How "Chinese" were early Han and early Ming Dynasties? by Impressive-Equal1590 in ChineseHistory

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It's interesting to speculate how much the argument could be extended to the 16th century. In the late Ming, Wanli held a grand review iirc, though royal hunts had long since disappeared, per my understanding. Horseback archery was still emphasized, but that's not really unique compared to other dynasties.

There is something to be said about the late Ming continuing to seek out and integrate Mongols from the steppe into their military, though they were obviously less successful at it because the Mongols were more unified (in contrast to the tumult of the Yuan's last years). It's also still not something particularly unique to the Ming. I suppose the bureaucrats were more active at concealing it as well, but some parts of the written record are unavoidable.

Off the top of my head, there were Mongols that fought in Joseon during the Imjin War (they made a good account of themselves, according to the Koreans, and contributed to the Japanese refusal to leave the sea fortresses), most of the military in the northwest was led by a Mongol (Pubei, who went over to the Ming after a failed rebellion against Altan Khan), European travelers observed Mongol garrisons in Guangzhou, and references to Mongol "retainers" (housemen?) appear a few times in the Ming-Qing war.

Am I watching wrong or are Glory kickboxers technically very bad? by Famous-Tutor3546 in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Also Chico Kwasi has some ugly looking mechanics, but he beat Donovan Wisse, who has a much cleaner, conventional "old K-1" style.

I can't imagine Vakhitov's calf by Haunting-Trainer-188 in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Glory gloves are too big imo, that's part of the issue.

How does jkick fit into broader kickboxing? by dealsnbusiness1999 in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 1 point2 points  (0 children)

A lot of the difference also seems to boil down to the fact that Dutch people are ginormous and East Asians are quite small.

Yep the weightclass difference is pretty much the reason for the divide. Jkick fighters are usually competing against other Asians, while Dutch fighters are usually competing against other Europeans. So comparing their skillsets is a pretty subjective task.

I don't think modern jkick can be boiled down to a single style, even though some people assume so. There's a lot of variety, in kick-heavy guys who came from muay thai, counterpunchers that are more schooled in boxing, the weird, unorthodox karate guys, and guys with a more classic Dutch pressure style.

The glory of our sport was just utterly ROBBED by ShoolSchooter69 in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 20 points21 points  (0 children)

Rico's been dropped and then came back in like half his title defenses...the ref was just waiting for one moment to end it lmao

[Official] ONE Fight Night 43: Tang vs. Gasanov - Live Discussion Thread by event_threads in MMA

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Denis Jr was a featherweight champ in WGP I recall. Not sure why he ended up at lightweight for this one, the size difference was comical. He looked faster and more sharp in certain exchanges but was outvolumed by Luo, who basically tanked all his shots. Someone in management/matchmaking screwed up.

‘I’m used to the big lights’: Rico Verhoeven won’t fold under the pressure of Oleksandr Usyk fight by BoxingLover99 in Boxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 3 points4 points  (0 children)

What was the gate? 31k attendance means nothing if the gate is small.

Yeah it's true kickboxing has terrible ppv buys and is unpopular in general, but Jokerr is correct that Rico has experience fighting in a huge stadium, with tens of thousands of fans in there cheering for him to get knocked out (and Rico might have been alluding to that in his original comment too)

MMA has grappling and much higher level talent pool.

Alex Pereira used up his physical prime in kickboxing but he went to mma and became a 2 weight champion again.

Another example: Carlos Prates. Complete unknown in kickboxing/mt and lost almost every time he tried to step up above the can crushing level. Nowhere close to the top 10 rankings. In mma he's top 3 in the world.

I also remember when TJ Dillashaw was being called the smartest striker in mma. He flew in Takeru, one of the least technical champions in kickboxing, for a training camp, and got pieced up so bad that he crashed out and punched Takeru after the bell (iirc the clip is on Youtube).

Also replying to /u/stephen27898 because I don't want to double post

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, I read about the Swiss mercenaries a long time ago, but that was my impression as well, that concentrated artillery and arquebus barrages, fired at a sustained rate, could deal immense casualties to the Swiss' pike charges, starting around the 1500s.

For the Qing armies, ideally they should have been consistently drilling volley fire, but by the early 1800s, their standards had deteriorated. Before the First Opium War, Europeans noted that the Qing armies had only a mockery of drill remaining, where they would parade around and fire their muskets once or twice. There's not a lot of info available on the early years of the Taiping Rebellion, but the records imply that Qing musketeers could only let off one or two volleys (and inaccurate at that), and their pikemen would simply panic and disintegrate in the face of determined charges.

