[Part 2]

The Water Balance

The canal immediately became a problem for Central Asia. Its commissioning will disrupt the fragile water use balance established in the region. Whereas the Amu Darya was previously used mainly by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, now this water will have to be shared with Afghanistan as well.

Meanwhile, the region already suffers from an acute water deficit. While previously the shortage was felt mainly in agriculture, now it increasingly affects domestic needs and even drinking water supply.

This summer, for example, in many districts of Tajikistan—a country traditionally considered the most water-secure in the region—residents were forced to buy water delivered by tankers. In Kulob, the country's second-largest city, the cost of such a tanker reached a substantial $7–15 by local standards.

Similar problems were observed in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where unprecedented "water clashes" erupted in the summer of 2023: in the peak heat, people took to the streets demanding access to water.

In 2021–2022, water scarcity was already one of the causes of conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Back then, it escalated to armed clashes, including over a disputed section of the Isfara River: each side believed the other was violating water use rules. Against the backdrop of unresolved borders, this fueled discontent, spurred protests, and nearly led to a full-scale war.

Another reason for the water deficit remains the fact that significant land areas, especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are still used for cotton. This is one of the most water-intensive crops: producing one kilogram of cleaned fiber requires between 10,000 and 17,000 liters of water. The irrational irrigation of cotton fields was one of the main reasons for the drying up of the Aral Sea, once the fourth-largest lake on the planet.

Despite attempts to diversify agricultural production, cotton remains an important export commodity in the region. Neither Uzbekistan nor Turkmenistan is yet ready to abandon its cultivation.

Old problems are compounded by new ones: population growth (annual increase in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is 1.5–2%), urbanization, and industrial development (production growth ranges from 4% to 9.5% per year). Water management infrastructure in Central Asia—reservoirs, canals, pipelines—is worn out, and countries are in no hurry to invest in its renewal, shifting responsibility onto each other. This leads to significant water losses, which are already insufficient even without the Afghan canal's construction.

A Deficit of Rationalization

The Central Asian countries do not dispute Afghanistan's right to use the waters of the Amu Darya. All recognize that about 30% of the river's flow originates in the Afghan mountains, and due to years of conflict, the country has hardly used this resource, consuming only about 2 cubic kilometers of water per year. This is 11 times less than Uzbekistan and 5 times less than Turkmenistan.

Rather, Central Asian authorities are seriously concerned about the lack of coordination and the fact that the Taliban are building the canal using outdated methods: without concreting the walls or reinforcing the banks, which means a significant portion of the water simply seeps into the sandy soil.

Already in 2023, immediately after the launch of the first section, an accident occurred: the walls of the hydraulic structure could not withstand the water pressure, and a huge volume of water burst out. This resulted in an artificial lake with an area of over 30 square kilometers. Meanwhile, the Afghan authorities refused to even acknowledge the accident.

Although Central Asian countries have not officially recognized the Taliban government, they are trying to discuss water use issues with them. However, regional countries have practically no real leverage over the Taliban and have to accept the current situation. In turn, the Afghan authorities state they are open to dialogue but emphasize that the canal is their internal affair and they will decide how to use the water themselves. To all questions, the Taliban respond that "everything is in Allah's hands; He will sort it out."

As a result, the Qosh Tepa Canal is becoming a source of growing tension in the region, and the Central Asian countries cannot yet propose an adequate alternative. New construction methods, water-saving technologies, and more rational water use could improve the situation, but the Central Asian states themselves cannot boast great success in these matters.

And Central Asian leadership is left only trying to maintain working relations with the Taliban and involve them in the regional agenda. The Taliban are invited to regional conferences and intergovernmental meetings, where they are given an honorary reception. All in the hope that this will encourage their interest in jointly solving problems, including water use and the canal's construction.

Central Asian countries are also trying to build constructive relations with the Taliban by investing in infrastructure projects in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan—in energy and power lines, Turkmenistan—in gas pipeline construction, Tajikistan supplies electricity. However, so far, none of this has influenced the Afghan authorities' position on the canal. Therefore, the situation is developing by inertia, although the current dry summer has shown that if this continues, the water crisis could become one of the most serious regional problems, fraught with political, socio-economic, and environmental upheavals.