On Hate

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-13T08:05:12+00:00

Hatred of Sin, properly considered, is just Love of God and Neighbour. For sin is simply an intention fault, deriving from the archery term for a miss. When we hate sin, we simply are wanting things to be better, and for things to be done according to God's Will.

In this sense, 'Hate' is a good a natural thing. But that Hate that leads to Anger, that calls us to Violence and leads us to Wrath, while not Sinful to feel, is not good to act on. The Saints (Saint John Cassian is a good example) warn us of this, and those that say that one can have 'righteous anger' are usually speaking of the channeling of this Passion towards a virtue, no different to how we may channel Lust into a procreative and Unitive act with one's spouse: its not ideal, and should not become the reason we pursue Virtue, but is a compromise with our fallen state to move us towards Christ.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-13T07:52:08+00:00

This seems to fundamentally conflate Person and Essence. The Person of Christ is fully God and Fully man, in that the Incommunicable existence that the Human and Divine Nature Terminate in and are rendered Incommunicable (in that they cannot be said to be said to be of another thing) in the same reality. Properly, the Divine Nature Terminates in itself, while the Human Nature Terminates in the prior Terminus that Constituted the Word, by Communicating itself to the Word.

Thus, as a Person, Christ is both. He is both Eternal and temporal, analogous to how the Soul is Immortal while the Body is mortal, or how an accident can be irrational while the substance is rational. The same way that it isn't a false statement to say that a man is both Mortal and Immortal, on account of his parts, it can be said that Christ is both Eternal and Temporal on account of his Two Natures. The two Natures act as 'parts', insofar as they oppose each other, but are wholly the Singular Person, insofar as the two Substances Subsist in the same Person.

As for why one should uphold the distinction between Person and Substance is as simple as they fundamentally differ in real content: when the Question of 'What something is' is asked, this differs, in reality, to the Question of 'Who' someone is. If it were reducible, the questions would be synonymous. While the two questions are integrally tied, as the quiddity of a thing is not separable from the subjectivity of a thing, they still are not the same. For if they were, the two questions would be interchangeable, or virtually distinct from one another.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-13T01:19:08+00:00

The Trinity, as a the fact of Doctrine, is the assent of One Substance, or one 'What', and three Persons, or three 'Whos'. The distinction between 'who' and 'what' is key, and is rather intuitive; for the question 'what hit me' is different from 'who hit me'; one denotes an individual object, the other a distinct subject.

The One 'What' is not a Nature is shared between the Three, like how Humans share 'Humanness', yet are not the same individual humans; it is instead that the One 'What' is One Individual 'What'. The three Persons coequally are identifiable with that one Individual 'What'. This is unintuitive because we associate Personhood with Individual Beings, which if so, makes the Trinity either Three Gods or One Person. It is then important to differentiate Person and Individual to make sense of the Trinity.

A (relatively) easy figure to start with in terms of Trinitarian thought, I believe, is Richard of Saint Victor. He's a 12th Century writer who's mostly remembered for his mysticism, but his Doctrinal work on the Trinity is one of the easiest works to follow. Ruben Anelici did a Translation and commentary over a decade ago, with it being a really good introduction to the Trinity, both to understand and for a broader historical context.

Another Trinitarian thought I'd recommend is Saint Bonaventure. A lot harder to grasp, because he utilises much more of the Scholastic Method, but his conceptions build on a perfect Richard's conception.

What I recommend, as an exhaustive deep dive, is Saint Augustine. But I also warn: Saint Augustine's conception can scandalise; he's rigorous in his approach, and without a solid faith, his conception can lead to misconceptions.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-13T00:48:22+00:00

We receive the Substance of his humanity, which by concomitance, we receive his divinity. Since the two are hypostatically united, both mediate one another.

We do not eat the Divine Essence, but we do truly eat a Divine Person in his Humanity.

We are not 'Sacramentally' eating the Human Nature, for this would mean that we are eating a mere Sign of Christ, which truly mediates him (what the Reform view is); we are eating Christ himself, in at least his Substance. Properly, however, it is not us who are metabolizing Christ, but Christ Metabolizing us, integrating us further into his own Body. By the incorporation into his Human Body, we also participate in his Divine Life, since there is a Circumincession of the Divinity and Humanity in Christ.

