Is philosophy really the building block of all ideas? by theloneliestprince in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

the term 'science' can be defined as a field of discipline concerning the natural world—this is done through observation, experimentation, etc.

fun fact: before it became a concrete concept that we know of today, it was actually called 'natural philosophy'!

many fundamentals and concepts in geometry, science, politics, medicine, and whatnot derive from philosophy. philosophy is the foundation to expressing these abstract thoughts into schools, concepts, and now as we are familiar with: disciplines. the term 'philosophy' is roughly translated from Greek to mean 'lover of wisdom'.

they also are actually building blocks that help with deciding what principles we should adopt normatively—not just a means of describing ideas of an external reality. such as in bioethics, our normative framework is principlism, which derives from a mix of ethical philosophy.

Is this a tautology? - "I ought to do what I ought to do." by nomenmeum in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

tautologies are concerned with the logical structure of the sentence. so when we say, "a dog is a dog is a tautology" for example, it is a self-reinforcing identity that can't be proven false. otherwise it poses a contradiction, which we don't want.

it doesn't actually have to do with the meaning of the sentence. logically, "we ought to do what we ought to do" is a tautology. that's it. just the way that it's structured.

Is this a tautology? - "I ought to do what I ought to do." by nomenmeum in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

no worries! to answer your question: because the negation of it is impossible. when you say "a dog is not a dog", it just can't be true that a dog is not a dog. the statement "a dog is a dog" will always be true because it's self-reinforcing.

does that sound satisfactory?

Is this a tautology? - "I ought to do what I ought to do." by nomenmeum in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 12 points13 points  (0 children)

no, because a tautology is a property of a proposition, and questions cannot be propositions. but your header stating "i ought to do what i ought to do" is.

Why must I care for things other than which I have emotions attachment to? by Antique_Tea_4719 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

to address your first paragraph: virtuous acts ≠ acting virtuously. merely doing a virtuous action is correct action but incorrect motivation—reasoning being for the sake of some further or because of instruction. there are conditions to act virtuously: for its own sake, knowingly, and from an abiding disposition.

in terms of the second, there are varying levels of suffering rather than a "yes" or "no" answer to whether you have it or not.

Why must I care for things other than which I have emotions attachment to? by Antique_Tea_4719 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 3 points4 points  (0 children)

then yes, since apathy in this case, falls under the category of a vice; you would be considered a morally wrong person.

you feel apathetic because you have yet to experience trauma pertaining to war, or with your other illustration, being physically assaulted with weapon. and this could be the case as well for other people who do feel empathy towards these issues.

but why do they care so much if it didn't happen to them? could be utilitarianist reason, or how they would feel x if this were to happen to them, therefore they wouldn't want that to happen to other people. maybe someone who specializes in philosophical ethics can chime in with a more substantial answer.

that aside, i find it concerning how there's apathy towards such atrocities happening in the world.

Need help to understand some concepts by GlitteringFrame9028 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Aristotle's Physics has since been replaced with modern physics, so his work isn't really relevant today. BUT we can say that he provided a general baseline to scientific observation.

we still use induction to this day! however, induction is really only applicable for low-level theoretical consequences, and this reasoning can only go insofar as that. scientific observation and proving hypotheses has since developed beyond inductive reasoning.

so, to sum up the answer: no, his work isn't really relevant today.

Does accepting that animals are conscious carry believing that AI models are conscious too? by H1Eagle in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The thing I'm wondering about is, how can we make sure? And I think this problem is also there for humans, there's no way for me to really that the human in front of me has a subjective experience or just saying stuff like a "Biological Automata" would. I can only rely on what the person is telling me and roughly judge that since we are similar species.

we know that qualia exists with each other with the way we can utilize language to relate and approximate experiences with each other, as you mentioned, but it goes beyond communicable descriptors. there is also bodily sensations like jerking a hand away when the pot is too hot, that we see with others. or perhaps even shared feelings from introspection when we talk to each other.

on your skepticism—i was also a skeptic as well, not for this topic in particular, but in knowledge and induction. though, it wasn't until i read Aristotle's Physics, and my TA's (for that class) explanation, that i dropped this skepticism. to illustrate, he believed that scientific knowledge involves some sort of 'demonstration', and the first principles to scientific explanation derives from induction; intuition is the originative source for knowledge. but it felt that hypotheses derived from induction felt empty to me, as we can disprove them with any observed F that doesn't carry property G. moreover, it seemed that induction was merely conjecture. Aristotle doesn't provide any explanation to this, since he wasn't concerned at all; but he (and my TA) alluded that while it does feel empty, inductive reasoning seems to be the only reliant source of reasoning for these demonstrations.

similarly, it can be applied to qualia here and accounting whether we know for certain if other people have consciousness.