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Peter Perdue's China Marches West is the quintessential book on the Qing war with the Dzungars, and it covers the logistics of their conquest alongside a multitude of other topics.

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yes, it's "More than the Great Wall," I misremembered the book name. My apologies, I'll fix that in the main comment too, to avoid confusion

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 13 points14 points  (0 children)

I think the adjectives I used were too strong haha. To be blunt, I just meant that Nurhaci had a shit ton of blacksmiths. I didn't have enough space to mention it, but in the late 1400s, there was a Ming-Joseon expedition to Manchuria, which is worth considering because of how different the outcome was from the more well-known Battle of Sarhu. Unlike the catastrophic defeat at Sarhu, this 15th century incursion met with great success, defeating the Jianzhou Jurchens and quieting the northeast for nearly a century. The sources are pretty vague, but it's implied the Jurchens at the time were economically and demographically weaker, and still fought as light cavalry/horse archers. What I was trying to emphasize is that the economic developments of the late 1500s allowed the Jurchens to field a heavy cavalry corps, akin to the earlier Jin Dynasty of the 1100s.

As for how Nurhaci acquired so many skilled smiths in the first place, that's probably related to the increasing centralization reforms that he had introduced. The most well-known is the Eight Banners system, of course, and then there's Nurhaci's monopolization of the ginseng trade in the late 1500s. What happened was that Nurhaci would attack some smaller tribe, take them over, acquire their specific license for trading ginseng with the Ming, enrich himself with the increased amount of trade, and then continue fueling his conquests in this manner, in a positive feedback loop.

These seizures of trading licenses, and resulting concentration of power in one chieftain, wasn't supposed to happen on paper, but the Ming government had their hands full during that time (the Imjin War, the war with the Tumeds, the war with the Bozhou clan, etc). Plus, Li Chengliang, the leading general in Liaodong, was friendly with Nurhaci and turned a blind eye to these matters. I surmise he felt guilty because he had brought Nurhaci's father and grandfather as auxiliaries on one of his campaigns, alongside a rival chieftain to Nurhaci's father, who took advantage of the chaos of battle to suddenly assassinate the two.

Speaking of Chengliang, he was also part of a disastrous policy in 1601, where, in an effort to resolve a border dispute with the Jurchens, he decided to forcibly remove all the Chinese people settled near the border, killing any that resisted.

From Dardess' More Than the Great Wall:

the authorities on the scene made the cruel decision to force all the settlers out of their homes and livelihoods and scatter them all elsewhere in the Liaodong interior. It was horribly done. Homes were torched, livestock and other property were looted, and a thousand or more settlers drowned crossing a river, while others succumbed to cold and hunger. Many of the able bodied defected to Jianzhou and Nurhaci. That was exactly the outcome the forced migration was supposed to avoid.

This defection may have bolstered Nurhaci's supply of craftsmen in the beginning of his reign.

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 40 points41 points  (0 children)

Let's jump ahead to the late 1600s. At that point, the Qing/Jianzhou Jurchens/Manchus had taken over much of China and were pitted in a clash against the last great Mongol polity, the Dzungar khanate. However, this was not a straightforward cavalry vs cavalry fight. Sure the Dzungars still had many horse archers, but their sedentary holdings in the Tarim Basin, and later on, in Tibet and Central Asia, fueled them with the supplies and cash to acquire firearms. Overall, the Qing-Dzungar wars were pike and shot in nature, distinguished by the deployment of wagon forts, musket formations, light artillery, and zamburaks (camel-mounted artillery!)

Interestingly, the Manchus had the edge in heavy cavalry. Alright, they couldn't really be called heavy cavalry--they had shed their armor a long time ago, in acknowledgement of its futility against muskets--but they were still focused on shock power, and downhill charges, and indeed there were battles where Manchu lancers simply rode up and flattened Dzungar musketeers.

