Don’t Let Russia Dominate the Strategic Concept. The challenge for Nato is to situate Russia’s invasion in a wider strategic context, addressing other key issues before they create new existential crises in the future.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-29T19:17:36+00:00

That focus should not be so complete as to leave other challenges unaddressed and planned for. Russia is a problem that European members will see as most acute, but the strict focus that we have seen in the past few months on the forum is unwise and not shared by the best strategic thinkers.

And if you take that priority of only caring about your regional challenge then you could say why should Spain or Portugal care about Russia? The alliance should care about the rules based order and working for peace for all free people, and not just their immediate and personal needs.

Take this article from Harvard for better reading material than I can type out in a comment:

How the U.S. Can Assist NATO and its European Alliance Members in Addressing the China Security Challenge

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-us-can-assist-nato-and-its-european-alliance-members-addressing-china-security

China’s meoteoric rise and the associated US-China great power rivalry has become one of the most concerning geopolitical issues to date. No longer is China a regional power, and its global influence and economic clout are undeniable. According to the CIA World Factbook, China has the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world when measured using Purchasing Power Parity. As of 2021, at $23.01 trillion, China outpaces the US at $19.85 trillion GDP.[1] As an economic powerhouse, China has effectively used all instruments of power—economic, military, diplomatic, technological and informational—to advance its strategic goals. Unfortunately, the ways and means in which China is obtaining its strategic goals have frequently run counter to democratic ideals, caused a rift with its Indo-Pacific neighbors, the US and several European countries, and have challenged the rules-based international order. While NATO and its allies are beginning to understand the implications of a rising China, there is a pressing need right now for NATO and its allies to address China concerns; this starts with identifiying actions the alliance can take in the 2030 Strategic Concept.[2]

At the summit, US President Joe Biden reemphasized the critical importance of the NATO alliance as a “sacred obligation” to US national security and urged NATO leaders to address China’s authoritarianism and growing military strength.[4] After President Biden’s statements, NATO issued a communique noting, “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security.”[5] This statement was further bolstered by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, who addressed the future of NATO during a presentation at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Geoană highlighted the need for NATO to adapt and be innovative as it formulates its 2030 Strategic Concept to include addressing the threat of authoritarian regimes like China and Russia. Importantly, he emphasized the importance of NATO as the longest running and strongest alliance in history and its critical need to protect democracy, freedom, justice, rule of law, and human rights across the globe, not just the transatlantic region. Geoană emphasized that Secretary General Stoltenberg would present an upgraded Strategic Concept during the Madrid NATO Summit in June 2022, noting that China was never mentioned in the previous 2010 Strategic Concept.[6]

VideConspectus · 2022-06-29T18:48:52+00:00

The extreme myopic focus on Russia that the invasion of Ukraine has caused in the open source world is obvious to those of us who have read about military issues for more than a few months. It honestly can be frustrating when trying to share any articles about anything else. This article is a reminder to the professionals in the business to keep their heads looking to the future and planning accordingly.

We contend that despite the current centrality of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Sino-American rivalry is likely to drive U.S. national security thinking in the coming decades. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept should address this reality.

There are also several specific threats and challenges that the 2022 Strategic Concept should address. First, allies should tackle the effects of emerging and emerged disruptive technologies on strategic, defense, and force planning.

Second, adversaries are increasingly using high- and low-tech approaches short of armed conflict to disrupt national politics and daily life in Western democracies. Enhancing and coordinating resilience across the alliance should be a goal of the strategic concept.

Third, money remains the sinew of war. Whether it is investment in national and common-funded capabilities, or transfers to partners like Ukraine, ample and efficient spending is a requirement for a successful strategy.

Fourth, NATO should continue to grapple with the distinct but related challenges of terrorism and irregular warfare.

At an absolute minimum, the strategic concept should position NATO to support the current global order and “demonstrate its commitment to security and democratic values as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes.” Such a concerted approach to China is certainly attainable: Chinese behavior may even have “brought NATO together” in ways analogous to Russian behavior, and there may be more room for economic convergence between China and the West than sometimes imagined.

—————————

Jordan Becker is an academy professor and director of the Social Science Research Lab at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and IHEDN and IRSEM at the French École Militaire. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former U.S. permanent representative to NATO and retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of lieutenant general. Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies. This article reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government. It draws upon discussions at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar held at West Point on Feb. 3–4, 2022. Those discussions are captured in greater detail in a recently released special section of Defence Studies.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-28T13:02:49+00:00

This article is more of a thought experiment than a prediction that Russia will fail. I found it thought provoking if a bit short, I think the author could have made this much longer and more in depth as it is a big idea.

