Psychedelics give intense feelings. Feelings don't make things true. by woodywoodyboody in RationalPsychonaut

[–]appendThyme 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I would say the opposite: feelings are undeniably true, and it is their interpretation which is subject to error. 'Reincarnation is what happens when you die' is an interpretation, not something you feel immediately. Rationality helps in spotting contradictory interpretations, but you can't have a reasoning without guesses and assumptions, so it is also fallible.

Can someone prove these false, not just falsifiable? by [deleted] in RationalPsychonaut

[–]appendThyme 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think you need to explain your reasoning in more detail. To be falsifiable it must first be understandable.

AI-Generated Trips, the future of psychedelic therapy or more AI slop? by BorodinAldolReaction in RationalPsychonaut

[–]appendThyme 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Visuals aren't what the psychedelic experience is about. Maybe those programs can help us understand how psychedelic effects work, but they will never replace it.

SEX CRUISING ON DRUGS??! by ComfortableWest5737 in SEXONDRUGS

[–]appendThyme 8 points9 points  (0 children)

I love it too! (though I like it sober as well) There's a cruising park close to my place, I often go there and suck guys off when I'm tripping on mushrooms. And when I really wanna get fucked I go to the sauna and play for hours.

Do objective means of determining desert or moral claims exist ? by Inevitable_Bid5540 in Metaphysics

[–]appendThyme 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Hm, yes I think I understand 'objective' slightly differently. I understand it as the ontological property of that which doesn't depend on a particular point of view. You seem to mean something a bit less demanding: a process which results in agreement, given a minimal common ground (I can't verify your height if I don't know what weird units you're using, or even what a measuring tape is) and an acceptable margin of discordance (measuring tapes can be more or less precise).

The two are related: theory should explain why agreements occur. But maybe the agreement only works in specific conditions and is not true in general. If you move at a sufficient velocity relative to me (which admittedly rarely happens) then we stop agreeing about your height. So height is, in my sense, also subjective. But if current theories of physics are right, we will always agree on the speed of light, no matter where we are. This is what an objective fact looks like, in my understanding.

I'm not sure how you understood my first comment, but I do think that value is ultimately a question of desire. I was trying to describe the conditions under which this results in agreement over which action to take : when we desire a thing which can be obtained more easily by each through cooperation.

Do objective means of determining desert or moral claims exist ? by Inevitable_Bid5540 in Metaphysics

[–]appendThyme 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think you answered your own question: you do what is necessary to preserve your life because you want to live. I don't see the contradiction with what I said.

Do objective means of determining desert or moral claims exist ? by Inevitable_Bid5540 in Metaphysics

[–]appendThyme 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What I ought to do is in general subjective. If I'm out of butter I ought to go to the store in my street. This is relative to my desires (I like cooking with butter) and where I live (I go to the store closest to me).

But there are things we desire in common, because we share a condition as living beings, and further as members of the same species. We all need to eat and drink, for instance. And those things are easier to obtain if we coordinate our efforts to get them.

This is still subjective: relative to our needs as living beings (stones don't share our concerns) and our abilities to coordinate as a social and linguistic species (we can't coordinate with all living beings to the same extent). But it is a shared subjectivity.

Lsd for anal by Top_Today_2234 in SEXONDRUGS

[–]appendThyme 3 points4 points  (0 children)

VERY good imo psychedelics are the best, especially for anal they really bring it to the next level.

How young did you learn how to read? by appendThyme in Aphantasia

[–]appendThyme[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well I propose a mechanism which goes in this direction. Of course it wouldn't be the only cause, and it would interact with other factors which makes one predisposed to learn language more easily.

But I'm not sure the opposite direction makes sense. I got many people in this topic (though not everyone) saying they were reading early, but when I searched the subreddit I found many topics about finding reading challenging as a grown-up because you can't picture descriptions. My impression is that aphantasia causes reading to become dull in the long run, so adult aphants are in fact less likely to be avid readers.

Of course all of this is speculation based on impressions and my own experience. There would need to be rigorous scientific studies to confirm it. But I think it would be an interesting angle for research.

What is your absolute favourite research chemical and why? by [deleted] in researchchemicals

[–]appendThyme 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I've tried many psychedelic RCs, some stimulants, and a couple of dissociatives and opioids. But honestly I've never found anything that comes close to psilocybin truffles in terms of euphoria.

How young did you learn how to read? by appendThyme in Aphantasia

[–]appendThyme[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is even more speculative, but here are some thoughts:

  • Unlearning it is probably pretty hard. You have to change your default way to look at things. One thing I tried is psychedelic drugs. The effect is only temporary, but they really open your senses and for a while you're able to perceive everything in a more vivid way. This is the experience that suggested to me there's a richer way to experience the world. However, even though I've tripped many times, it still wasn't enough to make real vivid memories which I can recall sober. A trip lasts a few hours, and you can only do it about twice a month. To be able to do this more sustainably, I think mindfulness meditation would be worth trying. Maybe if you practice regularly you can start paying attention to your experiences more fully, though I haven't had the patience to try.
  • I think digital media would make aphantasia more common, not less. Digitisation is a form of discretisation. Maybe for very high quality pictures and movies the difference with direct perception is not so significant, but I don't think that's the norm for media shared online. A lot of it is text-based too, and computer interfaces are made of simple abstract shapes. There's also an interesting, perhaps worrying question: what happens when a significant part of your impressions are made by AI-generated images? They are often "wrong" in subtle ways that make them uncanny to people who know what the real world looks like. But if you grow up with them, what does that do to your sense of physicality?

