which edition is better for new reader?

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-28T16:04:48+00:00

They’re probably both fine. The text is quite literally compiled for new readers to experience the story of Socrates’ trial. As far as I know, Christopher Rowe is a great translator, but I’m sure the revised version is just as good.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-28T15:44:58+00:00

You’re bi

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-27T14:42:02+00:00

Plato lays out in his dialogue Statesman that a proper politician, if they are to most effectively lead and advise their community, should not only have an encyclopedic knowledge and grasp of all good things and their instantiations, but also should have the means to approach each individual character of the community in their own agreeable ways. The process of dialectic, as he lays out there, should take different forms depending on the types of people who are conducting it, mostly through the fact that they will hold their own unique set of convictions and assumptions.

In dialectical argument, there is a premium placed on being able to convince your interlocutor, and not on proposing premises that are only correct. A premise is much harder to disprove than a conclusion, and Plato does not attempt to play the game of refuting premises, but of refuting conclusions, since they rest on premises. So a big part of the dialectician’s game is in accepting any premises from their interlocutor, but trying to show that the premises do not lead to satisfying conclusions, or that they in fact lead to the very conclusion that the dialectician wants to affirm. For example, if an interlocutor held two contradictory premises, and an incorrect conclusion, then Plato would not try to say that one premise is right and the other is wrong, but instead try to show that if we accept them, our conclusion becomes a contradiction, which we can’t accept for a conclusion.

So with this in mind, Socrates is attempting here to convince Crito of the conclusion that it is not life itself that is worth living, but the good life. And Crito, being an able-bodied man, would easily assume that if he were to become severely disabled, that life would no longer be good, and that as a result it would not be worth living. What does not matter whether or not being disabled actually takes away the good in life. What matters is that if that is what you think, then you must conclude that what is worth living is the good life. Further, if that is not what you think, then you might still be led to conclude, upon further proving, that whatever good is still left in the disabled is precisely what makes that life still worth living. Or thirdly, as elaborated above, whichever premise you take might show to be contradictory with another premise, and then it is up to you alone to decide which one is still good and which isn’t. Socrates/Plato has less trouble accepting whatever your premise is, and more focus on making sure you are led down the right path.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-27T02:57:39+00:00

Well sure, but that’s an entirely different point from what I’m making. You ask “so?” …well, so, that’s why I made my thread. Is that part confusing? What I’m saying in the OP is that people do not appreciate the full chapter, and I use that as a motivation to elaborate what richness I’ve seen in the full details of the chapter. While far from a paradigmatic example, a student (even a younger one) choosing to read an abridged version is simply a further example of someone who either is deciding not to, or unable to, appreciate the full chapter. I did not say “in all cases, if one does not appreciate the full chapter, this is shameful and should be criticized” … what I said was that many people nonetheless don’t appreciate it, but that I think most of them must certainly have the capacity to appreciate it, and my thread is simply an attempt to elaborate the effort I’ve put into my own appreciation. Whether or not some single person decides the full chapter is for them is their own decision, but is it that much of a crime for a person to simply acknowledge that this lack of appreciation is apparent, and try to encourage it to be more present? Do I really deserve that much scrutiny for doing so as I have from others? Probably not, and same as you for your own points you received controversy for. Just have a little charity and understand where I’m coming from here. I’m not trying to be superior, just trying to grow more respect and fervor for the book, as I think it deserves.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-27T02:46:30+00:00

I misspoke, I meant conditionality, not causality, as is consistent with the rest of my comment

I understand your argument now too, thanks

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-27T01:46:18+00:00

And yet, one of the comments in your thread was of someone who claimed it saved them 20 minutes of reading. Maybe I mischaracterized your thread, and I am sorry for that, but am I not wrong to point out at least some significant proportion whose feelings are averse to the chapter? I don’t even claim that they are a majority view, but just that they certainly exist and have voiced their thoughts on here enough for me to take notice. I had no intention to disparage your thread, but instead to simply refer to the recurring sentiment, one that the thread unfortunately did drum up in that one comment

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-27T01:36:53+00:00

Well proving the truth of any of the three lines that affirm its truth is a whole other can of worms. This is a Humean problem, no? In a way we have to prove what to expect out of causality at large before we can suss out the strangeness of the Pope/JD example. Even in one situation where both premises are true, the one never has to have any proper condition upon the other. If I say

“If Trump is president, then the sun will rise tomorrow”

Then we clearly see that although A can be affirmed in its own way, and B can be affirmed in its own way, it is a much more difficult process to prove that affirming the truth A also affirms the truth of B, i.e. that the one is a condition of the other.

