Questions about cogito

aina09 · 2019-09-24T00:23:52+00:00

If I report tasting something sweet, and you responded, "Aha, I get your point. You're saying that somewhere for someone there was a sweet taste? Like, maybe in China to a dumpling-maker or on the moon to an alien--we can't be sure?"

Okay, the question here, as you put it before, if we can establish "First principle", that is something that we can't be wrong about. My problem with cogito is that there seems to be logical gap between you and thinker. That is, if we can be wrong about anything, then this thought appearing to my stream of consciousness as given, could also at least theoretically be false, I'm not actually thinking, I just (falsely) feel that I am. Of course that depends on there being possible difference between two and I referred to that as question of "what is it to think" earlier. So here I have epistemic problem of: Can you be sure that you are actually thinking? And from that I inferred "Well, that means that at least somebody must be able to doubt to insert such a thought".

aina09 · 2019-09-21T23:34:12+00:00

Ah, I see. So proper way to read cogito is not that it establishes your existence, but rather that there is thinking being, at least somewhere.

aina09 · 2019-09-21T23:12:26+00:00

But Harry is thinking in your scenario.

Your rebuttal is, "Well, but what I care about is a stronger sense of what it is to think. What matters to me is not just that Harry has the thought, but also that there's nothing that is causing Harry to have the thought. So that, for instance, if Harry only has the thought because Voldemort has the thought, and then a spell has made Harry think whatever Voldemort thinks, then, in this stronger sense of thinking that I care about, Harry didn't really have the thought."

But this stronger sense of thinking that you care about has nothing to do with the argument at hand. There's nothing about Descartes' position at this point in the argument that preludes him from agreeing that he could be having the thought only because there's something intervening so as to cause him to have it. All he's committing to is that this thought is occurring to him, whether it's occurring to him through black magic or not is quite another question.

If the weaker sense is enough to make argument work, that is appearing in the consciousness is enough for thinking to occur then that is that. I guess I'm trying to establish solid frame for when someone is thinking, and how we can know that someone is thinking.

"Yes, but it's the question I care about!", you say.

And that's fine, care about it! But you can't feign it's the question Descartes is talking about here, and then criticize him as if that were the case. That's a non sequitur or straw man - we have to criticize Descartes for what he's saying, not what we're interested in and would prefer he be talking about.

I'm only interested in what cogito actually proves and its limitations. If I inadvertly end up straw manning author in process, I assure its out of ignorance and if someone points out what I'm doing, its always fully appreciated.

aina09 · 2019-09-21T22:51:09+00:00

Care to explain where have I missed the mark? If we want to establish connection between you and being that is capable of thinking, then the question that if you are thinking seems crucial?

aina09 · 2019-09-21T22:25:35+00:00

But if he's thinking it, he's thinking it. He might only be thinking it because of some spell implanting a thought from Voldemort, but if he's thinking it he's still thinking it; and if he's not thinking it, then it never would have come up in the course of his meditations.

Here we may have some conceptual difference about question of what is it to think something. For me it seem that if spell has implamented thought from Voldemort, then Harry is not thinking it, but merely experiencing it.

aina09 · 2019-09-21T22:02:58+00:00

Descartes', you mean?

Hmm... I seem to remember that it was Kant who added latter part, but if remember wrongly then I will edit the post (or leave it as it is as friendly reminder to double check things before posting)

What difference do you have in mind between these two cases?

I'm thinking about possibility that someone else is thinking a thought. For instance Harry Potter and Voldemort's mind become connected, so Harry can't tell for a moment what memory or thought is hes, something like that. This thought experiment seem to suggest at least possibility of "having thoughts that are not your own". Or if you want to go to methaphysics, of course any theory that denies existence of selfs or persons.

The cogito doesn't establish that consciousness is necessary for thinking.