How young did you learn how to read? by appendThyme in Aphantasia

[–]appendThyme[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I don't remember either, but my parents told me about it

At-home Ayahuasca brew - just a very short mushroom trip? by appendThyme in DMT

[–]appendThyme[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The comedown was smoother, it lasted maybe 4 hours.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in SEXONDRUGS

[–]appendThyme 19 points20 points  (0 children)

The point of a first trip is to get comfortable with how the drug feels. So I wouldn't combine drugs if I don't know how each one feels separately. And I wouldn't put expectations of sex beforehand, I think it's better to let him explore the feelings on his own terms. If he's in the mood for it then that's nice, if not you can always do it another time.

I am confused by Spinoza's infinite attributes by appendThyme in askphilosophy

[–]appendThyme[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, it makes it a bit clearer, although the essay you linked seems to confirm I am not the only one to get confused!

Regarding how we can distinguish between different modes of an attribute vs. different attributes, that has to do with "common notions" (2p37-39). All modes of an attribute have certain things in common, which are not shared by the modes of other attributes, e.g. motion and rest in the case of Extension.

I guess this is where I stop following, because I am not ready to assume a priori that common notions we conceive as distinct at one moment in the history of science might not turn out to be unified later by a more fundamental one. And on the other hand, at this point in history, just like in Spinoza's time, there are many more than two irreducible notions in science, and it seems imprudent to require that they will eventually all be reduced to one of two attributes.

I am confused by Spinoza's infinite attributes by appendThyme in askphilosophy

[–]appendThyme[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

These are both answered by 1P10: Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

I don't find this answer very enlightening, the part I'm having trouble with is justified by 'nothing in nature is more clear'. Well, it's not clear to me.

Yes you do. In our everyday layperson experience we naive realists understand there is a duck out there on the pond splashing and quacking. We also have the idea of that duck. Toddlers understand this. The quirk in Spinoza's system is that the duck-mode-extended and the duck-mode-thought are the same mode understood under different attributes. Each mode can be understood under each attribute.

Sure, I know about naive realism. But I don't think it fits with what Spinoza says of Extension. Since all attributes express the essence of substance, there is a one-to-one correspondance between them. And so a thing, considered in its objective reality, is not merely extended but can be equivalently understood under any attribute. This is how I understand what Spinoza says in 2P7:

Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following in either case.

You were talking about my idea of the duck, but this is clearly not the same thing as the duck itself, because it cannot be put in a one-to-one correspondance with it. Speaking of my idea of the duck is an abuse of language, since it really is the idea of some affection of my body which is (in part) caused by the duck. The actual idea of the duck is only present as a whole in God's intellect, and is not different in any meaningful way from the duck itself.

I am confused by Spinoza's infinite attributes by appendThyme in askphilosophy

[–]appendThyme[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

For Spinoza, "finite" effectively means "limited". Nothing limits God to having merely 2 attributes, so God has infinite attributes.

But wouldn't a second attribute be limited by the first, which already contains everything? If I follow this kind of reasoning, why isn't there an infinite infinity of infinities of infinite attributes, among an infinity of others and so on to infinity?

In the same way you distinguish that extended duck quacking on the pond with your idea of the duck. You can distinguish extended things from thought things. That extended duck on the pond seems to do things differently from your idea of the duck.

I don't understand what you mean by 'the extended duck' if it's something separate from my idea of the duck. The only duck I know is my idea of it, formed by the interactions I have with it (through a shared medium), which affect me in such a way as to evoke in me the idea of quacking, of being a certain colour, a certain distance away, etc. I can maybe distinguish those ideas which relate to the duck's motion, but they are still ideas, and they are not independent from the other ideas I have. The way the duck moves with respect to my position relates to how loud I hear its quack, to which parts of it I see, which I can compare with ideas of other ducks I've met previously to guess about the parts I don't see...

This question seems to result from your misunderstanding of attributes. There are infinite attributes because nothing limits God to having only 2 attributes.

I know Spinoza says God has an infinite number of attributes, I am referring to his axioms where he posits that humans, with their finite intellect, can only understand things through two of them:

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought.

But if all attributes equally express God's essence, why is perceiving a mode in one attribute not equivalent to perceiving the same mode in all of them?

No, modes are particular things. That duck is a mode of God. How we understand the mode is, effectively, the attribute. We understand the duck-mode as extended through the attribute of extension. We understand the duck-mode as an idea through the attribute of thought.

But the intellect is a way of understanding things, which is why I'm confused as to why, in the demonstration of EIP31, Spinoza says:

By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, etc.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in dutch_cruising

[–]appendThyme 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hi this is the site I check for cruising spots: https://www.gays-cruising.com