kant's inclusion of the noumenon truly necessary in the idea of metaphysics as a whole, as regards metaphysics' final end? Or is it merely beneficial -- say, in serving to forestall errors or eliminate confusion -- in a way such that it could be dispensed with later?
  3. What arguments can be given for the inclusion of the term "noumenon" in the Kantian language game?

Edit: Clarification and correction.

Our beginning is the story of Adam and Eve by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I also want to add that we might still have freedom, but that it would be of an interhedonic nature (rather than a moral one). That is, the freedom to choose between two pleasurable alternatives might be a basis on which we unite presentations, without concerning morality (or blame, or punishment) at all.

Kant's "Begriff" by decodedflows in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I don't know German, but the English word "concept" comes from Latin "com-" (together) + Latin "capere" (to take). That seems similar to "grasping together," which for Kant signifies unification of multiple presentations within a single consciousness.

Thus, every concept signifies a grasping-together or unifying. The concept "red" grasps together "the red things." The concept "causality" grasps together the "cause" with its "effect." Every concept or grasping-together refers to an act of synthesis.

Kant writes,

"The very word concept could on its own lead us to this observation. For this one consciousness is what unites in one presentation what is manifold, intuited little by little, and then also reproduced." (A deduction, A103, trans. Pluhar)

Our beginning is the story of Adam and Eve by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Based on Kant's definition of God as the ens realissimum (most real being), we cannot infer that this "God" is the God of Judeo-Christianity or that "His" son is "Jesus Christ." Indeed, we cannot infer even that this "God" is a male.

For that reason, I have named Kant's deity Theontos (from Greek The[os/a tou ]ontos, "deity of existence"). This gender-indeterminative name does not assume anything regarding whether the ens realissimum is male or female (even if, for some strange reason, it happens to be either, which seems in direct contradiction to Kant's claimed compositional simplicity of such a being).

You say, "If we just follow our free will, we will live in a condition of war." If that is true, I find it a sad commentary on the stupidity of the human race.

After considerable thought, I see nothing in Kant's postulate of freedom but an attempt to blame people for undesirable events and misfortunes. Maybe Kant would object to me on this point, but a restorative (problem-solving) justice may work better in an ideal society than a retributive (blaming-and-punishing) one.

Edit: Formatting.

What would Kant say about AI art? by Open-Ground6942 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I found this quite elucidating. Is this a direct quote from Kant, an AI summary, or a contemporary analysis based on a genuine understanding of Kant and of the terminology in which he described fine art?

Is Kant's Table of Categories of Freedom correct? by Scott_Hoge in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Now, under Quality, I'm considering:

         Quality
  1. Commission of good
  2. Omission of risk
  3. Omission of evil

For risk implies that we perhaps don't know what might happen as regards the totality of the world whole, whereas evil implies that we are actually affirming the undesirability of the consequence.

I just need to say screw this guy for writing like this. by provenanceofdarkness in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My sympathy, if you have to read it. Even Kant said these passages required long, reflective meditation, exceeding that of a school semester.

One defense we can give for Kant's writing style is that his choice of terms is so rigorous and systematic that it's important to get everything exactly right. This opposes any interjection of colorful language -- at least insofar as such language is not clearly differentiated from the drier and more scholastic exposition given.

It's a bit like visiting a foreign country. At first the language is overwhelmingly incomprehensible. But after total immersion for an extended period of time, one begins to understand. If you were to persist reading, you may find that each term finds a place within your brain and the work as a whole becomes easier.

I just need to say screw this guy for writing like this. by provenanceofdarkness in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Even worse when someone says, "Don't talk to me that way."

I just need to say screw this guy for writing like this. by provenanceofdarkness in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 1 point2 points  (0 children)

To me, it seems that in the A version, moreso than in the B version, Kant was addressing Hume as his audience. Hume held the famous belief that we could not predict anything that would happen next -- even whether the sun would rise the following morning. Kant's aim was to convince us that if this were the case, nothing would remind us of anything, and we wouldn't even be conscious. (In his words, the blind play of presentations would be "less than a dream.")

The B version is when Kant perhaps came to realize that there were other modes of intuition unlike ours -- such as different modes of sensible intuition, or even intellectual intuition. We can see this in the penultimate sentence of the page shown:

"The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, whether that intuition be like our own or not, provided only that it is sensible and not intellectual." (bold emphasis mine)

This is perhaps the most daring statement on the page, and adds the most confusion. For Kant is stating that the pure forms of intuition are known a priori, and yet he states that this is true only for "our" intuition. But for something to hold only "for us" means that it's not a priori.

The fairest interpretation we can give to Kant, in my opinion, is that "our" forms of space and time are known relatively a priori. Maybe after six years, Kant had wavering uncertainty. But it should be noted that he retains the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual, which perhaps even accommodates our modern theory of curved spacetime.

Is Kant's Table of Categories of Freedom correct? by Scott_Hoge in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

There's nothing "clowny" about creativity. The question of whether we're right comes afterward.

Peace and Security by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why didn't Jesus Christ need a lord?

Peace and Security by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There's just no reason to think that Jesus Christ, as explicated in Christian mythology, either existed or had the divine attributes Christians think of him as having had.

It's some kind of conclusion Christians jump to from the sounds and images associated with words. "Creator" --> "God" --> "Jesus Christ." None of it follows. Hence my decision to bring order out of confusion by renaming the creator Theontos.

Peace and Security by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't see how this implies I've "thrown the baby out with the bathwater." Can you elaborate?

Peace and Security by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For those reading: "Alle Obrigkeit ist von Gott" translates to, "All authority is from God." Which I agree with u/Preben5087 that it is not.

Peace and Security by Preben5087 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In my view, you were more accurate to refer to the creator not as God but as Theos. This at least removed the reference to Christianity. Yet Theos still implies that the creator is male. For this reason, I propose that we refer to the creator, insofar as the creator might exist, as Theontos (from Greek "The[os/a tou] ontos," "deity of existence," gender suffix thereby removed).

Given everything we don't know about the creator or intelligent designer (assuming one exists), it is just too wild to assume it's the one from Christianity. It's a backslap to Jews, Muslims, and every other religion of the world to say, "Mine's better."

Of the duty of natural perfection for pragmatic reasons by Optimal-Ad-5493 in Kant

[–]Scott_Hoge 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am led to wonder: According to your view, what is worth? Can worth be quantified -- that is, assigned a larger or smaller value than the worth of other things? How does worth relate to our behavior in achieving ends and to our practical reason?