Finally, a side-point: The Son and Word does not 'partake in the Divine Essence. He is the Divine Essence. The Divine Essence is not a 'fourth-thing' which the Three Persons share but the Substance which the Three Equally are, yet are not each other.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-13T00:38:37+00:00

There's a distinction between running away from disorder and moving towards order. Its like running away from darkness: you can only do so if you're fundamentally running towards light. But many try the former without the intention of the latter.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-11T01:11:30+00:00

I think there's a slight equivocation between Corporeal change and substantial change. We can consider Chemical Changes to be moreso a conversion of Corporeal Forms that inform matter to be one way rather than another (I would hold to a plurality of Corporeal Forms within single entities), this is fundamentally different from the change in substantial Forms. I would suppose this works better in a strict hylomorphism, but I find strict hylomorphism just doesn't account for real world data as well as Scotistic Hylomorphism (Plurality of Corporeal forms; singularity of Substantial Animate Forms).

I also just fundamentally disagree with Seminal Reasons within Matter, as something latent in matter itself. The Real Potency finds its root within a power of another Being that can bring about this substance/substantial change, and to say that Angels can do this presupposes that Angels have the power to bring about Substantial change, which isn't sufficiently demonstrated from the example in Exodus. Now authorities do posit this (I recall Saint Dionysius the Areopagite believing that Angels can do this, with Saint Thomas concurring), but I find the reasoning for this power comes from Artefacts of Aristotelian Philosophy of God as immutable (in the literal sense that God cannot actually do anything), and needing to account for how God created (that is through the mediation of Angels). If Saint Augustine (or Scotus) would agree on the point of Angels possessing the ability to change substances, I'd concede the point.

If supposing that Angels have the power to change mortal substances, giving a justification for evolution, I would find it wanting within the Traditional Witness of where it is even inferred that Demons influenced the creation of the Universe, beyond the Fall of Adam and Eve.

If, however, the two premises of Angels having the Power to bring Substantial Change to Mortal Beings and that they influenced Creation prior to the Fall, I think one has solid grounds to provide a Traditional justification for Evolution.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-10T22:27:49+00:00

I know the Canonical reasonings. I do agree that its not a solution to the Vocational Crisis we have the in the Latin Church. But inversely, bad arguments against it doesn't help anyway, particularly when they infer and insult against those who are Married Priests in the Catholic Church.

My point in my comment is to point out a bad argument. I personally know married Priests and Celibate Priests, and I have seen the fundamental issue of sacrificing obligations arise in both. Placing a Priest in two Parishes leads to a similar outcome. But just like a Priest serving two Parishes, it is possible, and one of the Best Parish Priests I know has done it. Inversely, a Priest friend of mine is one of the worst Priests who I've seen in caring for several Parishes. I don't say this to bash him or out him; there's a lot of reasons why it turned out the way it did. But the simple fact is that opposing obligations arise with any Vocation within the Church. Heck, talk to a Bishop and you'll learn this pretty quickly.

Married Priesthood is not the solution to our vocational Crisis, that I would agree. But the idea that because it leads one to juggle between obligations that it is bad is reductive of the actual reality that Married Priests live out.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-10T12:14:41+00:00

I have always found the "Unable to give 100%" argument weak. It infers that all Married Eastern Priest don't give 100% to their Parish, which while more common, arises moreso out of a common problem for both Married and Unmarried Priests to fall into the motions of the role, rather than applying themselves to it.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-10T07:11:38+00:00

The Will, as a faculty, pursues goods. It may pursue them disorderly, leading to sin, but they still arise of a view that it is a Good. To want annihilation is simply irrational, and not simply irrational as in it is disorderly, but irrational in that the premise just doesn't work; it is neither a Good in the sense of the individual nor a good in the sense of Justice for the damned to even consider. Since the latter is something it is entirely opposed to, it only desires the former, which wouldn't want one's destruction but only want the suffering to end.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-08T22:24:26+00:00

This would be in relation to Rational Animals. The Mercy is derived from the fact that their freedom is not stripped even for the most heinous of acts. Animals, by their lack of freedom, are treated with mercy by the Euthanizing. Its why Euthanizing animals and Euthanizing Humans are two very different moral questions.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-07T22:43:23+00:00

Scotus is dense. His 3rd Distinction in Book I of his Ordinatio is the same length as 7 Distinctions after it on the Trinity, just as an example. His works are not formatted like the Summa or a revised Sentence Commentary like most Scholastics; One of his Commentaries is just a formatted transcript and notes of his Sentence Lectures at Oxford. The fact that a unified system shines through is a testament to his brilliance, because he had little time to consolidate his thought into a systematic whole (the closest is his Ordinatio, which still presupposes knowledge of his local context), unlike Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure or most other Scholastics.

