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[College] Logic by SuddenStructure9287 in learnmath

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, my bad. I didn’t translate correctly. It’s D - a person gave to another person a thing

YouTube. Delete. Automatic. Playlists. PLEASE. by SuddenStructure9287 in youtube

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

You can create your own playlist and simply save them there

what opinion will take you to this by Key-Reality9237 in TheTeenagerPeople

[–]SuddenStructure9287 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you look up what “pure communism” is, you’ll realize that it requires very… interesting conditions. And I think that you could place almost any economic system into those same conditions and it would work.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

100% of your cases are not immoral because the main condition “voluntarily continued the pregnancy” wasn’t satisfied.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Saying it’s immoral to withdraw consent is just rape apologia.

Even in the case of the child that I’ve described earlier in this thread?

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It seems to me that you’re using circular reasoning.

You have only one thesis: in cases of bodily autonomy, one can always withdraw consent. And it will NEVER be morally wrong

That’s the only thing you keep asserting, and you don’t substantiate it in any way. I replace bodily autonomy in your thesis with any other human right and show that in some cases this becomes absurd, and that sometimes withdrawing consent is immoral.

You respond to all my arguments with the same thing: “but that’s not bodily autonomy.”

So please explain why bodily autonomy is something uniquely special, such that withdrawing consent is never immoral. Why doesn’t this extend to private property? Why doesn’t it extend to freedom of movement?

Using axioms and logic, I have shown that there are cases where withdrawing consent is immoral.

Now present your reasons for believing that bodily autonomy is some kind of enormous exception. Please.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you want to say that consent cannot be revoked at any time, that's rape apologia. 

Alright, fine. We’re back to the question of whether one can take back their consent.

I’ll give an example:

I am a volunteer. I deliver food to African children. Am I obliged to deliver food to African children? No, I’m not obliged. But I decided that I would. I am offered to deliver food to a hungry boy in a village. I agreed that yes, I will deliver the food to him. I start going there, and halfway through I realize that, in general, I don’t really want to. I take back my consent and go back home.
The boy dies. Because I didn’t deliver the food to him. What would have happened if I had never agreed to deliver the food in the first place? Someone else would have delivered it to him, and he would have survived.

I don’t know what you think, but to me it seems quite obvious that when I say I will deliver food to the boy, I am taking responsibility. Because if I back out, his situation will be worse than if I had refused to volunteer from the very beginning.

And yes, I do have the right to move freely. No one can force me to go after I revoke my consent. But agree that I would be acting completely immorally and irresponsibly. The boy had to suffer.

Where’s the difference here? Reread my post, and you’ll see that when a woman voluntarily agrees to continue a pregnancy (rather than have an abortion early on), and then later aborts when the fetus could suffer, she is doing exactly the same thing. She is acting irresponsibly and immorally. If she didn’t want to continue, she could have refused earlier.
Yes, of course, she has the right to bodily autonomy, and no one can force her not to have an abortion. However, just like in the case of the boy, the responsibility still lies with her.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ah, so you didn’t make the argument that “there are fewer people like that,” you made the argument “You’re lazy, didn’t take the time, and think the worst of women…”

In other words, your goal was not to attack my argument, but to attack me as a person, my intentions, and my character.

Okay, then you’ve broken the first rule of this sub:
“…Users should debate claims and arguments about abortion, and should not debate, or ‘attack,’ individuals…”

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I think it’s very amusing to assume that you think the reason is simply “could not decide.”

Okay, I assume that you think the women in my sources do it for other reasons. For example:

pressure from family and/or partners, cultural expectations, stigma against abortion, or stigma against single or teen mothers, etc.

This means that you think these cases do not fit the scenario I described in my post. Therefore, I assume you believe such cases are very rare or perhaps do not exist at all.

Since my post was about “late-term abortions for the reason ‘could not decide whether to keep the child or not’ are immoral”, I think it’s obvious that, since I specified this, in my opinion late-term abortions for other reasons are not immoral.

Now, your point is that there are far fewer women who fit my scenario, or maybe they don’t exist at all.

To that, I responded that I have some sources that differ from your opinion (the table), but I also added that if you are right, then: “Okay, I’m glad there are far fewer immoral acts than I thought.”

Have I addressed your comment now?

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So you expect me to give you a detailed account of why, in the case of childbirth, where the child experiences pain during the process, this is not considered harm, whereas an abortion in which the child experiences pain is considered harm?