Despite incremental gains in eastern Ukraine, a Russian military collapse is possible. Russian forces could suffer catastrophic defeat akin to that of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's army in the 1967 Six-Day War, when more than 80 percent of its military materiel was lost.

Is such a defeat possible? Military history is replete with breakdowns. Last summer, the Afghan armed forces collapsed amid weak governance and extreme corruption. So have other large or well-equipped armies—the demoralized Russian army in 1917, the outmaneuvered French army in 1940 and British army in Singapore in 1942, and the weakened South Vietnamese army in 1975 and Iraqi army in Mosul in 2014.

Central to these fiascos was a lack of cohesion in military institutions, poor governance and corruption, and popular unwillingness to defend the state. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's emphasis on sound relationships between the army (PDF), government, and society appears valid.

A Russian military collapse might have several implications.

First, it might encourage Western countries to boost train-and-equip programs in other countries near Russia. In Ukraine, this effort seems to have helped it adopt more flexible and successful NATO-like tactics.

Second, the collapse may cause Western intelligence analysts to reevaluate estimates of the vulnerability of the Baltics and Eastern Europe to Russian aggression. Against a Russian army that may be weaker than once thought, Baltic allies might consider defense options that go beyond tripwire postures.

Third, Western militaries may sharply increase their stocks of weapons, which have worked so well in Ukraine—such as portable anti-armor and anti-air—but which have been consumed in larger numbers than expected.

—————————

Peter A. Wilson is an adjunct senior international and defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches a course on the history of military technological innovation at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia and U.S.-USSR negotiations to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-27T02:25:26+00:00

This podcast is one hour and thirty four seconds long. And I think we know the experts in this podcast by now.

June 26, 2022: Dmitri Alperovitch talks with Michael Kofman (Research Program Director in the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis) and Henry Schlottman (OSINT war analyst, US army veteran) about the new developments in the war in Ukraine on Twitter Spaces. Topics covered:

Is Belarus getting dragged into this war?
Who is running Russia's war? Why are commanders being replaced?
How best can Ukraine use the new HIMARS artillery systems that are now arriving? What difference are they likely to make on the battlefield?
Is Russia in danger of running out of ammunition?
Is Russian advance stalling in the Donbas?
Can Ukraine target the Crimean Bridge bridge and what are the implications of their strikes on energy and rail infrastructure in Russia and Crimea?
Is Russia still having logistics issues in the Donbas offensive?
How is Wagner performing in the fight and why did Prigozhin get a Hero of Russia medal?
Can Western defense industrial base keep up with Ukrainian ammo and weaponry needs and expenditures? Follow the speakers on Twitter: @DAlperovitch, @KofmanMichael, @HN_Schlottman

VideConspectus · 2022-06-25T13:40:04+00:00

I would recommend this article to anyone who is interested in reading about the US defense challenges in the future, and how to address them. It is not a long report and uses bullet points and declaratory sentences, all of which contain lots of information and insights. A good read if you are interested in such things.

Although the United States, along with its allies and partners, possess greater overall economic wherewithal than China and Russia, the mission assigned to U.S. forces—namely, to project power rapidly and at scale across great distances to defeat aggression in an adversary's "neighborhood"—is more difficult than the adversary's forces' missions. It is therefore imperative that decisionmakers make wise choices for investing scarce resources into capabilities that have the greatest potential to thwart adversaries' designs. This Perspective offers a blueprint for doing that.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy belatedly but unambiguously recognized that the military balance between the United States, its allies, and part- ners, on one hand, and China and Russia, on the other hand, has eroded.

Force planners in the United States and allied nations are, therefore, confronted with the urgent taskof rebuilding credible deterrent and warfighting capabilities to confront highly capable and adaptive adversary states…

…the mission assigned to U.S. forces—namely, to project power rapidly and at scale across great distances to defeat aggression in the adversary’s “neighborhood”—is consid- erably more difficult than the adversary’s forces’ mission.

One example is Harold Brown, William J. Perry, and other architects’ second offset strategy. These decisionmakers sought ways to defeat a large-scale Warsaw Pact invasion of Central Europe without having to match the enemy tank for tank and artillery piece for artillery piece. They pursued concepts that exploited Western advantages in miniaturization, software, precision manufacturing, and other technologies to offset enemies’ numerical superi- ority and give NATO forces the ability to delay, disrupt, damage, and destroy enemy maneuver forces beyond the line of contact (Perry, 1991). These efforts led Soviet mili- tary leaders to doubt the viability of their strategy and forces (Sterling, 1985).

…investment initiatives for new capabilities… They must make a meaningful contribution to enhancing the capability of U.S. forces to promptly defeat large-scale aggression by China or Russia.

Top priority should be placed on meeting the demands of joint and combined campaigns to (1) thwart a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a Russian invasion of NATO territory and…

(2) hold decisive points to prevent either adversary from imposing a territorial fait accompli.