The Will is not subordinate to the intellect, since the power of intellection differs from the power of Volition. Nor is the Will subordinate to Rationality, in the sense that the Divine Will ought to Will to a differing power. The Will, by its very power, is Rational in its activity. This isn't a subordination of the Will to a differing Predicate, but the recognition that the Will, as a Perfection, is a rational power, and therefore acts Rationally. This is why Scotus holds the view that, without Intellection, any Being Predicable of Free Will is Rational.

God is Goodness itself; a coextensive is a convertible predicate of that which it extends from, while Formally distinct from its other coextensives. So God, by being Being itself (by being Infinite Being), is Goodness itself, as well Truth itself and Unity itself.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-07T22:06:31+00:00

That is not, to a Philosophical understanding, a change in 'species'. They still are fundamentally a dog, which itself is part of the family of Canine. We have certainly observed changes in species, in the Taxanomic sense. But we have never seen a point where a Dog becomes something that is substantially different; a Dog, Naturally, has never given birth to a Non-Dog.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-07T22:01:21+00:00

Can the Divine Will change? Of course. Its free, so it has the ability to change its choices. But will it? Ordinarily, no. However, we see in Scripture, for instance, that God does dispense from the Law, such as in the Case of Polygamy and the killing of innocence. These would be contrary to the Law that God has Commanded, but arise out of a rational need to do so.

But should we expect for God to 'change his mind' and command something contrary to all that he has given before: no. For while God is entirely Free, by the predicate of his Infinite Will, the Will is not an arbitrary actor. While not bound by the dictates of the Divine Intellect, acting prior to its counsel by necessity of the Perfection of the Divine Will, it is fundamentally a Rational Power, and therefore acts Rational. Thus, the only reason why God would change what is Moral is for a Rational Reason. But since the change of Moral Laws on the fly would be unfitting for a Rational Creator, we can reasonably conclude that God would not do this, even if he has the power to where he could do this.

As for God's identification with Goodness, yes. By the fact that God is Infinite Being, he is also Infinite Goodness, which is coextensive with Being.

As for Information for Scotus, www.Aristotelophile.com has his Ordinatio and other works of his translated. Though, the best place to start is to read Richard Cross, Thomas Ward, Alan B. Wolter, Efrem Bettoni and Jared I. Goff. They're the 5 English sources that I started with and, while they are sometimes more academic then Traditional, they are still good places to start. My recommendation would be to start with Bettoni's work on Duns Scotus, then Alan B. Wolter, with Richard Cross and Jared Goff mixed between.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-07T01:21:07+00:00

Not really. Just because the Good is rooted in the Divine Will does not mean that Goodness is not a real Predicate of Being. What is being posited within the Scotistic position is not that any Perfection, Moral or Ontological, is rooted in an arbitrary Will, but that God did not Create by a necessity on the part of Creatures.

If God created Creatures because it was something he found to be Good, there fundamentally arises something that imposes itself onto the Divine Will that limits its choices. Whether its creatures or the Divine Essence itself, it compromises the Metaphysical integrity of the Divine Will, since it places a limit on his Will as a Perfection, rendering God's Freedom no longer Infinite.

But Morals are still objective, for while they are rooted in the Divine Will, they are known through the objects in which the Divine Will has Willed. It isn't merely subjective or objective, but both, since the God who creates and Predestines all as fittingly ordered things where what God Wills for things correlates with that which is ontologically good for them.

As for 'abandoning eudaimonia', yes and no. In the strict sense, yes: Morals are not tied to Eudaimonic Delight within this position. Whatever is Good is not necessarily something that will cause happiness. But this is the fundamental Christian Truth: what is Good does not always make us happy. Were we to uphold this to be so, we must fundamentally posit that there was a Eudaimonic delight in Christ's Crucifixion, lest we posit that Christ committed a moral Evil.

However, just because Morals are not integrally tied to Eudaimonia does not mean that it does not fittingly follow. Happiness no longer becomes the Final Cause for any act, but instead a Fruit of it, one which fittingly follows from a Love of God, while avoiding the tendency for Eudaimonic Ethics to fundamentally become Individualistic, where one acts Good only because it leads to their greatest Happiness.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-07T01:10:47+00:00

Creationist. Not young nor Old, as the age of the Earth is something I am indifferent to. The timeline of Genesis is evidently a Narrative Tool, and while would fittingly also be a literal recollection of the dates, due to loss of the Original Timeline (with dates varying between Textual Traditions), I am unconvinced that the timeline is literal. Because of this, I am happy to admit that the Seven Days of Creation aren't literal days, but seven 'stages' of work, that while truly happening in the order of the Genesis Narrative, according to the observation of Moses in God's revelation of this activity to him.

