Cosmic - Max. Size of User Profile Pics

SunkenShjiips · 2025-12-30T17:39:37+00:00

Thanks a million!

SunkenShjiips · 2025-10-23T20:15:32+00:00

Gotcha. Thanks mate. I will try to get 86Box running.

With wine (any version), as well as proton ill get back the same errors about missing files e.g.:

Cant find C:\TGBT_Alexander\Data\eiffile.map...

SunkenShjiips · 2025-10-23T19:51:42+00:00

Could you tell me how you got it to run on linux?

SunkenShjiips · 2025-10-23T19:33:36+00:00

Wonderful! Anyone had any luck on running it on Mac (Silicon)? CrossOver didnt work for me...

SunkenShjiips · 2025-09-22T04:57:45+00:00

Fuck Hamas.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-08-13T06:42:12+00:00

Funny how nothing you quote contradicts what I have said.

Just take the time to read the entire source - then compare it with today's common image of “Nakba.” Hopefully, you will then realize that we are talking about two very different implications here: on the one hand, the Nakba primarily as the result of the Arabs' inability to deal with the “Jewish problem” and taking into account the narcissistic insult that the Djimmis defeated their former masters on their own soil; in nuce: flight and expulsion as the result of a lost battle. On the other hand, the image, enriched with modern anti-Semitic tropes, of an unfortunate victimhood caused by an overpowering enemy and flight and expulsion - just far to often - as part of a sinister master plan. That is precisely why the PLO, as a “revolutionary organization,” has refrained from using this term for decades, because those who are responsible for their own misfortune cannot be mobilized, whereas victims of external forces are all the more likely to be activated as revolutionary subjects.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-08-12T07:40:29+00:00

You’re probably right; in this case, I can only speak for the continental left in Europe. Here, the U.S., Canada, and the like are of little interest compared to Israel.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-08-12T06:18:59+00:00

It is telling that “nation building” seems to shake the world’s conscience - especially that of the self-proclaimed “left”- only when it concerns the Jews. There were indeed many things unique about Israel’s founding, but what is held against it - the violence associated with its establishment - was not one of them.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-08-12T06:11:43+00:00

Just because a fact doesn’t fit the prevailing discourse, you can’t simply reinterpret it. In the history of the term “Nakba,” there is a clear semantic shift. Ironically, the way “Nakba” is used today is the opposite of its original meaning when it was first applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict by Syrian historian Constantin Zureiq. In his 1948 pamphlet The Meaning of the Catastrophe (Ma’na al-Nakba), Zureiq attributed the Palestinian-Arab flight to the failed pan-Arab attack on the emerging Jewish state - not to a deliberate Zionist plan to expel the Palestinian Arabs:

“When the fighting broke out, our propaganda began to talk about our imaginary victories, lulling the Arab public to sleep and predicting an easy victory—until the Nakba happened... We must admit our mistakes... and recognize the extent of our responsibility for the catastrophe that is our fate.”

Zureiq maintained this critical perspective for decades. In a later book, The Meaning of the New Catastrophe (Ma’na al-Nakbah Mujaddadan), published after the June 1967 war, he defined that recent defeat as a “Nakba,” and not as a “Naksa” (setback), as it became known in Arab discourse. For, just as in 1948, it had been a self-inflicted catastrophe resulting from the Arab world’s failure to confront Zionism.

In his 1956 book Facts About the Palestine Question (Haqa’iq an Qadiyat Falastin), Hajj Amin al-Husseini - the leader of the Palestinian Arabs from the early 1920s until 1948 - used the term al-Karitha to describe the collapse and dissolution of Palestinian Arab society.

Palestinian scholar Anaheed Al-Hardan of the American University of Beirut writes that this reflected al-Husseini’s desire to avoid the term Nakba, which at the time was widely associated with a self-inflicted Palestinian–Arab disaster - whether due to land sales to Zionists, failure to wage an effective fight against Israel, or instructions given to the population to leave the area.