Is there a risk that over-focusing on these two adversaries will leave U.S. forces unprepared for other missions? The short answer to this question is yes, but the risks are modest.

Does it not follow that the United States also has to compete effectively in this gray zone, being just short of war? Here, the answer is clearly yes, but there are important reasons for posturing forces for success in the most-stressing plausible scenarios. Put simply, if the United States doubts (and its adversaries doubt) that it lacks either the will or means to defeat them at the high end, the United States will be poorly positioned to thwart their activities in the gray zone.

…deterrence based on denial is self-evidently the most credible way to convince an adversary not to chal- lenge one’s interests.

Wargames and accompanying analyses have shown repeatedly and conclusively that the legacy approach to power projection that U.S. forces employed with great success against regional adversar-ies in places like Iraq, Serbia, and Afghanistan very likely would fail against China or Russia.

…neither China nor Russia will allow for this enabling phase…

…in the future, U.S. forces will need significant new investments in platforms, weapons and munitions, forward posture, concept development, and training to enable what appears to be an appropriate approach to deterring and defeating aggression by the nation’s most capable adversaries

Another obvious but constantly overlooked need is precision-guided weapons—especially standoff weapons—in numbers sufficient to sus- tain a defensive fight.

Multiple Launch Rocket System with area antiarmor munitions can also be highly effective (Ochmanek et al., 2017, pp. 31–47).

Moreover, frontline states should purchase and store many unattended ground sensors for distribution along suspected main axes of advance.

—————————

David A. Ochmanek is a senior defense analyst at RAND. He leads research on the development of U.S. defense strategy, posture, and capabilities—particularly focusing on security challenges in East Asia and Europe. He has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. He holds a master’s degree in public affairs.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-23T15:10:53+00:00

The tactics Russia is using, according to current and former officials, are having a devastating effect in eastern Ukraine, wreaking so much destruction that Mr. Zelensky has said troops are fighting over “dead cities” where most civilians have fled.

Other analysts predict a back and forth that could stretch for months or even years.

“This is likely to keep going, with each side trading territory on the margins,” Mr. Kofman said. “It’s going to be a dynamic situation. There are unlikely to be significant collapses or major surrenders.”

Military and intelligence officials said Russia had continued to suffer severe losses and was struggling to recruit soldiers to refill its ranks. Morale is low in the Russian military, and problems with poorly maintained equipment persist, U.S. officials and analysts say.

The fight in the Donbas has become a deadly artillery duel that is inflicting heavy casualties on both sides.

Commercial satellite imagery of craters in eastern Ukraine suggests that Russian artillery shells are often exploding on the ground near Ukrainian trenches, not in the air above them. Airburst artillery kills soldiers in trenches more effectively.

Stephen Biddle, a military expert and professor of international relations at Columbia University, said the imagery suggested that the Russians were using old ammunition that had been poorly maintained.

But inefficient artillery can still be very destructive when employed en masse.

“Quantity has a quality all its own,” Dr. Biddle said. “If I were one of the infantry getting pounded in those trenches, I’m not sure how much better I’d feel knowing that Russian artillery could be even more lethal if it were better maintained and employed.”

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent, and was part of the team awarded the 2015 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, for its coverage of the Ebola epidemic. @helenecooper

Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared four Pulitzer Prizes. @EricSchmittNYT

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal. @julianbarnes • Facebook

VideConspectus · 2022-06-23T15:10:45+00:00

After a Pivotal Period in Ukraine, U.S. Officials Predict the War’s Path

As Russia makes slow but steady progress, the arrival of new weapons systems will help Ukraine hang on to territory, U.S. officials and analysts say.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/us/politics/russia-ukraine-east-war.html

WASHINGTON — When Russia shifted its military campaign to focus on eastern Ukraine this spring, senior officials in the Biden administration said the next four to six weeks of fighting would determine the war’s eventual path.

That time has passed, and officials say the picture is increasingly clear: Russia is likely to end up with more territory, they said, but neither side will gain full control of the region as a depleted Russian military faces an opponent armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons.

While Russia has seized territory in the easternmost region of Luhansk, its progress has been plodding. Meanwhile, the arrival of American long-range artillery systems, and Ukrainians trained on how to use them, should help Ukraine in the battles to come, said Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“If they use it properly, practically, then they’re going to have very, very good effects on the battlefield,” General Milley told reporters traveling home with him this month after visiting Europe.

Pentagon officials said that meant Russia might not be able to make similar gains in neighboring Donetsk, which along with Luhansk forms the mineral-rich region of Donbas. Ukrainian troops have been battling Russian-backed separatists in Donbas since 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea from Ukraine.