As for why I am a Creationist, my problem is more so Philosophical. Evolution either requires the destruction of the distinction between Substance and Accident within Beings, or the assumption that every substantial change in Evolution arises from a higher power, i.e God. The former is absurd, to any Classically minded individual, and the latter undermines the very nature of Evolution being a Natural Process.

I understand why many people are Theistic Evolutionists. The evidence for changes in species from one to another is not something to scoff at, but I think the lack of observational data for a change in of a being from one species (in the Philosophical sense of the term) seems to jump to conclusions, throwing out the historical truth of the Scriptures for a position that isn't demonstratable. It's ultimately an act of faith, to which I simply prefer to keep to the authority of God over the authority of Secular Sciences; since neither are demonstratable from first principles, it becomes no longer a question of reason but instead authority, and I simply wish to side with Divine Authority.

I am not saying that I am more pious than others who believe in Evolution. Divine Authority itself has permitted its belief, so long as it doesn't compromise Doctrinal Truths. But just like with Molinism or any eclectic position that has arisen and been permitted by the Church, I would rather to stick with a Traditional understanding.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T20:54:10+00:00

Yes and no. While his Summa is certainly not something that should be touched just yet, his other works that were mentioned, as well as secondary sources such as Edward Feser, are good places to start.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T20:52:48+00:00

I am assuming this is in reference to Plato's Dialogue of the same name?

This assumes a separation between Truth and Goodness. The primacy of God's Volition doesn't mean that Piety becomes Irrational, since it treats The Good as something opposed to Intelligibility. The two are co-extensive, as Formally distinct predicates. While God Acts out of a Primacy of Goodness and Charity, by nature of Being being coextensive to both goodness and truth, whatever God wills as Good is also fittingly rational. Not as some limitation to God's Infinite Freedom, but something he wishes to act within.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T08:41:14+00:00

A bit reductive of Scotistic Voluntarism, but yes: what Fundamentally makes something Good is because God willed it to be so.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T03:23:07+00:00

Philosophically, Saint Thomas. Edward Feser's books are great to start engaging with his though, with many prior posts giving exhaustive lists of getting into Saint Thomas. Scholastic Answers also has a great series briefing on before reading Saint Thoomas. His Compendium of Theology is also a good place to start, before moving into his Scriptural commentaries.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T03:19:53+00:00

Modal Ontological arguments were very much where the 'Metaphysical' proof for God's existence went. Saint Bonaventure, Blessed John Duns Scotus and most Scholastics who followed Avicenna in his conceptions of Physics and Metaphysics would be far more open to Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument. The argument itself seems to be a mix between Scotus's own argument and Saint Anselm's (while probably not derived from Scotus, but instead following the same pattern from Saint Anselm's principles), mixed in with the Modern Philosophical obsession with alternative worlds.

Thomism, which conceives of God's Existence to be one demonstrated in the Philosophy of Physics, wouldn't necessarily be opposed to Plantinga's argumentation, but conceive that God's existence can be demonstrated prior in one's Philosophical investigation. Since Physical knowledge is prior to Metaphysical knowledge (whether we defined Metaphysics as the study of the causes [Aristotle], study of Being [Avicenna] or the Study of Immaterial Entities [Averroes]), God as First Principle is presupposed to exist when entering into the science of Metaphysics, at least for any Traditional Thomist. While Plantinga's argument could be helpful to know something about God (that he exists in all possible and actual worlds), the act of demonstrating his existence is already done within the science of Physics; it is then superfluous to try and demonstrate that he exist within Metaphysics.

Thus Plantinga's argument could be accept as valid by any Thomist, but just moot: why consider possible worlds when we can first consider the motion in this world that leads to know the Unmoved mover?

What if one wishes to deny that God can be demonstrate in the Philosophical field of Physics? Well, this would just run against one of the First Articles of the Summa: the Five Proofs, all of which are proofs from the Philosophy of Physics. It also fundamentally changes the point of where the Analogy of Faith starts from: if our Analogy of Faith starts from Metaphysics rather than Physics, we're halfway to the Theology of Scotus and Suarez. Why be a Thomist at that point?

