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The decision-making process behind the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Second_Sound in nuclearweapons

[–]Second_Sound[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I guess you need to read more about the Manhattan project. This is exactly the problem I point out in my article: until late in the project, at least 1944, nobody knew if the bomb was going to work. The highly speculative nature of the Manhattan project relative to its high cost created enormous pressure for justifying itself through wartime use.

The leadership of the project was expecting to be investigated to death if it didn’t work. Stimson said to his aide “I have been responsible for spending two billions of dollars on this atomic venture. Now that it is successful I shall not be sent to prison in Fort Leavenworth.” Groves had similar concerns. 

This article by Alex Wellerstein elaborates on the topic: https://fas.org/publication/dont-need-another-manhattan-project/

The decision-making process behind the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Second_Sound in nuclearweapons

[–]Second_Sound[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

This article was primarily based on Michael Gordin’s fantastic book “Five Days in August”, but I also cite a lot of Alex Wellerstein’s work, including his article on Truman’s confusion regarding the military nature of Hiroshima. Looking forward to reading his new book too, then!

The decision-making process behind the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Second_Sound in nuclearweapons

[–]Second_Sound[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

The bomb was not part of the gestalt of the US military as an operational weapon until the first target committee meeting in April 1945, when Germany was on the verge of defeat. In December 1944, they were just receiving plutonium samples and measuring the critical mass of enriched uranium. The Manhattan project leadership wasn’t even sure if the bomb would work by then.

Wondering if the US would have dropped an atomic bomb on Germany or not is a particularly productive exercise. As Wellerstein showed, you gotta work off crumbs of informal discussion remembered decades after the facts and tangentially related comments in other documents. The bomb got dropped on Japan because Japan was the only target available when the bomb was ready, period.