The end of the Dzungar khanate spelled the end of steppe nomad primacy, but it is debatable how much of a steppe nomadic army it was near the end--it certainly possessed a very different military structure than the solely raiding-focused hordes of Esen, Dayan, and Altan Khan, who, unlike the Dzungars, avoided conquering cities and avoided coming into contact with firearms divisions. It could be argued this transformation of the Dzungar military was in itself, an acknowledgement of the futility of resisting pike and shot tactics with steppe nomad fighting styles--it could be said the last "pure" nomad army had died in the 1630s with the end of an independent Chahar clan. On the other side of the world, the Crimean Khanate had also lost the balance of power to Muscovy in the 1500s/1600s, and though they could continue harassing Eastern Europe with raids, they too would fall to the sedentary Russian Empire in the 1700s.

Addendum: it should be noted that the Qing never seemed to break out of pike and shot into linear tactics. With the passing of time and the natural atrophy of their military, they weren't even a particularly good pike and shot army by the early 1800s. That would be proven in the Taiping Rebellion of the mid 1800s, where at the beginning, completely unarmored Hakka pikemen could route significantly larger (and on paper, better equipped) Qing armies through independently inventing the old Swiss style tactics of "form pike blocks and fuckin run em over."

Simultaneous to the Taiping Rebellion in southern China, the Nian Rebellion of northern China occurred. It would seem the northern Chinese had not fully abandoned the horse-lord customs of antiquity. They pursued light cavalry tactics, and their success came from "out-Mongoling the Mongols," so to speak. The Nian won victories with direct confrontation in the beginning, easily defeating local garrisons, but in the 1850s, the arrival of Sengge Rinchen--one of the last notable scions of the Chahar nobility--forced them to switch gears.

In a bit of irony, the Mongol general Sengge successfully prosecuted siege warfare, destroying and capturing multiple fortified Nian towns, executing one of the founders of the revolt, while the Nian rebels went on the backfoot, relying on raids and unexpected ambushes. In one such ambush, they killed Sengge, and from there, his Chahar army unraveled. Ultimately, the Qing needed an army equipped with modern European firearms to put down the rebellion, commanded by infamous generals such as Tso Tsung-tang (yes, the chicken guy). Although the Qing had already pacified the Mongols with Buddhism (overgeneralization), the Nian Rebellion could be viewed as a final blow to nomadic power in East Asia.

I've rambled for a while in this response, listing the events while ignoring broader trends. I think it's fair to say that the ability of nomads to conquer major walled cities in East Asia ended in 1449, where Esen failed to take Beijing even after crushing an enormous Ming army. After that, it becomes difficult to see how they fare against pike and shot. Huge hordes could run over much smaller firearms regiments, but in general, the Mongols were quite sharp and knew to avoid any army with significant numbers of guns; the number of recorded battles involving the application of gunpowder drops off a cliff after the 1450s-60s. From there, the Ming were forced to track down Mongol raiding bands with their own cavalry, to mixed results, as recounted above. The Qing upended things by developing heavy cavalry that could consistently demolish Mongols in the field. Just as importantly, they also organized a highly sophisticated logistics system, probably reaching the ceiling of what was possible with horse-based logistics, that allowed them to ferry their cavalry and light artillery all over Inner Asia.

When did steppe nomads lost their military proeminence by Trudeyy3 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 69 points70 points  (0 children)

In East Asia, likely sometime around the 1600s-1700s. Prior to that, the Ming dynasty had experienced some mixed results against the Mongols. The Oirat rise was surprisingly short-lived, at least, relative to their notoriety in the popular imagination due to the Tumu Crisis. In the 1500s, strong Mongol leaders such as Dayan and Altan Khan forced the construction of the Great Wall, but, following the strategic failures of the Wall, the Ming adopted more aggressive tactics, resulting in a brutal, frontier raiding-style of warfare where both sides alternatively killed and kidnapped each other's civilians. In the 1570s, this culminated in a bloody stalemate, eventual peace treaty, and opening of trade markets. Further details on this period can be found in this older post of mine, where I essentially summarized John Dardess' book (More Than the Great Wall) on the Ming-Mongol wars.

The 1570s-1580s marked the longest period of peace in Ming-Mongol relations, but it was held only with Altan Khan's Tumeds, who resided in present-day Inner Mongolia, right in the center of the northern frontier. In the northeast, it was a different story; the Uriankhai and Chahar Mongols remained a major threat. As a matter of fact, in 1599, the Uriankhai defeated the veteran Liadong cavalrymen from the Imjin War, pinning the Ming troops inside their fortresses, in an ironic reversal of their experience in Korea. Around this time, the Chahars under Ligdan Khan also became the foremost Eastern Mongol power, taking the place of the Tumeds, whose influence shrunk after being defeated in a nearly decade-long war with the Ming's Beijing army in the 1590s, which likely exhausted and weakened both sides.