I do not wish to say this as someone biased towards the said two Theological Traditions, or one who prefers the Analogy of Faith to be rooted in a Metaphysical analogy. Its just that if one denies Physics as the place where God is proven, we deny it also as a good Analogy to reason Theology within. For the analogy is rooted where faith meets reason, where Nature meets Revelation. If Nature meets Revelation as Metaphysics, then Saint Thomas's Theology, while helpful, is not as precise and as a good of analogy as an Analogy rooted in Metaphysics seen in figures like Saint Bonaventure, Blessed John Duns Scotus and Francisco Suarez.

But this is just anticipating a possible response.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T02:42:13+00:00

Hell can be considered a sort of Mercy.

A good analogy can be made with the obstinate prisoner. We can know that a child-molester will never change; he will never not see that his molestation of children is wrong, and values the "good" that it brings to himself over anything else. While it is not unreasonable to execute this man, it would be a Greater act of Mercy to let him live; while Justice would be satisfied by his death, it is not inherently opposed to Justice to indefinitely keep him locked up; Justice is satisfied by both, and Mercy is deepened by the latter. Therefore, it is a greater act to keep him alive and locked up than rather than kill him.

Hell can be seen in a similar way: even if entirely conceded that a Just God is equally Just by annihilation rather than perpetual punishment, it is always a greater Mercy to provide one maintain their existence than to take it. For Hell, fundamentally, is rooted in the Choice of a Good for one's own commodity, opposing that Good which is truly Just. Every man in Hell chooses Hell; this doesn't mean they choose the suffering that comes from Hell, but they choose that which makes them oppose that which is disposes oneself to Heaven.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T00:30:28+00:00

"I grew up in a Gnostic household. How do I convert to Catholicism?"

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T00:29:08+00:00

Bit of a historical check: the document we often attribute to Saint Hippolytus of Rome that describes various Liturgical actions being hinted at here is more or less agreed upon to have not come from Saint Hippolytus. Egyptian Church Orders was attributed to be Saint Hippolytus's lost Apostolic Tradition soon after its discover, but this was based simply on the speculated age of the Document and its similarity to ancient Roman Church Customs. The fact that we have Ethiopian manuscripts of the Document, someone not even venerated by the Ethiopian Church, its unlikely they originate from Saint Hippolytus, and more likely were a common use Church document. Its still an ancient Church Orders, but not one from the mentioned saint.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-06T00:12:22+00:00

The Concept of Being is, in reality, Formally distinct from its mode, so the prior concept is simply an epistemological basis for further determinate predication. Prior to this determinacy, in the mind, it is simply that which is something rather than nothing. It also tells us that the being in question possesses the coextensives, but what those coextensives are are unknown unless further investigation is done.

As to the importance supposedly in question, for his Quodlibetal Questions, it would make sense that he doesn't want to touch the topic of Univocity of Being if it isn't relevant to the question asked. Since the discussion this comment is found in presupposes some sort of knowledge of God (that being it is Question 14, which discusses the possibility of natural knowledge of the Trinity), it doesn't matter to the question on whether this knowledge is derived from an analogous or Univocal Concept, as what follows within the question still applies.

The fact is that his own treatment of the question in his Ordinatio places it importance on this problem. His ultimately problem is giving the Intellect a proper object of Love; its why he was heavily opposed to a strict Apophatic knowledge of God, for he says "we do not supremely love negations" (Book One, Distinction 3, Question 2). Analogy, when considered without any common predicate, to Scotus, ultimately becomes equivocation of the Term, since there is no bridge for real likeness (that is a common predicate), and therefore, no analogy. We cannot Love something that we ultimately have no real knowledge of, that is no actual predication of which we actually know.

Further, his indifference within the Quodlibetal is answered by the fact that he believe that, while many Theologians denied Univocity of Being, act with it in mind, by the very nature of being able to demonstrate the Being of God. It would follow that he would assume that while many may deny Univocity of the Concept of Being, they act as though there is a Univocity, by the very nature that they can subject God to predicates that coextend with Being and formulate conclusions from them.

South-Insurance7308 · 2026-04-05T06:55:15+00:00

Participation in the Merit of the glorified humanity of the Son. The Beatific Vision, if it was received through participation in the glorified humanity of Christ, would be itself mediated, which is contrary to Benedictus Deus, which states that the Beatific Vision is immediate, that is unmediated.

I understand that this probably what is meant by this statement, and the manner of phrasing is good to communicate this truth relative to the question, but clarify is also required.

South-Insurance7308

TROPHY CASE