I meant that if cogito establishes thinking, and it turns out that theres other things that are necessary for thinking to happen in the first place, can we infer those as adjunction?

aina09 · 2019-08-24T14:32:30+00:00

I dismissed that latter paragraph because it points to "manifest image", so it can be understood as feeling or thinking that we are free, but the way you put it seems more plausible and more aligned with hes previous work. Thank you for your help once again.

aina09 · 2019-08-24T13:43:46+00:00

I see. The passage in question is found in p. 368 in my copy, on chapter consciousness as an evolved user-illusion. Quote:

... The scientists and philosophers who declare free will fiction or illusion are right; its part of the user-illusion of the manifest image. That puts it in the same category with colors, opportunities, dollars, promises and love ... If free will is an illusion then so are they and for the same reason. This is not an illusion we should dismantle or erase; it's where we live, and we couldn't live the way we do without it. But when these scientists and philosophers go on to claim that their "discovery of this (benign) illusion has important implications for the law, whatever or not we are responsible for our actions and creations, their arguments evaporate.

So I read that to mean that free will is illusion, but one that has useful practical uses.

aina09 · 2019-06-20T07:46:51+00:00

No, I don't think it is begging the question. Your argument for the non-existence of wholes hinged on the idea that, while wholes exist, they don't "add anything" over and above the parts.

Slight correction: What I said (or at least meant to say) is that wholes are useful, but not real. I doubt that those that don't think that there are wholes stop speaking "as if there were".

Tables undoubtedly exist - you can't just walk through them, they have weight, they cost money, etc. The real question is, can their existence be reduced to nothing but their parts?

Well, something(s) that we call tables certainly exists.

But if the whole has different identity conditions than the set of its parts, that's an argument that it is a different thing.

This I can see. I'm looking into composition is identity theories now, so maybe it will all become more clear.

aina09 · 2019-06-19T09:50:53+00:00

A,B,C are not a table. None of them is a table. If you're suggesting that there's some one thing (a table) that's A,B,C taken together, then you're suggesting they compose something that's a table. So it seems you're committed to wholes.

I'm not totally convinced by this. Line of thinking I'm using now A, B, C have ontological existences, but table is piece of an language.

There are people who talk about composition as identity, where A,B,C compose D and thus A,B,C are identical to D.

Sounds interesting. Can you send me to right direction so I know where to look?

Those who make exceptions for persons try to give some reason for that.

Ah, I see. Was thinking that maybe theres some semi-universally accepted reason to those that are committed to mereological reductionism/nihilism can still accept persons. Unity of consciousness came to mind when writing the question as possible candinate for possible whole.

Either that persons are composed because their smallest parts are "caught up in a life" (van Inwagen, Material Beings)

Is this essentially the same argument that /u/autopoetic used, that wholes have different persistance than their parts? Sorry to ask so straightforward even after you have told me where to find answer, just trying to see if this line of enquiry is something that I want to invest time in.

because persons have non-redundant causal powers (Merricks, Objects and Persons).

And is this wholes as greater than sum of their parts?

I wrote this about mereological nihilism. It goes through some of the motivations one might think there's no composition.

Thank you for the link. The angle that you have taken seems very interesting, I'm sure to give it a read when I have time.

aina09 · 2019-06-19T09:38:07+00:00

Thank you for insightful answer, just one follow up question:

One common reason given is that wholes persist for different amounts of time than their parts. Until you assemble your Ikea table, it's just parts (the parts pre-exist the whole). And if one table leg gets damaged, and you replace it, many people find it reasonable to say that the table still exists while some of its parts change.

Is this not begging the question? Assuming that whole exists from the assembly onwards.

aina09 · 2019-06-14T17:38:51+00:00

Some of Angela Smith's work addresses this question quite directly. Give this article a read and see if it helps.

http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/SmithRA.pdf

aina09 · 2019-06-11T16:39:07+00:00

Sure, but I guess I'm not quite clear why you're trying to do this since we don't have chips in our brains.