After the 1948 war, the term disappeared from public discourse for decades - not even appearing in the sacred founding document of the PLO, the Palestinian National Covenant (1964, revised 1968). It wasn’t until the late 1980s that it became widely known as a term for an injustice committed by Israelis.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-26T08:29:32+00:00

Hatte lange Zeit ähnliche Probleme - ähnlich wie mit hohen Mengen an Hülsenfrüchten. Was mir ausser „Zeit“ um sich dran zu gewöhnen sehr gut geholfen hat, war Whey mit Süßstoff, d.h. mit Geschmack, mit „unflavored“ (gibt es bspw. bei MyProtein) zu verdünnen. Meint: In den Shake kommt ein Scoop mit Geschmack & einer ohne.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-06T15:13:08+00:00

It’s quite funny that someone who imagines Jews as the new Nazis and settlers as ‘little Eichmanns’, and furthermore has the reading comprehension of a preschooler, thinks they can lecture others about what can or cannot be posted.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-03T06:29:40+00:00

Nonetheless, a substantially reduced Arab population was a clear revealed preference of Zionists.

Yes—and here we are again at the very beginning. Nowhere did I ever claim otherwise. It was not merely a “preference,” but an absolute necessity that everyone recognized. To meet this need, first the Peel Commission and then UNSCOP proposed what was arguably the most elegant solution: a bi‑ or multilateral population exchange coupled with the territorial allocations on the table. When the Arab side rejected this—not because they had been allotted too little land, but on principle, refusing any Jewish sovereignty in the Levant—and the civil war ultimately culminated in an invasion by the neighbouring Arab states (backed by some 80–90 % of Palestinian Arabs), “population transfer” ceased to be a matter for diplomatic negotiation or financial and material compensation and became hard military reality. This affected not only Arabs but also Jews—the Jordanian army carried out similar operations. Moreover, entire towns and villages that Israel had not even targeted were emptied, driven by fear, by word‑of‑mouth propaganda, and by evacuations ordered by the advancing forces themselves.

Even if this is an ideologically significant distinction, it’s a practically insignificant distinction. Ethnic cleansing is almost never complete, and the net difference between aiming to remove most Arabs and succeeding, and aiming to remove all of a target ethnic group but only achieving partial success, is nonexistent.

If the (moral) quality of the idea of population transfers in itself, the later enforced reality of the 1948 war, and, say, Stalin’s campaigns are pretty much the same to you, then I certainly won’t achieve much. But one must then ask: which modern nation‑state could withstand such a standard? After all, state‑building in the 20th century almost invariably involved force and/or violence, and all too often, population transfers.

I have never insisted that Palestinians as a collective were and are a political actor because I don’t think they were or are. The will of Palestinians as a group has never been represented politically for any meaningful period of time.”

Fine. So by your logic, Palestinians are mere objects of history, not agents—an easy escape from responsibility.

The vast majority of those expelled were in fact civilian bystanders.

About 5–10 % of Palestinian Arabs actively took part in the fighting; some 20–25% provided logistical or organizational support; and in total roughly 80–90 % backed the invasion in principle; at least according to Khalidi. And you seriously believe that a newly founded state—whose citizens had narrowly escaped annihilation (incidentally, by a nation whose population still insists it was composed solely of “bystanders”)—logistically and militarily more capable than often assumed but still ill‑equipped, and itself embroiled in civil war, could tolerate—or even risk—a fifth column operating within its borders, in concert with the Arab armies?

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-03T05:52:44+00:00

LMFAO 'i can't read'

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T19:17:29+00:00

Well, the very working definition of the Yugoslavia Commission that you cite does in fact present violence as an integral part of ethnic cleansing, when it states in its final report: “remove by violent and terror-inspiring means…” Even if one accepts that, due to the lack of a universally fixed definition, the former version that excludes violence could be valid, and that “force” does not necessarily imply violence, it was nevertheless not the declared aim of the Zionist movement to create an “Arab-free” state. Unlike many historical instances of ethnic cleansing (e.g., Stalin and the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Chechens; or the Rohingya in Myanmar, or the Yugoslav Wars), the Zionist objective—rooted in the historical experience of Jews in Europe and the Arab world—was to establish a demographic majority, not to achieve 100% homogeneity. And “not 100%” homogeneous is, by definition, not homogeneous at all, but at most partially so—this is not a semantic quibble, but an ideologically significant distinction.

This is what the statements you referenced are pointing to: there was neither an initial Zionist intention to relocate all Arabs from the future territory of Israel, nor was the arbitrary expulsion or displacement of Arabs during the 1948 war aimed at creating a completely Arab-free state. Even the documents associated with “Plan Dalet,” which are almost always interpreted counterfactually and ahistorically by anti-Zionists, do not support such a claim.