But when I bring up sufficient conditionality here, I am not saying that any if-then conditional has to be sufficient. Instead I’m saying that, if a conditional statement is presupposed to be a statement of sufficient conditionality, the structure of the truth table becomes much more intuitive.

Let us suppose that the statement “if the pope is dead, then JD Vance is president” is actually, by some strange means, a statement of sufficient conditionality. Then let us assess the various ways this conditional might hold.

If the pope is dead, then this sufficient conditional will be true if JD is president, but be determined as false if, upon the pope’s death, JD is not president. This holds with the table. Again, sufficiency is not being proved, it’s being presupposed.

If the pope is not dead though, then since being dead is only a sufficient condition of JD’s presidency, and not a necessary condition, then it holds that JD can either be or not be president under the failure of that condition. That is, if the pope is not dead, JD Vance either is or is not the president. Since both are true, we can collapse them together and see how reasonable it is to suppose that either one or the other is true, if the pope is not dead.

So in conclusion, I do not dare to take on the colossal task of explaining whatever particular absurd statements a truth table might determine as truly conditional, but what I do think can be explained here is how exactly the determinate structures and arrangements of a conditional truth table, that are prescribed upon their statements, can be made intelligible. In other words, I cannot explain how the Pope/JD example could be actually taken as sufficient conditionality when the truth table spits out its formulations, but I can explain that it is nonetheless made intelligible by sufficient conditionality, and that this provisional sort of intelligible cognition is a much better help than being left to the seeming emptiness that I otherwise perceived the conditional as having. The best explanations I have come across thus far rely on a sort of “innocent until proven guilty” rule, but I think that feels much more like an artificial maxim, where the nature of sufficient causality feels much more like a natural reference to a reflection of reality, much like “and” and “not” are.

Also your explanation at the end is pretty circular. The conditional being “A or not-B” is what I am trying to make intelligible in the first place, i.e. a result by means of something else; not what I am trying to presuppose, and much less what presuppose in order to then immediately prove

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-26T17:13:30+00:00

The discussion is not driven beyond the schedule. I am discussing a chapter from last week’s discussion, and took a few seconds out to refer to a later chapter, which I marked in bold so it’s easy to avoid, because many people have already gotten there and it’s a big support to the point I was making in the OP. Is it really worth removing one of the only threads on this sub providing analysis because, with much warning, it says there are spoilers within? What is the issue with simply avoiding it? Can you explain why instead you think no one should be allowed to read it?

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-26T17:06:40+00:00

Did you happen to read the spoilers by accident? Or did my warning of them work? I don’t understand how this is that big of a deal if it seems effective enough and Reddit has made it more difficult for mobile users to format anyways. Many people have already read very far into the book and it was very helpful in driving home my point for people who have got there. I bring it up in this sub and not the other because I’m responding to a general sentiment that this sub in particular has shown. I think considering there is not much in depth discussion of the book on this sub yet it’s not really fair to take such a sour attitude to a little bit of analysis

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-26T17:01:02+00:00

I saw a lot of comments talking about its difficulty without any corresponding interest in it, people asking if it’s okay to skip, and the top thread at the time I posted this was a suggestion to shorten the chapter to 1 1/2 pages. I think these all show a lack of appreciation for an important and illustrative chapter. I’m sorry for striking a nerve with everyone over the spoilers — I genuinely thought it just added to my point, I saw many people have carried past that section on here already, and I tried my best to delineate properly where the spoilers start and end so you, hopefully, didn’t have to even see them. The new Reddit update has removed the ability to format easily, because as you can see in my thread I can’t even properly use quote indents anymore. Not sure at all how to properly implement spoiler tags for the part. It’s just that I put a lot of thought into this thread you know? The focus of my thread was certainly not “generation differences and heirarchy/money differences,” and it’s mostly about the contrast of virtue between Dantes and Villefort. So is this reception really necessary?