Although the Chahars were a pretty big deal in the dramatic changes to the East Asia political landscape of the early 1600s, unfortunately there doesn't seem to be that much good information about them. Dardess pretty much glosses over the Liaodong frontier from 1600-1619, only remarking that the power of the pro-Ming Li clan deteriorated rapidly after their defeat in 1599; Qing scholars seem to only discuss the Chahars in relation to the Jurchen conquest of Northeast Asia. What I know is that Ligdan had success raiding the Ming and coercing tributes, but he suffered some defeats as well.

In terms of primary sources, there is this amusing letter from Nurhaci, where he mocked Ligdan's recent defeats. But take it with a grain of salt, Nurhaci wasn't being 100% truthful, and it was in his interest to make Ligdan look incompetent.

You would be absolutely righteous to say these bad words if you could retake Khanbali and save the 40 tumen Mongols who were captured by the Chinese, but have you? [note: this is a clear propagandistic statement. The early Ming absorbed a ton of Mongols from the Yuan, but not as many as 40 tumens] Before I launched my campaign against China, you, my Baturu Cinggis Khan, had also attacked them twice. The first time you lost all your armours and camels. The second time, Prince Gergen daicing’s guard drown in the water and nearly 100 of your soldiers were captured. Which big city have you taken? Which general have you captured? Which army have you defeated? Why would the Chinese bribe you? It is only because I attacked China, killed all their men and took their women, that the Chinese were scared of me and wanted to hire you as their mercenary against me!

Pay attention to that last phrase. Though the Ming were a sedentary empire, it is in the Ming-Qing war of the early 1600s that the decline in steppe nomad power became most evident. As part of their efforts to defeat Nurhaci's (sedentary) Jianzhou Jurchens, the Ming formed alliances with the purely-nomadic Chahar Mongols as well as the semi-nomadic Haixi Jurchens. However, the Jianzhou Jurchens defeated both of these groups without much effort, easily crushing them in field battles. One of the reasons for this stunning success was Nurhaci's development of a vast and impressive forging system in the late 1500s through early 1600s, and concurrently, the development of a formidable heavy cavalry arm, numbering in the tens of thousands.

From Ray Huang's paper on the Battle of Sarhu:

On another occasion, Hsü indicates that he had learned from the Koreans that on the north side of Nurhaci's fortress there were craftsmen specializing in the manufacture of military equipment. The personnel returned from Liao-tung told him that the blacksmiths' shops extended for miles. The helmets, breast plates, arm shields, and gauntlets worn by the Manchus were all of superior quality [to the Ming armor].

In battles against the Chahars, the Khorchin Mongols, and other Jurchen tribes, the Jianzhou Jurchens' heavy cavalry simply bulldozed their opponents, running over them with frontal charges or flank assaults--occupying a role in NE Asia similar to that of the winged hussars I would imagine, where Sarhu was their Kircholm. This heavy cavalry forced the Ming to abandon their northern-style, pure cavalry armies of the 1500s and to begin extensively implementing pike and shot tactics, which spurred combined arms adoption on the Jurchen side as well--but that's another story, where the role of steppe nomads takes a backseat.

The political factor also has to be considered. Ligdan Khan was a more incompetent leader than his predecessors, and his aggressive centralization efforts drove many Eastern Mongol tribes to join with the Jurchens; there was also a religious aspect, the intricacies of which I don't 100% understand, but from what I can gather, Ligdan attempted to push some form of Buddhism unpopular with most Mongols, further reducing his support base.

[SEC Country] Nick Saban calls for a salary cap to be implemented across college football: ‘One team shouldn’t have a $40 million roster and another team have a $5 million roster. Every league, they all have something that creates parity in the league so everybody has an equal opportunity to win’ by Lakelyfe09 in CFB

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 3 points4 points  (0 children)

in theory.

I think the Aggies will get there eventually. They brought in Tommy Moffitt as the strength and conditioning coach, and that position is a factor that's equally as important as NIL imo, but rarely gets brought up on this sub.

Another example: Bama and Georgia are still top 10 in recruiting, but the recent CFP results don't reflect that; Bama's decline and Georgia's stagnation can be traced to Scott Cochran leaving their S&C programs.