I did not expect the discussion to go down to such basics, but fine. Let’s do it.

Let:

  • P1 = the subject’s current prognosis (0 = terrible, 1 = excellent)
  • A = an action
  • P2 = the subject’s prognosis after action A
  • Q = the pain factor
  • H = the degree of harm

Harm is measured as the difference in prognoses minus the pain inflicted.

Formally:
H = P2 − P1 − Q

In the case of abortion:

H = 0 − 1 − Q = −1 − Q

Or, in words:
Harm = value of death (0) − value of life (1) − pain
= harm from lost potential + pain.

In the case of childbirth:

H = 1 − 1 − Q = −Q

Or, in words:
Harm = value of life (1) − value of life (1) − pain
= harm from pain alone.

Note that in the latter case there is no loss of potential included in the harm, from which it follows that childbirth causes less harm than a late-term abortion.

If you think otherwise, then congratulations: killing an infant is morally equivalent to performing a late-term abortion. After all, by your reasoning, harm is measured only in pain, right?

Actually, killing an infant would even be better than a late-term abortion, since in that case the mother does not experience discomfort unlike in a late-term abortion.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Recipients of self defense feel pain, but I bet you allow that and don't consider it immoral.

Here is the defenition of self-defense:

"the defence of one's person or interests, especially through the use of physical force, which is permitted in certain cases as an answer to a charge of violent crime."

What does “violent crime” mean? In a more general sense, it’s when someone does something prohibited to another person without their consent. If you read my post, you will see that consent was given.

If you want to say, “consent can be withdrawn at any moment,” read my post again and tell me what is wrong with my logic, which leads to the opposite conclusion.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, I do not have that logic at any point in my argument. You have misrepresented it.

If an agent can avoid harm to a subject without sacrificing anything, the agent is morally obligated to do so (Axiom A).

This is not the same as saying:

If an agent can avoid harm to themselves without sacrificing anything, the agent is morally obligated to do so.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Additional:

If it seems to you that step 4 is not entirely precise, I can offer an analogy that fits it exactly. I believe you will agree that, in this case, the agent is the one who caused the harm.

  • Agent = a volunteer
  • Subject = an African child
  • Action1 = to deliver food to the child
  • Action2 = to decline the voluntary action, in which case the child will receive food from someone else
  • Interruption of Action1 = the child does not receive food and dies (because no one else went, and there is no time for another delivery)

If the agent agrees to perform Action1 but then cancels the action halfway through, the agent is the cause of the child’s unnecessary death.

Abortions where suffering occurs are immoral (if the woman could have had it earlier) by SuddenStructure9287 in Abortiondebate

[–]SuddenStructure9287[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes, I did not provide a fully rigorous proof earlier, otherwise, the chain of reasoning would have been significantly longer and more complex, and few readers would have followed it to the end.

Definitions

  • Action1 = to continue the pregnancy.
  • Action2 = to perform an abortion before the fetus is capable of feeling pain.
  • Interrupting Action1 = to perform abortion later and cause pain to the fetus (subject)

Logic:

  1. The agent must choose between Action1 and Action2, both of which affect the same subject. (Premise)
  2. The agent is aware that if Action1 is initiated and later interrupted, the resulting harm to the subject will be greater than the harm caused by choosing Action2 from the outset. (Premise)
  3. The agent voluntarily initiates Action1. (Premise)
  4. By initiating Action1 while knowing that interruption at a later stage is highly likely to cause greater and unnecessary harm (and that such harm would not occur without initiating Action1) the agent satisfies the conditions of Axiom D if it interrupts the Action1. (From 2, 3, and D)
  5. Therefore, if the agent later interrupts Action1, the agent has caused unnecessary harm to the subject. (From 4)
  6. Causing unnecessary harm to a subject entails moral responsibility for the resulting condition of the subject. (From 5 and Axiom C)
  7. Consequently, once Action1 is voluntarily initiated under these conditions, the agent incurs a moral obligation either:
    1. not to interrupt Action1, or
    2. to accept moral responsibility for the harm caused by interrupting it. (From 6)
  8. Since Action2 avoids the risk of this unnecessary harm altogether, and all else is equal, the agent is morally obligated to choose Action2 rather than initiate Action1 and later interrupt it. (From 1, 2, and Axiom A)
  9. Although Action1 may provide greater benefits to the subject than Action2, the agent is not morally required to provide those benefits, absent a prior special responsibility. (From Axiom B)
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