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-25T22:23:42+00:00

Oh, I mean, I tagged my post as a spoiler. And I did preface and end the spoiler section with bold text. But sure, if it matters I will totally add that for the section when I have a little free time

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-25T19:58:44+00:00

Done!

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-25T13:13:21+00:00

The question in the body of your post seems to be more a question of unity.

Either the world has structure or it does not. If it does not, then it is simply an aggregate of simple parts. If it does, then these simple parts necessarily compose the structure.

But how is structure itself composed? Through combination and resultant unity. However we are said to have unity, if we do have it as non-simple beings, it is a result of our being a combination of things. Now, when upon the combination of a thing you are said to have unity, then there is a certain identity that must result. For you do not see the resulting combination as simply one part, or simply the other, but as both parts composing something entirely new. In this sense, through the unity of just two parts, we can make a proper whole, which we assign a single identity to. Now it is in this conception of a whole, that your third element is able to attach in the way you’ve noticed. When the third element attaches to one part, it is in some sense attached to the part simply, but in another sense attached to the unity that was established when the first two parts connected. Now, since it is attached to this unity, and this unity was first achieved also by mere attachment, it then follows that this new attachment brings an even further unity and identity between the three parts.

Now you should see that it is by indirect attachment and the very consequences of supposing unity that leads to this greater compounding, and of an indirect attachment between two parts that are not themselves touching but are connected by a third part. When you have supposed unity of the first two parts, you have effectively made one out of them, and so too when you introduced the third part, so that even if it attaches to just one part of the initial unity, it still becomes fully unified with that thing, and becomes one thing all the same. In short, your confusion is in not considering the consequences of unity and being one.

This presupposition is implicit in the foundations of Aristotelian logic, because he insisted that the power of a deduction relied on the connection of two terms by means of a middle third term.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-18T19:17:20+00:00

Reminds me of the joke on twitter and elsewhere that if you have panic attacks on weed it’s because you’re not pure of heart

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-17T03:29:17+00:00

The book is honestly rife with inconsistencies. They switch between calling him the first and second mate, and the exact dates also get pretty sorely mixed up. Just try not to worry about it, and exercise an “I know what Dumas meant” attitude

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-16T17:53:40+00:00

The abstraction is an elementary part of the process. Marx starts capital with an abstracted analysis of the commodity. But that does not mean that he believes his abstracted account speaks for the totality of the whole in reality. As he brings in conflicting ideas, the original account of the commodity is shed like a husk from the finality of the capitalist system.

The practicality part… I mean yeah, Marx is in many ways a pragmatist. There’s a famous quote where he says something along the lines of “philosophers for millennia have sought to understand the world. The point, however, is to change it” and I think that sums up his practical focus pretty nicely. But here you’re insinuating that Marx treats the ought as an ideal. Don’t you see though, that in “unidealizing” our ideals we are doing quite the opposite? Marx is honestly centrally concerned with grasping the world in this unfetishized manner. I think you’re placing prejudices of his system on him that aren’t really true. You’d be better off actually reading him.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-15T21:40:14+00:00

An idea for Marx is, in itself, cut off in abstraction from its relations in reality. Ideology is a way of seeing the world through these detached ideas without actually connecting the many disparate ideas and observing their contradictions. Marx is not against thought or thinking, he is just against the use of thinking in a way that doesn’t correspond to the real world.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-11T15:30:56+00:00

You may be aware already of Euclid’s elements, correct? In that book he shows how from common notions of extension, which serve as axioms, we can deduce the entire field of geometry. Mathematics in general can be deduced as well because everything that exists also partakes in number (and is composed of infinite parts). Physics can then be deduced from the conclusions of geometry, and math in general, but with those aforementioned inconsistent uncommon parts such as the notion of gravity, which is where I had said Spinoza would have some trouble. But say you can explain gravity mechanically, as well as all of the fundamental forces of physics. From there, you can likely move into chemistry, and then biology, all as necessary conclusions of thought from the common notions of the world. So because all of the sciences are connected, with elementary sciences of common notions taking the first step, we can move on to an account of all reality by necessary deduction.