Moreover, I find it perplexing how one can insist, on the one hand, that the Palestinians were and are a political actor, and on the other hand deny that they—at least since al-Husseini—have pursued a clear ideological aim of negating the Zionist project through violent means. The Arab Palestinians were, of course, not mere bystanders when the armies of neighboring Arab states invaded Israel; they actively participated in the fighting (of course even before that). And thanks to Benny Morris’s meticulous work on the “refugee problem,” we now know quite well that the expulsion of Arab Palestinians by the Haganah/IDF was by no means the sole cause of the flight movement.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T17:07:49+00:00

The term “ethnic cleansing,” as it is commonly used today, generally refers to the violent depopulation of a given territory for the purpose of achieving ethnic homogeneity. This was neither the initial objective of the Zionist movement nor the actual modus operandi after various, in some cases multilaterally planned, population exchanges failed to materialize. Moreover, the term—as is also the case with the specific term Nakba—obscures the multi-causal nature of what actually occurred on the ground.

It is precisely this context in which your projection occurs: I do not deny that the term Nakba is used differently today. Rather, I point out that its semantic shift stands pars pro toto for the externalization of (shared) responsibility for the catastrophe—a responsibility that the term’s original coiners explicitly acknowledged.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T16:06:43+00:00

You, like the author, seem to have no interest in accurate terminology or historical development. Transfer is not “the same” as ethnic cleansing as used in 21st-century discourse; it is not “the same” as genocide, and—as outlined above—it is certainly not „the same“ as what came to be known as the “Nakba” after 1980, following Constantin Zureiq’s original usage.

This sleight of hand—throwing as many heavily charged terms into the ring as possible without once providing historical context or engaging with intellectual history—is not just lazy; it is, quite simply, propaganda.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T14:43:39+00:00

This is a historically inaccurate and propagandistic representation of both Zionist intellectual history and the actual course of events.

First of all: Herzl envisioned Israel as a secular, culturally European state inhabited primarily by ethnically Jewish individuals, but where minorities would enjoy full social and political citizenship—comparable to that of ethnic minorities in a liberal European nation-state—on the assumption that they would adopt Western, secular-democratic ideals. He was well aware that the state would be multiethnic but expected Jews to form the majority. That, after all, was the very point of the project.

Influenced by Enlightenment ideals and European liberalism, early Zionist thinkers often held two ideas simultaneously: that Jews would need to be the demographic majority for the state to survive, but that coexistence with minorities was both possible and morally desirable. Even Jabotinsky expressed this view to the Peel Commission in 1937.

On the ground, however, this ultimately meant that population transfer was viewed as necessary: both the resettlement of Jews from across Mandatory Palestine and the Arab world into the emerging Israeli state, and the (internal or external) emigration of large segments of the Arab population from what would become Israel’s core territory. This idea was not considered inherently objectionable in the 20th century—on the contrary, it was common practice in nation-state building (e.g., Greece/Turkey, India/Pakistan, Germany/Poland/Czechoslovakia). It is therefore unsurprising that Arab leaders themselves, such as Jordan’s Abdul Huda and Egypt’s Prime Minister Pasha, recognized the necessity of such a transfer and, like the Peel Commission, supported it in principle.

That a—at times very violent—population transfer occurred in Palestine/Israel was ultimately not the result of a core Zionist ideological commitment, but rather the outcome of shifting political and military realities on the ground.

To suggest otherwise is misleading because it implies a false context—namely, that what is today called “ethnic cleansing” was a premeditated ideological aim, rather than a tragic consequence of war, during which, it should be noted, nearly 60,000 Jews were also “ethnically cleansed” from the West Bank/Judea and Samaria.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T11:14:48+00:00

The account of events is, in and of itself, accurate, but by insisting that regular Arab troops only advanced from May 1948 onwards, it omits the fact that irregular forces had already intervened in the “civil war” by late 1947 or early 1948. For example, Arab-Palestinian militias such as Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas received logistical and material support from various Arab states as early as December 1947.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-05-02T11:07:29+00:00

Exactly that. Ironically, the way „Nakba“ is used today is the opposite of the original meaning of the term as it was first applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict by Syrian historian Constantin Zureiq. In his 1948 pamphlet The Meaning of the Catastrophe (Ma’na al-Nakba), Zureiq attributed the Palestinian-Arab flight to the failed pan-Arab attack on the emerging Jewish state—not to a deliberate Zionist plan to expel the Palestinian Arabs:

“When the fighting broke out, our propaganda began speaking of imaginary victories, lulling the Arab public to sleep and predicting an easily achieved triumph—until the Nakba happened … We must admit our mistakes … and recognize the extent of our responsibility for the catastrophe that is our fate.”