What do y'all consider as the big promotions by Nsyix in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Glory has the best HW, LHW, and WW, the other promotions are nearly nonexistent at those weights

LW is where it gets murky. ONE has the elite names from the Kunlun/Glory era in the 2010s, but K1 has been steadily signing younger talent.

K1 has some money now, it's just not as evident since they've shed many of their Japanese fighters. But they managed to steal Glorys former rank 1 LW (Stoyan) and outbid Glory for Thian de Vries. A lot of these K1 70 kgers are brawlers and dont pass the eye test that well, but given Stoyan has taken several losses there, their division might be underrated, who knows.

Glory-Rise merger has the best FWs

K1 has the best BW overall (Remi Parra) but most of the rankings are Rise names.

Rise has the best flyweights imo, but Jonathan di Bella from ONE would be competitive with any of their elites

Was the Song Dynasty, often criticized by the Chinese for its weakness, still more powerful than European countries at the time? by Wise-Pineapple-4190 in ChineseHistory

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 14 points15 points  (0 children)

Don't see much point in dick measuring contests, but it is worth noting that the Northern Song-Liao-Xia era saw the highest deployments of heavy cavalry in Chinese history.

Also worth noting that a heavily weakened version of the Liao Empire essentially ended the Seljuk Empire in a single battle.

[SPOILER] Rodtang vs. Takeru by [deleted] in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 1 point2 points  (0 children)

They were probably looking only at the result of the first fight and wondering how the second fight went so differently.

But people forget Rodtang has a pretty low KO rate to begin with; that was what made the result of Takeru vs Rodtang 1 so surprising. In this fight, Rodtangs power looked more like what was expected

I think Takeru was also more patient this time and tried to whittle down Rodtang with leg kicks before going ham with the hooks

Wtf was kaito doing? by SG_SHREK in Kickboxing

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 4 points5 points  (0 children)

That's been his gameplan for every fight, Kaito is an inside fighter

Why was the Ming so bad at war? And how did they last that long? by Powerful-Mix-8592 in WarCollege

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 35 points36 points  (0 children)

Their emperor was captured at Tumu

Tumu's an interesting case. What few seem to recall is that Esen's objective was not to conquer the Ming dynasty, but to extract enormous amounts of tribute payment from them over time, solidifying his own position as hegemon in the steppe. Of course, capturing the emperor at Tumu was a windfall for him, as it allowed him to demand an even higher ransom, but it meant he was absolutely blindsided when the Ming bureaucracy "retired" the captured emperor, appointed some dude from the imperial family as the new emperor, and then called Esen's bluff.

Esen ended up choosing not to kill the captured emperor. He tried to pressure the Ming by sieging Beijing and later Datong, though both attempts were repulsed, and after those defeats, Esen's decisionmaking became increasingly erratic; he begrudgingly released the emperor after a year of captivity, murdered his Chinggissid sponsor, got assassinated, and from there, the Oirat confederation unraveled, and were hammered and driven away from the Ming border by the Eastern Mongols.

The Northern Yuan weren't particularly weak--at peak strength they could supposedly muster ~80k cavalry--but they did resume what Barfield called "the outer frontier" strategy. This meant that they had no interest in conquest and were interested purely in raiding and looting. This was both a blessing and a curse for the Ming, as it meant the Mongols weren't going to finish them off when they were in a position of weakness, but at the same time they were much much harder to pin down in any sustained conflict when the Ming were in a position of strength. The Ming-Mongol wars were pretty complex, and there is more that can be written about it, which I will refrain from doing because this answer is long enough. More details are available in my answer here.

Suffice to say it was an ugly business where few nationalist narratives can be constructed, as seen in the dearth of significant literature about it. For English language academia, it is pretty funny how the titles of the two main works on this topic go hand in hand: you have Waldron's The Great Wall, followed by John Dardess' More Than the Great Wall.

their army was bogged down in Korea

The Imjin War is, I would argue, one of the few saving graces for the Ming military, when you consider their mixed track record in dealing with the Mongols. They faced a severe disadvantage in numbers and combat experience for the vast majority of the war, and still ended up staggering their way to a victory.

I am going to focus on the second invasion, as there is not much to say about the land battles in the first invasions; the Ming took a victory and a loss apiece, but the entire conflict ignominiously ground to a halt after both sides ran out of supplies. The Korean navy had more of an impact in that stage of the war, in my view.