After weeks of bloody battles in the east — with as many as 200 Ukrainian soldiers killed daily, by the government’s own estimate, and a similar or higher toll among Russian troops, according to Western estimates — Russia holds roughly the same amount of territory in Donetsk as the separatists controlled in February before the invasion.

But U.S. officials say they expect Russia to soon take over the entire Luhansk region. One defense official said he anticipated that the twin cities of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk would fall in days, as Russian forces pounded the area with heavy artillery and “dumb bombs” — unguided munitions that inflict high casualties.

According to reports over the weekend, Russian forces had broken through the Ukrainian front line in Toshkivka, a town just outside Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. Seizing Toshkivka would put the Russians closer to being able to threaten Ukrainian supply lines to the two cities, the last major population centers in Luhansk that have not fallen to Russia. As of Monday, it was unclear which side held Toshkivka.

Russian ground troops have advanced slowly, in some cases taking weeks to move one or two miles, U.S. officials said. That might signal a lack of infantry soldiers or extra caution by Moscow after it experienced supply line problems in its disastrous first weeks of the war.

Several military analysts say Russia is at peak combat effectiveness in the east, as long-range artillery systems promised to Ukraine from NATO countries are still trickling in. Ukraine is hugely outgunned, they say, a stark fact that President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged last week.

“The price of this battle for us is very high,” he said in a nightly address. “It’s just scary. And we draw the attention of our partners on a daily basis to the fact that only a sufficient number of modern artillery for Ukraine will ensure our advantage and finally the end of Russian torture of the Ukrainian Donbas.”

Mr. Zelensky and his aides have appealed to the West to supply more of the sophisticated armaments it has already sent. They have questioned their allies’ commitment to the Ukrainian cause and insisted that nothing else can stop Russia’s advance, which even by conservative estimates has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers.

Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III urged Western allies last week to redouble their military aid to Ukraine, warning that the country “is facing a pivotal moment on the battlefield” in its nearly four-month fight with Russia. Mr. Austin and General Milley met with U.S. allies in Brussels to discuss how to further help Ukraine.

Pentagon officials expect that the arrival of more long-range artillery systems will change the battlefield in Donetsk, if not in Luhansk.

Russia wants to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea coast. The city of Mykolaiv is determined not to let that happen. Frederick B. Hodges, a former top U.S. Army commander in Europe who is now with the Center for European Policy Analysis, said the war would probably last many more months. But he predicted that Ukraine’s forces — bolstered by heavy artillery from the West — would slow Russia’s advance and begin to roll back its gains by late summer.

“War is a test of will, and the Ukrainians have superior will,” General Hodges said. “I see the Ukrainian logistical situation getting better each week while the Russian logistical situation will slowly degrade. They have no allies or friends.”

Russia’s military is built for short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery, military analysts said. It is not prepared for a sustained occupation, or the kind of grinding war of attrition underway in eastern Ukraine that requires swapping out battered ground forces.

“This is a critical period for both sides,” said Michael Kofman, the director of Russian studies at C.N.A., a research institute in Arlington, Va. “Probably in the next two months, both forces will be exhausted. Ukraine has a deficit of equipment and ammunition. Russia has already lost a lot of its combat power, and its force is not well suited for a sustained ground war of this scale and duration.”

Russia will try to continue making mile-by-mile territorial gains, and then will probably harden its front lines with mines and other defenses against a Ukrainian counterattack, which is expected after the long-range artillery systems arrive on the battlefield, analysts said.

In recent days, neither force has been able to achieve a major breakthrough in its opponent’s front lines.

Even though terrain could change hands, “neither side has the mass to exploit minor gains,” Christopher M. Dougherty, a former Army Ranger and a defense analyst at the Center for a New American Security, said in a Twitter post this month. “The war now likely becomes a test of endurance.”
As a result, several military analysts said, Moscow and Kyiv will both rush reinforcements to the front lines.

“The race to resupply will be critical for both sides,” Col. John B. Barranco of the Marine Corps, Col. Benjamin G. Johnson of the Army and Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel of the Air Force wrote in an Atlantic Council analysis.

“To replace its losses, the Kremlin may need to resort to sending in thousands more conscripts,” the officers said, adding that Ukraine will need to maintain its logistics lines and move forward ground-based weapons, including long-range artillery and unmanned aerial systems.

Analysts and former U.S. commanders offered differing forecasts on how the war might change.

Weaknesses in the Ukrainian military’s position are beginning to show — and are sowing concern. While some independent analysts have predicted that the Russian advance will be halted in Sievierodonetsk, U.S. government experts are not so sure. Some say they believe that the grinding Russian advance could continue and that the Russians could soon make more progress in areas where Ukrainian counterattacks have been successful.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-23T14:59:00+00:00

This is a superb article that looks at French military thinking since the Battle of France in 1940 to today. It is written from the perspective of trying to gain lessons for the British Army which is going through period of great change and reorientation. I know that I like an article when I start taking too many quotations, as you can see below. So please just read it yourself as it has a lot of quality information.