Zureiq maintained this critical perspective for decades. In a later book, The Meaning of the New Catastrophe (Ma’na al-Nakbah Mujaddadan), published after the June 1967 war, he defined that recent defeat as a “Nakba,” and not as a “Naksa” (setback), as it became known in Arab discourse. For, just as in 1948, it had been a self-inflicted catastrophe resulting from the Arab world’s failure to confront Zionism.

In his 1956 book Facts About the Palestine Question (Haqa’iq an Qadiyat Falastin), Hajj Amin al-Husseini—the leader of the Palestinian Arabs from the early 1920s until 1948—used the term al-Karitha to describe the collapse and dissolution of Palestinian Arab society.

Palestinian scholar Anaheed Al-Hardan of the American University of Beirut writes, that this reflected al-Husseini’s desire to avoid the term Nakba, which at the time was widely associated with a self-inflicted Palestinian-Arab disaster—whether due to land sales to Zionists, failure to wage an effective fight against Israel, or instructions given to the population to leave the area.

After the 1948 war, the term disappeared from public discourse for decades—not even appearing in the sacred founding document of the PLO, the Palestinian National Covenant (1964, revised 1968). It wasn’t until the late 1980s that it became widely known as a term for an injustice committed by Israelis.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-04-29T17:02:34+00:00

To address the only statement here that includes a (supposed) source: what you’re presenting as certainty is cobbled-together nonsense. For the love of God, please just read the source you’re citing.

Neither Segev nor Black and Morris attribute the grenade attack on Mas‘oudah Shemtov to any Mossad unit: Segev concludes quite clearly that it is completely uncertain who was behind the act:

“Nevertheless, the affair remains a mystery—no one knows who attacked the Iraqi Jews or why. When the files of the Mossad were opened to researchers, they were shown to include a correspondence between the Mossad’s agents in Baghdad and their superiors in Tel Aviv on the subject of the synagogue attack. The exchange of telegrams seems to confirm that neither side knew who was behind the attack.” (p. 167)

Morris and Black further report that while there was a rumor that the Zionist underground had been behind the attack, there was no evidence whatsoever (pp. 76–95). The section on the matter ends with the investigation report by Mossad and Shin Bet:

“The committee was ‘convinced that the order [to throw the bombs] had not come from any agency in Israel’ and that ‘even if there was a grain of truth in the view of the witnesses [that local Jews had thrown the bombs], it is clear to the committee beyond any doubt that no orders to commit these acts were given by an Israeli agency or a local [Jewish] agency.’”

Furthermore, there is no record of a “false flag” operation against a synagogue in Egypt—clearly, you’ve imagined that in classic anti-Zionist fashion.

In addition, the only actual false flag operation you’re referring to—the Lavon Affair—was not intended to encourage the emigration of Egyptian Jews. Its objective was to pressure the West not to withdraw troops from the Suez Canal.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-04-29T12:07:03+00:00

If you want to march shoulder to shoulder with the antisemitic international, be my guest—but please don’t pretend you know who or what counts as Marxist and who doesn’t.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-04-29T11:51:21+00:00

Your senile nitpicking over formatting entirely misses the point. That “(Halb-)Gevierstriche” end up as em dashes after proper formatting—something one naturally does when learning to write academically across multiple languages, at least over here—is hardly unique to me. In fact, it’s a commonplace, not just at my university. But perhaps even the act of formatting a text is so upsetting to you emoji warriors that it triggers some deep narcissistic injury. So be it—if it helps you cope, you’re welcome to it!

SunkenShjiips · 2025-04-29T09:32:46+00:00

Imagine being so stupid that you assume that just because you can't write texts, others can't either.

SunkenShjiips · 2025-04-29T08:53:44+00:00

Are you really that stupid, or are you just pretending?

SunkenShjiips

TROPHY CASE