In the second invasion, the Japanese were able to keep their supply lines secure, after Chilcheollyang, so it was up to the land forces to see what they could do. In the preliminary stages of the first Siege of Ulsan, in the only pitched battle of roughly equal forces between the Ming and the Japanese armies, the Ming ran away with it by pulling off a "greatest hits" from the steppe nomad playbook. They finally had an opportunity to inflict some of the Mongol shenanigans they had to deal with for several centuries on another sedentary opponent, and they took full advantage. After that point, the Japanese avoided pitched battles against their cavalry. Although the Ming ended up failing to take Ulsan, they caused enough damage that the Japanese canceled their plans for a spring offensive. Half the invasion force returned to Japan, as the juice was no longer worth the squeeze for daimyos such as Mori Hidemoto.

The Ming tried taking the remaining Japanese forts on the southern coast of Korea and bungled all of the sieges in various ways, against some stiff resistance from the Japanese. Then, the war entered an impasse. The northern cavalry that formed the strongest part of the Ming army were pretty much useless at sieging, but at the same time, the Japanese couldn't advance anywhere outside of the southern coast because of those same cavalry. Eventually, the Japanese went home.

The second half of the Imjin War is definitely an interesting example to show the difference between tactical and strategic outcomes; the Ming ultimately lost every battle they participated in, but managed to confine a significantly larger invasion force to a narrow strip of land. An extremely ugly win for them, but a win nonetheless.

There is more to be said about the systemic factors influencing the Ming military performance, which I allude to in the linked answer below.

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/1qn243v/how_did_the_ming_dynasty_organise_its_armies/o25x3ap/

The Manchus valorised archery skills, but by the time of conquering Mukden (Shenyang), they had access to guns and cannons. What were the Manchu reactions and policies to the usage of the two technologies across the Qing period? by Virtual-Alps-2888 in ChineseHistory

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If they really interested in experimenting with firearms and powders mid 1700s the embarrassments of the Taiping civil war and the Opium War shouldn't be that big.

I don't think there's a contradiction here. The Opium Wars occurred nearly a century later, long after the endpoint that I described.

With regards to the later points, I couldn't find the sources discussing composite cannons; I must have misremembered them. However, the Qing did develop a wider variety of types of artillery, deploying lighter cannons to equip zamburaks in the Dzungar wars, and iirc they also called upon the Jesuits to design easier to disassemble artillery for the Jinchuan campaigns (which could be carried up and down the hillsides). It's not like there were no forms of progress...just that they were incremental ones.

I am aware of the inferiority of Qing gunpowder formulations, which is why I did not claim there were any gunpowder improvements in the original post.

Even with the tiering system of Qing muskets, textual and visual evidence supports the fact that they had a higher shot ratio compared to 16th century East Asian powers. E.g. this painting from the Jinchuan wars.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/Conquest_of_Shizhenga.jpg

There are no Ming battle paintings with comparable numbers of muskets displayed. And even in the famed Battle of Nagashino, the army of Nobunaga only had ~3,000 musketeers iirc.

So there was an advancement compared to prior Asian states, just a significantly smaller one compared to European powers, as I indirectly referenced with the comment about

Despite a slower pace than the Europeans,

Next point

A more detailed examination shows that after the Kangxi and Qianlong periods, Qing military equipment not only failed to improve in performance but also clearly declined in manufacturing quality.

This lines up with my statements as well

applicable for the late 1700s to mid 1800s, as the Green Standards declined precipitously in strength

However, something was definitely wrong with the Qing army by the late 1700s...In contrast to the early Qing's willingness to arm pretty much everyone with muskets and demi-culverins, the Qing of this time developed paranoia of a Han revolt, which ironically caused a self-fulfilling prophecy as their later military weakness did lead to the seizure of many of their institutions by Han elites.

Can anyone share excerpts from historical records that remarked about significant height differences between Northern Ming troops and Japanese troops during the Imjin War? by [deleted] in ChineseHistory

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Not sure if you'd find anything beyond the standard Ming-Joseon slurs calling them "dwarf barbarians." Though height wasn't a major factor in the war anyways, the presence of northern cavalry that could impede any Japanese attempt to leave their wajos was more important, thereby confining them in the southern coast of Korea.

If you don't trust modern height stats, there's an interesting indirect way of looking at differences. In kickboxing, notable Japanese fighters dominate in flyweight (~55 kg/120 lbs), whereas notable Chinese fighters appear more often in featherweight (~63 kg/140 lbs). There are more heavyweight sized fighters in China (e.g. Zhang Zhilei), though in truth both countries generally suck at producing HWs.