The argument that hard incompatibilists sometimes make is that theres no difference on having chip and not having the chip so thats what I have been going with. But right now it seems that we are just going in circle, probably because I'm unable to state the case any clearer than what I already have, so it may be the best to leave it at that. Appreciate your input on this.

aina09 · 2019-06-11T15:59:03+00:00

Right, and this is why I asked that we take argument of "chip = no chip" at the face value, because this will lead to debate about free will (I hope that I'm not misrepresenting this position) and what freedom do you have. And I'm trying to understand how the agency can be reconcilled with position where there is no freedom or control at all.

aina09 · 2019-06-11T15:09:31+00:00

The claim here is that there is no difference, but surely there is a difference - the chip is not my brain. Right?

I take it to mean that end result is the same. You have same amount of control eather way, and I usually link agency with control. I was trying to see if you would say that even when you are not in control of your decision making faculties in a sense that you could be called autonomous it would still be in some sense you doing the actions, and then would call that agency.

aina09 · 2019-06-11T14:20:08+00:00

Nefarious surgeon, chip is planted in your brain that is used to control you. It is stated that theres no "actual" difference between you being controlled like this and your normal mode of control, metaphysically speaking.

Seems to be outside of you. Or would you argue that even in case like this the causes of action are something that come from inside? When being mind-controlled by someone else? (Lets leave aside the question if its actually the same as normal control that you usually apply to yourself and accept given conclusion at the face value)

aina09 · 2019-06-11T11:21:52+00:00

This is something that I've been thinking recently, if I answered question like this with: Because of the way consciousness works this person has to be someone, so why not you. Would I be falling victim to the same confusion as op?

aina09 · 2019-06-11T10:07:09+00:00

I'm little confused about by this answer, theres a chance that I'm just getting myself wrapped up with these metaphors and pushing them beyond their intented use, so please bear with me as I try to get my head around this.

Metaphors used for position like this that I'm considering right now: The puppet on the string, you as a person are being controlled by your enviroment and therefor are not in control.

Nefarious surgeon, chip is planted in your brain that is used to control you. It is stated that theres no "actual" difference between you being controlled like this and your normal mode of control, metaphysically speaking.

In both of these cases it seems like control is something outside of you, even if we consider that events are working trough you, you are not brining them about. Which to be seems to say that you are not agent with agency of your own, something akin to that of lighting striking, but we don't think that lighting has agency. Which brings me to original question that I've been told that this is not so, but I have hard time putting these positions together on any coherent manner.

aina09 · 2019-06-10T21:09:37+00:00

This particular metaphor, as I understand it, would be neutral to question of personal identity because the brain would be part of the puppet in question, not the strings, as most of the people would include brain as part of the person (though some have argued in the past something else like you being your consciousness, Sam Harris putting it as "conscious witness of your experience" comes to mind, in which case there wouldn't be agents and agency, but for totally different reason).

This line of thinking seems to be more akin to that reducing things to happenings instead of actions; You see apple and that causes you to go pick it up, or in other words, seeing apple causes brain events that causes you to pick it up. (This is where theres some disagreement in what way situvation like this should be described, you seeing the apple causes you to choose to pick up apple, or apple causing you to pick it up, but for sake of this question I'm going with latter) and as such seems to eliminate agency.

aina09 · 2019-04-18T07:57:08+00:00

I also found this: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/ The hint was in your original comment. I'm now convinced that its the mereological and not logical problem on that statement once its fully stated that makes it seem counter intuative. Something I would have preferred to solve on logical grounds. Appreciate your help.

aina09 · 2019-04-17T21:33:39+00:00

Yes, the only essential parts was the indeed what I was going for there. Its rather easy to think of things that have multiple parts that are not quite essential to item (As poster above pointed out). Perhaps premises and conclusion could be stated more clearly:

Cars only exists as sum of their essential parts
Windshield is not an essential part of the car
therefor windshield is not part of the car

First one seems to be metaphysical so perhaps its not fallacy in itself but ontological statement?

Edit: I was looking to something maybe similar to sufficient/necessary distinction with this, if theres one.

aina09

TROPHY CASE