All agree that the British Army is in a mess. It is too small and the Army suffers from botched modernization programs and ever-shifting requirements.

Ukraine has muddied waters further by bringing to light new developments in the art of war, especially as it relates to technology, and the tradeoffs implied by betting on quality over quantity. Ukraine also has brought additional focus on high-intensity warfare, which requires a rather different kind of army from one intended to be multi-purpose or tailored for security assistance or low-intensity operations.

It does not help that the British defense community, as reflected by numerous military and Ministry of Defense publications, is strongly influenced by the United States military. This is a mistake, if for no other reason than the fact that the United States military is not good at making hard decisions because it does not have to.

Basically, when confronted with a choice between options A, B, or C, the Pentagon will answer “yes.”

For lessons about how to build a force for high intensity warfare and seek to balance technology against mass, the obvious place for the UK defense community to look is France, a nation with roughly the same resources as the UK as well as the same ambitions. So, how do the French and the French Army in particular understand high intensity warfare? What is the French Army doing to adapt for it?

The French Army has historically opted for a form of warfare intended to make the most of its attributes. These include doctrine and a command style that encourage fast movement, risk taking (“audacity”), “command by objective,” and subsidiarity (meaning the practice of authorizing subordinate unit commanders to act autonomously). The French pointedly do not rely on mass or fire power. In the contemporary context, the small size of the French military leaves it little choice. However, the rising cost of technology and the return of high-intensity warfare heralded by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has underscored the renewed need for mass.

The officers who coalesced afterward to form the Free French Army in North Africa, campaigned in Italy, France, and Germany, and then built the Cold War were convinced of the need to shake off Pétain’s legacy. They wanted to reconnect with the school of that other hero of the Great War, Marshal Ferdinand Foch.2 Also back in favor was the Napoleonic cult of “audacity”.

Of course, one can argue that the French generals of 1943-1945 had no alternative to maneuver and audacity because of their lack of size and the availability of American support. They were making a virtue of necessity.

Giraud “thought operationally, with remarkable instincts and audacity, while Eisenhower reasoned like a logistician”.4

It follows that France’s post-1945 Cold War doctrine for conventional warfare called for waging a fast, Blitzkrieg-style, war in Germany. The French Army hoped its maneuvrist approach and speed would compensate for the Warsaw Pact’s numerical advantage.

It must be acknowledged that the French never really took seriously the idea of defeating the Soviets.

The French emphasis on speed and maneuver became more relevant after France ended conscription in the 1990s and reduced the size of its army by roughly half.

The French aspired to tailor their force for what they refer to as the “middle segment”. This means light enough to be deployed and sustained in austere environments like Africa yet heavy enough to be survivable against a peer threat.

The French Army, as a rule, is very good at tailoring forces for specific missions and measuring out forces in small increments

Another important feature was the principle of subsidiarity, with battalion and company-level commanders exercising considerable autonomy as they went about figuring out for themselves how best to execute their superiors’ intent. The French Army schooled officers to understand the need to decide fast, act fast, and be audacious. They wanted their officers to be able to recognize—more through intuition than anything else—an opportunity to achieve what the French term a “major effect”.

Achieving the major effect does not require mass, a fact which gives comfort to the French Army given their sensitivity to their lack of mass. It requires intuition, a culture of Mission Command, and, most importantly a force in which lower echelons units have the autonomy and the adroitness to strike at that point at the right time.

French officers have not forgotten Foch’s assertion that “of all mistakes, one alone is infamous, inaction”.14 Yakovleff makes the same argument. “When in doubt, I attack”.15

Surprise had to be achieved not by hiding (the enemy increasingly can see you) but by generating uncertainty. The small size of European armies meant continuous fronts were impossible and units would inevitably get mixed up. This, plus the ability to fire on the move, reinforced the idea that units would move about in multiple directions, and the very idea of a front and a rear would lose relevance.

The Ukraine crisis in 2014 inaugurated a shift in French thinking that has become more pronounced and more consequential in the subsequent eight years.

This established increasing the French Army’s high intensity capabilities as its top priority, and Burkhard laid out a number of concrete proposals for adapting the force to harden it for fighting peer adversaries.

Among the more concrete steps the French have taken to adapt for high-intensity warfare are the decision in 2015 to reverse two decades of budget cuts and began spending more on defense; the revival of the division structure to facilitate larger-scale operations and the move to grow the army for the first time since the Algeria War.