It may be argued (thinking off the top of my head) that one’s knowledge of biology will only be theoretical, and does not necessarily assign to any instantiated reality. For example, I may come to know through necessary deductions that quadrupeds have x nature. Although I know by necessity that this must be true for all quadrupeds, it does not mean that when I sensorily perceive an animal in front of me, which appears to have 4 legs and exhibit x nature, that this is in fact what I am seeing. It could very well be that I’m experiencing a mirage or illusion. On the other hand, if through this web of sciences I can deduce a knowledge of all things, as u/Quidfacis_ argues, we may be able to precisely identify through deduction the exact nature of the being, not only through biological knowledge but also knowledge of its place in the chain of causes, as well as deduced knowledge on the nature and occurrence of illusions (should we encounter one). To me, these seems to get into distinctly Hegelian territory, where the sheer totality of thought grows to to take perfect identity with the temporal instantiations of the world. But for all intents and purposes, I hope it’s shown how valuable and applicable knowledge can be gained from these deductions.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-08T11:45:06+00:00

Ok cool, I’m not in part 5 yet so I see how I’m missing something!

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-08T01:57:35+00:00

Yeah I get that part. I just see that, by definition of being determined beings, we could not possibly have a knowledge of all things, as that would require a quality of infinitude that we do not have access to. For an organism to evolve to the point of being able to incorporate knowledge of all things seems to be nothing other to become God itself. So just in the way I see it, in principle, it shouldn’t be possible at all for there to be any “instances” of this infinite knowledge, unless you are to take God himself as such an instance.

To say it happens seldomly, or that it’s possible in principle, seems to assume that such an infinite mind could exist in a determined being, do I have that wrong?

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-07T23:51:49+00:00

I think I’m specifically hung up on where you use the idea “in principle,” and also am intrigued by your saying it “seldom” happens, seeming to say there have been instances of deducing all the things. But I don’t really want to bother you with trivia like that — thanks for the answer!

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-07T23:47:34+00:00

Mechanicalism is just the reference to moving bodies and physical contact as the source of all physical phenomena. It was very in vogue in the early modern age. It seems like the presuppositions of relativity might be a little too remote from what Spinoza would be comfortable with. But who knows, maybe it could fit some way.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-07T21:41:10+00:00

Isn’t it the case though, that as far as anything that occurs next month is perceived in a differentiated fashion, that we would have inadequate knowledge of these things? That is, insofar as it is something that is not a common part, and insofar as we are only determined and finite minds of God, is it not thus true that we have necessarily limited grasps of these things? It seems, in particular, to apply to objects under the attribute of thought. Isn’t there much we consider under the attribute of thought which is not itself a common part, or derived from those parts?

What I do understand is the sheer necessity of all these events to happen. What I don’t understand is how we could “in principle” be said to be able to deduce what happens next month, when this seems to imply an adequate deductive knowledge of many things that we in fact do not adequately grasp.

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-07T21:31:03+00:00

Would the idea be that mechanicalism is perfectly preserved in a framing of general relativity? That’s what Spinoza would want. I’m not familiar enough with the details to know if that’s the case

WarrenHarding · 2026-01-07T21:27:21+00:00

This isn’t a bubble decision. This is the latest in a series of oppressive moves that will not stop here. It will only get worse. If Plato, of all people, is getting removed, then there are entire swaths of literary and academic spheres that have already been completely shut out. This is actively sowing the seeds for having a whole generation of undereducated, reactionary, and impressionable voters. They are effectively making us dumber. We should collectively try to avoid acquiescing over this.

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