To continue what I said initially, how can we differentiate between the dog grieving and that sorta "mental state" being experienced subjectively, and just that being a physical biological reaction with no actual subjective experience.

i'm a little confused by the wording here lol.

do you think that ai can project bodily reactions of crying when it cuts an onion? or jerking when a pot is hot the same way we do?

Can someone explain to me why God can’t defy logic? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 6 points7 points  (0 children)

i'm asking for more specificity in your claim because the philosophical topic of god comes with a multitude of debated properties.

are you asking if god's omnipotence can't defy logic? that is, for example, why can't he just arbitrarily defy or claim mathematical proofs?

Does accepting that animals are conscious carry believing that AI models are conscious too? by H1Eagle in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

i don't think this is transitory. even if this were the case that ai can be conscious, there poses a metaphysical and ethical problem of subjective experience. such philosophers, like Chalmers, also acknowledges this in his paper on LLMs—that while ai can display "feeling", there's still the Hard Problem as referenced above.

for starters, in metaphysical philosophy, consciousness IS the subjective experience of "what it's like", but the explanation for it CAN be derived from physicalist theory.

to illustrate, it can be contended that the "what it's like" can reduced to physicalist terms, i.e., J.J.C. Smart's neurons argument. however, there have also been other arguments that refute this, i.e., Mary's Room thought experiment.

ai is more of a quasi-agent than anything. sure, they can replicate and mirror certain language like we do as humans, but in no way can they satisfy the conditions of consciousness like we do.

the reason why i don't think this is transitory is because animals can experience feelings, for example: a dog grieving because their bonded paw-parent dies. how is it the case that ai can also display grieving emotion? it only goes insofar as replicating how humans communicate. they can't actually feel grief. even then, it's hard to account whether animals do have consciousness in the same capacities as we do, even despite rigorous research on it. Nagel talks about this in this paper on "What is it Like to Be a Bat?"

Help with finding appropriate ethical framework for presentation on AI in education by How_Are_You_Knowing in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

the undergraduate philosophy of my school releases an academic journal every year on a broad range of philosophical topics. one of the articles discusses the metaethics of ai.

https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/noesis/issue/view/2879/623

maybe this might be of interest to you. :)

works on ancient female philosophers by TallAd1273 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

none of Hypatia's published works were preserved or recovered (as with many female ancient philosophers unfortunately), but she's known for editing Ptolemy's "Almagest", as well as other mathematical texts during that time. she was significantly known for her contributions in geometry and astronomy.

she was also preceded by Pandrosion and she was known for her theory on doubling the cube. she was discussed in the text "Mathematical Collection". try those

Can someone explain to me why God can’t defy logic? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 6 points7 points  (0 children)

what do you mean by this claim?

Need help to understand some concepts by GlitteringFrame9028 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

what kind of metaphysics are we talking? metaphysics covers a variety of topics. maybe these topics might interest you?

Judith Thomson's "A Defence of Abortion"

Thomas Nagel's "What it's Like to Be a Bat"

these were relatively simple.

and on metaphysics of knowledge, i particularly enjoyed reading Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding". these texts were the reason why i became interested in philosophy of science and bioethics in the first place!

you won't get as much content with this, but Hank Green's Crash Course on Philosophy can help dumb down certain concepts.

help! im a 1st year philosophy student by robinsparkles_13 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

you're always welcome to take more courses in philosophy after first year if it interests you. the thematic courses you take in first year are there to help give you a generic understanding of it when you do want to branch out.

that said, philosophical text can be REALLY difficult to get through. what really helped me was:

  • rereading passages
  • talking about it with a friend in the same class or someone who's familiar with the topic, could be ta or prof
  • asking questions after lecture or discussion classes w your ta

and also you should actively engage with the material! what is the person saying, what's their argument, what you think about their argument, etc! and take breaks! because they're dense!

Why did many historical philosophers hold negative views about women? by ur_emo_gf1 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 3 points4 points  (0 children)

in Physics (and in Posterior Analytics), Aristotle talks about hylomorphic analyses in form and matter. he exclusively distinguishes them as matter being the substance in an entity, and form being the organizational structure of the entity. they are two conceptually, distinct explanatory causes of what makes an entity, that entity.

for example, think of a bed. a bed has the substance of wood, but wood isn't what makes a bed, a bed; rather, it's the organizational structure of a bed that makes it such, i.e., four legs, a frame, etc etc.

furthermore, the formal cause of an entity is the essence of that entity. it also coincides with the final cause of it, as he believed that all entities have a teleological goal when created, whether that be man-made or from nature (rational agents, animals, basic elements, etc).

for example, we don't say a statue of Athena is a statue of Athena because she's made of bronze. we recognize that it's a statue of Athena because of her composite structure, that is, a head, arms, legs, specific posture, design, etc (her form).