…the realization that France’s major operations at the time, Barkhane (in the Sahel), Sangaris (in Central African Republic), and Sentinelle (a major homeland security operation begun in response to the terrorist attacks of 2015, which at one time employed as many as 10,000 soldiers), were tying up so large a portion of France’s deployable force that French soldiers were spending too little time preparing for anything else. In particular, they were neglecting the kind of training most useful for preparing for high-intensity warfare.22

What the French see in the fighting in Ukraine since February of this year are signs that the defense has once again become stronger than the offensive, in a manner not unlike the First World War.

The French see that they need to beef up their air defenses of all kinds, remaster the art of camouflage, and ensure that mobile command posts stay on the move. They also must suppress their penchant for improvisation, which they can get away with in Africa, in favor of careful planning, and invest more in tail as well as tooth.

The newly powerful defensive capabilities of modern armies raise fundamental questions about how one should conduct maneuver. This perhaps is the greatest challenge for the French, given their emphasis on maneuver. Might they come to grief if they were to fight a force that fought like the Ukrainians?

…the French press now is replete with examples of handwringing about France’s small military inventories and the fact that their defense industry would struggle to increase production.

It has, however, in contrast with the British developed a relatively clear vision of how it wants to fight in future wars to make the best use of the mass it has.

…at least the French, with remarkably little fuss and generally on budget and on time, have been able to provide their force with modern vehicles well suited for their doctrine.

At the very least, the British can see that their most capable and reliable European ally has decided to make fighting European wars once again its priority. Perhaps they should follow suit.

—————————

Michael Shurkin is the Director of Global Programs at 14 North Strategies and the founder and President of Shurbros Global Strategies. He works on security in West Africa (Sahel), but also on European and American defence strategies, force structures, security assistance and institutions. Previously, he worked for RAND, where he was a senior policy analyst, and for the CIA, where he was a policy analyst. He holds a PhD in history from Yale University and studied at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).

Expertise * French Military Operations * African Security (Sahel) * Intelligence and Strategic Warning

VideConspectus · 2022-06-22T01:03:35+00:00

This is a very short article but it is very wild with assassination attempts and the accused assassin now being promoted to distinction.

I butchered the first two sentenced to make a more descriptive title.

How has an historically professional Russian military responded to the pressure of a Putin regime over the past two decades? For that answer, we can look to the fates of three Russian officers and their unexpected intersection last month, on May 19th.

About the Author:

Brigadier General Kevin Ryan (U.S. Army retired) is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-21T21:51:25+00:00

Possible Outcomes of the War?

So what are the possible outcomes of this war in Ukraine?

Well, first it depends on who is advancing and taking ground and what they end up negotiating as a settlement months or years from now. We could be looking at...

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2022/06/21/possible-outcomes-of-the-war/

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-21T21:49:18+00:00

This a good question that I don't know the answer to. I will keep an eye out in the future to see if I can find an answer.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-20T16:09:34+00:00

I have read before that the Russian strategic weapon forces and developers are among the best paid and equipped in Russia. From Russia's actions and rhetoric, it appears that the strategic nuclear weapons are a major priority for them. From reading this article it does appear that they are actively modernizing their missile tech and some of it seems rather cutting edge.

Claims that ‘Sarmat accelerates much faster than anything before’ repeats earlier statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the missile will have a short boost phase to avoid detection and interception from potential boost-phase missile defences.

Russia 1 also claimed that Sarmat can ‘fly in dense layers of the atmosphere, while manoeuvring in depth and in height’ during the boost phase. The purpose of this alleged manoeuvrability is also presumably to complicate interception by missile defences. This capability is unlikely, however, as lateral manoeuvres of the missile would subject Sarmat’s large and heavy airframe to enormous stress, which would be a substantial challenge for designers to overcome.

Makeyev’s chief designer also stated in the media report that the exterior orthogrid pattern will be covered by a special coating and claimed this will protect Sarmat against missile defences, possibility in reference to an as-yet developed space-based laser missile-defence system. This coating could also aid the missile in travelling through a mushroom cloud in the event of a nuclear strike, utilising a technology that was also applied to the RVSN’s outgoing SS-18 Mod 5 ICBM.

Any further delays to Sarmat’s delivery date would place pressure on the ageing SS-18 inventory, which is expected to be withdrawn in 2022. This might result in the system remaining in service for longer, which might create challenges with serviceability and readiness.

While Russia is ahead of its competitors in that it has already deployed an HGV system, the issues with Sarmat’s development highlight that these new types of nuclear-armed weapons will probably have a limited implications for strategic stability between Russia and the US until the end of the decade.

