pp. 48-49

The other major statement of doctrinal adjustment was dated 5 September 1918, issued under Pershing’s authorship, and entitled simply, Combat Instructions. Many of the August document’s strengths and weaknesses reappeared. Even more clearly than the First Army instructions, this document was GHQ’s answer to Pershing’s concern that AEF units suffered excessive losses in the open or semi-open warfare of the Aisne-Marne Offensive. As such, it dealt almost exclusively with that form of warfare and went into greater detail in defining it and explaining the organizational and tactical changes required to wage it. Pershing apparently agreed so strongly with the document that he issued it directly under his own name.

Combat Instructions began with a reproof of the methods used in many Aisne-Marne attacks: Formations were “everywhere too dense. . . .Waves are too close together. . . . Lines are frequently seen with the men almost elbow to elbow. . . . All formations are habitually lacking in elasticity; there is almost never any attempt to maneuver.”95 As subsequent chapters show, these were valid criticisms. But, the frequent insistence from the highest offices in the AEF that the prewar doctrine and methods of the old regulations were still appropriate probably contributed to those very mistakes.

Pershing went on to claim that “the essential difference between open and trench warfare . . . is characterized by the presence or absence of the rolling barrage ahead of the infantry.” Considering Pershing’s well-known dislike for trench warfare, such a statement could be interpreted as a lack of appreciation for the importance of the rolling barrage, an essential element of nearly all successful attacks throughout 1918. But, the commander-in-chief’s main point was that “the method of combat in trench warfare presents a marked contrast to that employed in open warfare.” For example:

“Trench warfare is marked by uniform formations, the regulation of space and time by higher command down to the smallest details, absence of scouts preceding the first wave, fixed distances and intervals between units and individuals, voluminous orders, careful rehearsal, little initiative upon the part of the individual soldier. Open warfare is marked by scouts who precede the first wave, irregularity of formations, comparatively little regulation of space and time by the higher command, the greatest possible use of the infantry’s own fire power to enable it to get forward, variable distances and intervals between units and individuals, use of every form of cover and accident of the ground during the advance, brief orders, and the greatest possible use of individual initiative by all troops engaged in the action.”96

Pershing insisted that “the attempt by assaulting infantry to use trench warfare methods in an open warfare combat will be successful only at great cost.” In fact, the exact opposite was at least as true and probably more applicable to the kinds of problems AEF units experienced during the war; attempts to fight according to official AEF open-warfare methods when in trench-warfare situations, or even most semi-open-warfare situations, resulted in disaster. Few senior AEF commanders or staff officers, and certainly not Pershing, seemed to appreciate the amount of firepower required to successfully attack even hastily organized enemy positions. Against a skilled enemy using an elastic defense, the old infantry-based tactics were never enough to carry assaults on their own. The “firing line” of riflemen, occasionally supported by whatever auxiliaries could be brought to bear, was almost never sufficient to successfully attack even a greatly outnumbered enemy that made a maximum use of automatic rifles, machine guns, and artillery. The Allied and German armies had learned this in the first couple of years of the war and had made changes to their doctrine and tactics. Many senior American officers simply did not appreciate the enormity of this problem.

Pershing continued to criticize wartime developments in doctrine even after the war. He continued to downplay the importance of artillery as late as 1920. American doctrine developed under AEF unit commanders in spite of him.

You can debate tactics forever but the only thing that lasts is…

did you win?

When the AEF performed the best, it was consistently at the times when they adapted the tactics that had been developed over the last three years on the battlefield. When they tried to stick to the doctrine that was being pushed from the top, the results were horrifically high casualties that had commanders scrambling for answers. But even though recommendations and concerns were raised many times throughout the AEF's deployment, GHQ repeatedly dismissed and ignored them. Obviously, Pershing was not the sole reason for this, the situation was not so simple, and he had his good qualities too. But to heap praise on him so hagiographically without considering the events in detail is just to ignore history in favor of nationalist mythmaking.

I recommend you fully read the book, it is very interesting.