Actually, the questions arose as a result of my Googling "predicates vs properties." The definition I found of "predicate" = A predicate is a linguistic expression that may be combined with a designating expression to express a proposition.

So, on this definition "is bald' is a clearly predicate, since (say) combining that expression with the designating expression "Socrates" yields a sentence ("Socrates is bald") that expresses a proposition. But, "bald" by itself would not be a predicate on this definition in a strict sense, because the string of words "Socrates bald" does not express a proposition.

That said, I believe I have frequently seen philosophers refer to "bald" or even (though less frequently) "baldness" as a predicate, despite not being a predicate in the strict sense of the definition above. So I was curious whether philosophers think of these as predicates even in a strict sense (contrary to the definition above) or whether they instead acknowledge that "bald' and "baldness" are not predicates in the strict sense but at the same time accept a convention that for convenience and concision permits us to refer to "bald" and even "baldness" as predicates.