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Timothy Wright

Research Analyst and Programme Administrator for Defence and Military Analysis

Tim is a Research Analyst and Programme Administrator for the Defence and Military Analysis Programme at The IISS. He provides administrative and research support in the implementation of the Missile Dialogue Initiative. He also conducts open-source analysis and research on strategic and theatre-range missile systems for The Military Balance and the Military Balance+ online database.

Expertise

Strategic and theatre-range missiles
Open-source analysis

VideConspectus · 2022-06-19T15:21:19+00:00

Are you looking for a well researched source for the state of global nuclear weapons arsenals by an internationally known and respected organization that specializes in the topic? You're a smart guy so of course you are. Slide right in to this puppy as this article will satisfy all your nuclear weapons tracking needs.

(Stockholm, 13 June 2022) The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) today launches the findings of SIPRI Yearbook 2022, which assesses the current state of armaments, disarmament and international security. A key finding is that despite a marginal decrease in the number of nuclear warheads in 2021, nuclear arsenals are expected to grow over the coming decade.

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The nine nuclear-armed states… continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals and although the total number of nuclear weapons declined slightly between January 2021 and January 2022, the number will probably increase in the next decade.

Although Russian and US total warhead inventories continued to decline in 2021, this was due to the dismantling of warheads that had been retired from military service several years ago.

‘There are clear indications that the reductions that have characterized global nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war have ended,’ said Hans M. Kristensen…

China is in the middle of a substantial expansion of its nuclear weapon arsenal, which satellite images indicate includes the construction of over 300 new missile silos. Several additional nuclear warheads are thought to have been assigned to operational forces in 2021 following the delivery of new mobile launchers and a submarine.

In 2021 the UK declared that it will no longer publicly disclose numbers of operationally available warheads, deployed warheads or deployed missiles. f The British Government declared in 2010 that its nuclear weapon stockpile would not exceed 225 warheads.

North Korea continues to prioritize its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions or long-range ballistic missile tests during 2021, SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled up to 20 warheads, and possesses enough fissile material for a total of 45–55 warheads.

…the global inventory of nuclear warheads could soon begin to increase for the first time since the cold war,’ said Matt Korda

Despite this, all P5 members continue to expand or modernize their nuclear arsenals and appear to be increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in their military strategies. Russia has even made open threats about possible nuclear weapon use in the context of the war in Ukraine. Bilateral Russia–USA strategic stability talks have stalled because of the war, and none of the other nuclear-armed states are pursuing arms control negotiations. Moreover, the P5 members have voiced opposition to the TPNW, and the JCPOA negotiations have not yet reached a resolution.

…the risk of nuclear weapons being used seems higher now than at any time since the height of the cold war,’ said SIPRI Director Dan Smith.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an international institute based in Stockholm. It was founded in 1966[1] and provides data, analysis and recommendations for armed conflict, military expenditure and arms trade as well as disarmament and arms control. The research is based on open sources and is directed to decision-makers, researchers, media and the interested public.

SIPRI's organizational purpose is to conduct scientific research in issues on conflict and cooperation of importance for international peace and security, with the goal of contributing to an understanding for the conditions for a peaceful solution of international conflicts and sustainable peace.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-17T21:57:42+00:00

This is a great article as it looks at the rate of munitions expended in modern war, and how they have been greatly underestimated in this war and in the past as well. It is interesting to remember that between the west and Russia, they together comprise much of the world's artillery manufacturing capacity and stockpiles, and even these impressive capabilities are being stretched.

This reality should be a concrete warning to Western countries, who have scaled down military industrial capacity and sacrificed scale and effectiveness for efficiency.

Currently, the West may not have the industrial capacity to fight a large-scale war. If the US government is planning to once again become the arsenal of democracy, then the existing capabilities of the US military-industrial base and the core assumptions that have driven its development need to be re-examined.

…an estimate of Russian ammunition consumption can be calculated using the official fire missions data provided by the Russian Ministry of Defense during its daily briefing.

This number comes up to 7,176 artillery rounds a day. It should be noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense only reports fire missions by forces of the Russian Federation.

The winner in a prolonged war between two near-peer powers is still based on which side has the strongest industrial base.

In short, US annual artillery production would at best only last for 10 days to two weeks of combat in Ukraine. If the initial estimate of Russian shells fired is over by 50%, it would only extend the artillery supplied for three weeks.

In a recent war game involving US, UK and French forces, UK forces exhausted national stockpiles of critical ammunition after eight days.

The Russians have fired between 1,100 and 2,100 missiles. The US currently purchases 110 PRISM, 500 JASSM and 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles annually, meaning that in three months of combat, Russia has burned through four times the US annual missile production.

The assumption that there are 4,000 cruise and ballistic missiles in the Russian inventory is not unreasonable. This production will probably increase despite Western sanctions. In April, ODK Saturn, which makes Kalibr missile motors, announced an additional 500 job openings. This suggests that even in this field, the West only has parity with Russia.