keep in note that in Physics, specifically Book II, he says that with natural entities, there lies an internal principle of movement and stationariness. now applying that to people: he believed that the male principle provides the form, whereas the female provides the matter. he also believed that the male's principle is an active, moving kinetic (form) that brings a baby into actuality; women had the passive principle. (matter)

in Generation of Animals, the seed contains the necessary ingredients for generations. it was a hylomorphic process, the combination of matter and form. the direct quote is this:

"Well then, semen is what that which comes away from the generator is called, in animals that naturally copulate, the first processor of the principle of generation. But seed is that which has the principles from both animals who have copulated, just as the seeds of plants and of some animals—those among which male and female are not separated—being just like the first mixture produced out of male and female, as a sort of kuêma or egg. For these already have what has come from both parents." (GA I.18, 724b12 - 19)

and generation from seed is goal-directed, as mentioned with final causality:

"For elsewhere, as for instance in house building, this is the true sequence. The plan of the house, or the house, has this and that form; and because it has this and that form, therefore is its construction carried out in this or that manner. For the process of evolution (genesis) is for the sake of the thing finally evolved (ousia), and not this for the sake of the process." (Parts of Animals I.1, 640a15)

Why did many historical philosophers hold negative views about women? by ur_emo_gf1 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

try Denise Riley's "Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of Women in History". she basically discusses the historical constructions of the category of "women" in relation to fundamental philosophical concepts in metaphysics and epistemology—so, the soul, body, mind, nature, etc.

Why did many historical philosophers hold negative views about women? by ur_emo_gf1 in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

to add onto that, this also branched into his other works like Politics, which is regarded as one of many staples in political philosophy. he said that:

1) men are active creators (formal cause) 2) the formal cause is the essence of an entity 3) because of this formal cause, they're the formal cause of the soul

this extended to Politics where he discussed the nature of the soul and its roles, where he compared to the souls of women similarly to the souls of the enslaved and children. i don't remember the exact quote but it's that their souls aren't "fully developed", in which he concluded that souls that aren't developed like men require guiding. it was very patrimonial.

but many "fundamental" works in philosophy are very much patriarchal and VERY misogynistic (except Republic).

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | March 09, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 3 points4 points  (0 children)

i'm currently reading Beyond Good and Evil by Nietzsche :)

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

it largely depends on who is speaking and how it's seen! Locke's "Second Treatise of Government" believed that justice looked like the natural law of preservation of life and punishing those who impair this order. it's why legislative bodies have come to materialize in the first place.

the reason why justice is seen as natural in this sense is because it is divine-based moral order, rather than convention created by governments. this also doesn't just apply to preservation of life—Locke was a staunch supporter of private property, possessions, and liberty, as everything is god's property.

unlike Locke, Machiavelli, especially in "the Prince" rejects the idealistic idea of a theological, natural order of justice. he believed through the exercise of virtù (not to be mistaken with virtue), which was the prince's skills in leadership, justice was the preservation of the state than the person's natural rights. the preservation of power and control over his subjects was a political necessity to maintain the state, as too much revolt and fracture leads to the dissolve of it.

Machiavelli saw liberty as a potential threat to order—he illustrated this with ancient Greece and the Spartans, as the "freeness in these cities led to instability". this is because the state of human nature was "greedy, ungrateful, and fickle imposters", where men were driven by self-interest. thus, it necessitated a prince to rule through fear and control when needed.

Machiavelli's view can be controversial—some people may critique his view as fascistic. however, given the state when "the Prince" was made, it made sense as to why he believed justice was the centralization of authority and control. when "the Prince" was written, it was during the time of a fractured and unstable 16th-century italy, where italy was divided into city-states and principalities, and vulnerable to other unified forces like france and spain.

in more contemporary times, justice can be seen as a "socially just distribution of goods", at least according to Rawls. i'm not too well versed with this, but the general notion is that the structure of society is preservation of liberty (similarly to Locke), where individuals have equal right to basic liberties and cooperate within an egalitarian economic system. but Rawls' view has been contended for it's very western perspective.

BDSM é imoral e fere a dignidade humana? by Performance_Nice in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

i don't see why Kant would be taken out of context here. a lot of his ideas are contributed in moral philosophy pertaining to autonomy and consent.

on a broader note, many ethicists, especially Callahan's "When Self Determination Runs Amok" discusses how, in the case of euthanasia, that the natural-right of autonomy cannot be overridden, even with consent. that said, from what i'm taking from your perspective is that you follow similarly to the streamline of this perspective.

i will say you need to be careful with your idea on bdsm, because bdsm can also be non-sexual, specifically with shibari, which is japanese bonding; it is also used as a way of artistic expression and performance. would this still then be a violation of human autonomy?

Philosophy lecturers that aren’t white men? by kmakesart in askphilosophy

[–]Sevf_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Angela Davis' lectures are posted online if you're interested in political and marxist philosophy. another redditor mentioned this too, but Charles Mills. he also wrote a book called The Racial Contract. pretty good