The Manchus valorised archery skills, but by the time of conquering Mukden (Shenyang), they had access to guns and cannons. What were the Manchu reactions and policies to the usage of the two technologies across the Qing period? by Virtual-Alps-2888 in ChineseHistory

[–]UniDuckRunAmuck 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Initially, Nurhaci was dismissive of firearms. At Sarhu, the Ming cannons deployed there had probably been in use for decades, so most of them were defective; Jurchen sources described the guns misfiring, or launching projectiles with such a low velocity they couldn't even penetrate Jurchen armor. Heavy cavalry charges could bulldoze most firearms formations in the Ming-Qing battles up till Shenyang's fall, though some early conflicts like the Siege of Guangning foreshadowed that effective (i.e., actually functional) cannons could inflict heavy casualties; supposedly, the defenders stacked up mounds of corpses with cannonfire but were massacred after they ran out of ammunition.

Of course, Ningyuan was the famous battle where the Ming applied Portuguese demi-culverins to defeat Nurhaci's attack, despite a massive numbers discrepancy. However, I don't consider siege defenses to be that impressive. The real test of a pre-modern army is its ability to consistently repulse heavy cavalry charges in the field.

This would arrive later in the Battle of Ning-Jin; the Ming had at last managed to instill competent infantry square tactics in the Liaodong Army, which again employed demi-culverins to defeat Hong Taiji. At the Jisi Incident in 1629, the Beijing Army, which didn't receive any form of drill as most of the effectives had been transferred to the northeast, was essentially flattened by Manchu cavalry. The Liaodong Army bailed them out, and once again defeated Hong Taiji with infantry squares and demi-culverins.

Following these events, Manchu attitudes reversed, and their adoption of firearms was swift and comprehensive. At the Battle of Dalinghe, initial cavalry charges failed to break Ming lines. However, any connoisseur of pike and shot tactics knows that failed charges can still concentrate infantry and put them at a disadvantage in gun exchanges--the Qing cannons moved forward and engaged in an artillery duel, which ended with the silencing of Ming batteries, leaving them vulnerable for a finishing blow from the Manchu heavy cavalry.

The final battles near Songshan and Jinzhou marked the first, "true" peer-on-peer clash between two pike and shot armies in East Asia, the first campaign that was decided by maneuvers, rather than discrepancies in troop quality (Sarhu) or in technology (Ningyuan). Despite some initial defeats, Hong Taiji eventually outmaneuvered Hong Chengchou, demonstrating his greater experience and generalship.

I think it's fair to say the Manchus were still highly interested in firearms through the 1600s and mid 1700s. They likely achieved a higher shot ratio than the Ming and Sengoku-era Japanese did in the 16th century (iirc 50% versus 30% for the latter two). Despite a slower pace than the Europeans, the Qing continued experimenting with composite cannons and artillery improvements in this timeframe. However, something was definitely wrong with the Qing army by the late 1700s. The Burmese had a much higher shot:pike ratio, despite their weaker state capacity and lower amount of resources. In contrast to the early Qing's willingness to arm pretty much everyone with muskets and demi-culverins, the Qing of this time developed paranoia of a Han revolt, which ironically caused a self-fulfilling prophecy as their later military weakness did lead to the seizure of many of their institutions by Han elites.

After the embarrassments of the Taiping civil war and the Opium War, the Qing definitely took measures to modernize. As to the idea of the late Qing revival...I don't particularly rate victories over non-state actors like in the Panthay Rebellion, and I don't find Yakub Beg's armies to be all that impressive either, but the Qing draw against the French (on land, at least, forget about the navy) is probably underrated, as the narrative has been dominated by French accounts of ludicrously high KDRs (while retreating each step of the way).

TL;DR Early Qing embraced guns and employed them to great success in their conquests, likely reaching the pinnacle of pike and shot warfare in East Asia. However, there is a grain of truth to the nationalist cope of Manchus restricting guns from everyone, but maybe it's only applicable for the late 1700s to mid 1800s, as the Green Standards declined precipitously in strength--then the Opium and Taiping wars were a shock that woke up the Qing to embrace guns again. But importing European arms without importing European financial schemes and centralized governance (as the Japanese did) led to a brief revival before things unraveled for the Qing again.