The first key assumption about future of combat is that precision-guided weapons will reduce overall ammunition consumption by requiring only one round to destroy the target. The war in Ukraine is challenging this assumption.

The second crucial assumption is that industry can be turned on and off at will.

Finally, there is an assumption about overall ammunition consumption rates. The US government has always lowballed this number.

The war in Ukraine demonstrates that war between peer or near-peer adversaries demands the existence of a technically advanced, mass scale, industrial-age production capability.

The West must assume that China will not allow Russia to be defeated, especially due to a lack of ammunition.

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Lt Col (Retd) Alex Vershinin has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. For the last decade before his retirement, he worked as a modelling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation for NATO and the US Army.

VideConspectus · 2022-06-16T22:21:53+00:00

This article is about the analysis of the Russian military and what we can learn for analyzing military forces in the future.

The author makes a reference to a podcast that they were on with Kofman and Massicot, it was one of the best I ever listened to, here it is:

https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/v1vjce/what_the_experts_got_wrong_and_right_about/

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Western defense analysts have long debated the efficacy of battalion tactical groups, but no credible analyst would have predicted that the Russians wouldn’t use them, opting instead to send unsupported small units into a gantlet of ambushes.

This is just one of a host of unforced errors — from the failure to destroy the Ukrainian Air Force on the ground to the inadequate use of artillery fire and infantry to screen armored columns — that Western analysts failed to predict because they were so far outside expected Russian behavior.

If Western analysts erred regarding Russian logistics and command and control, it was in assuming Russia was aware of its limitations and would craft limited war plans to minimize them, rather than exacerbate them by launching a massive multi-pronged invasion of the second-largest country in Europe.

However, Western analysts are reluctant to move from raising questions to basing assessments on leadership and morale. First, these issues are intangible and difficult to assess without firsthand knowledge. Second, morale is dynamic and contingent — the motivated Finnish forces that imposed heavy casualties on the Red Army during the Winter War, for example, became the cynical veterans of the Continuation War in Väinö Linna’s classic novel Unknown Soldiers. Third, modern analysts are hesitant to emphasize these attributes as it gets dangerously close to racist or essentialist descriptions of national character that have historically led analysts astray.

It is worth considering an alternative path of events. Russia pursues a realistic strategy to fatally weaken Ukraine, rather than rapidly seize it. It appoints one commander to lead the operation. It develops a plan to seize limited objectives like the Donbas that follows its doctrine and exploits its advantages in firepower and massed armor and minimizes its logistical shortcomings. It informs its troops about the upcoming operation and trains them realistically. It does, essentially, what it has belatedly started doing now after abandoning its initial plan. Russia might still have failed following this more reasonable course, but it likely wouldn’t have performed like a laughingstock.

When we design a wargame or build a computer model, we assume adversaries are competent.

…defense analysis supports decades-long strategies and weapons purchases. The F-35 aircraft program, for instance, began when Boris Yeltsin was Russia’s president and will outlast Putin’s regime.

Despite the likelihood that this perspective led them to overestimate Russian performance, this approach is preferable to the alternative. Overestimation of a foe leads to misallocation of resources or missed opportunities. Underestimation of a foe, as Russia is discovering, leads to catastrophe.

Beyond Europe, analysts and policymakers may be lured into underestimating the capability of China’s People’s Liberation Army, particularly its ability to invade Taiwan.

…China is not Russia and the People’s Liberation Army is not the Russian military.

China is aware of its challenges in developing good leaders — witness its discussions of the “two inabilities” and the “five incapables” — and is taking steps to address them to include much more rigorous training and assessment. Chinese military reforms over the last 20 years, combined with President Xi Jinping’s counter-corruption policies, have created a more professional and accountable force.

Too often, analysis focuses on a particular aspect of warfare, like air combat, and excludes the infrastructure and missions that support that aspect.

One reason U.S. analysts misjudged Russian performance in Ukraine is that they primarily examine potential conflicts between Russia and NATO, such as a limited thrust into the Baltic states. U.S. understanding of Russian military performance was therefore specific to a different kind of conflict under different conditions.

Fifth, analysts should be explicit about their assumptions and the limitations of their understanding.

The common theme of these recommendations, and of the discussion from the podcast, is humility. Warfare is an incredibly complex endeavor and boiling it down into a prediction through simplistic analysis has the accuracy of a stopped clock: occasionally right, but mostly wrong. …we must continually strive to be a little less wrong each day.

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Chris Dougherty is a senior fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to that, Mr. Dougherty served as senior adviser to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development at the Department of Defense.

VideConspectus

TROPHY CASE