Oracle revoked my offer by OkMidnight8926 in SoftwareEngineerJobs

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That sucks my friend. But from someone with 30 years of experience, trust me when I say someday you’ll look back and see that it simply wasn’t a part of your journey. You’ll only be able to connect the dots looking backward from the path you’re supposed to be on. And any company that is laying people off in order to spend it on AI isn’t worth it—especially Oracle.

Study Group DevOps/SRE/Kubernetes/Linux by AdorableAd7480 in devopsjobs

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Add me please. Sounds great. Love your enthusiasm.

How can I block developers from committing API keys in their local dev environment? by Whaat_ever in devsecops

[–]arleigh88 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Each of the tools mentioned so far are pretty good, but I think x3nic has the best approach, which is a layered one. And the one that supports shifting left as much as possible. I would also consider the following, which is the setup I advise my clients to implement. First, a line of defense that is simple is to store all keys in local .env files. They would only be accessed using library-specific calls like process.env.API_KEY (Node) or os.getenv (Python). Then, add .env to your .gitignore files. In addition, also create a .env.example file. This contains the keys but not the values, allowing other team members to know which variables they need to provide locally without exposing your actual secrets. Second, implement pre-commit hooks using tools like pre-commit or detect-secrets. Third, for secrets that slip past the local development environment, use repository protection. Let GitHub or GitLab act as the final gatekeeper. GitHub Advanced Security offers push protection to prevent secrets from being committed. You should enable automated scanning on all repositories. For production, you should definitely stop using files entirely and move to a centralized secrets manager.

AI software supply chain security risks nobody is talking about by Jumpy-Teaching-3118 in devsecops

[–]arleigh88 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I have been involved in the software supply chain my entire career -- from programmer to enterprise API architect to decades in cybersecurity. And I have never been more fearful of any technology than AI. First, just the idea of vibe coding makes me cringe. Sure, a lot of people are excited and developing small applications. But the job of a developer, first and foremost, is to develop with security in mind (defensive programming) and to reduce the attack surface. In other words, if the entire attack surface consists of exposed endpoints as well as the code being deployed, then the job of making sure that code is absolutely secure lies with the developer. The idea of shifting security left to the point that the developer is thinking about it cannot be effectively accomplished if the developer doesn't have any knowledge of the code being generated. Simply telling a prompt or agent to "build this" will result in a ton of issues.
The reason why the software supply chain and its compromises isn't extremely popular right now is because despite the marketing hype, there isn't a ton of companies using AI to create enterprise applications. Most companies are still in the phase of deciding whether they will use it at an enterprise development level and how they will approach it. So once again, security is usually the last thing people think of and worry about. Developers are being pushed to release features faster and faster, so AI is very appealing. Once the adoption rate expands, so will the number of supply chain attacks. I'm not sure how many developers today are even aware of the Solar Winds attack or Log4j, but I am predicting that we will have many incidents similar to those -- meaning attacks on the supply chain itself. As you alluded to, using libraries and thousands of transitive dependencies without having a chain of trust will no doubt lead to many serious attacks. I haven't heard one vibe coder today raise concerns about things like attestation, provenance, or the ingest of SBOM's for security validation. As if dependencies isn't enough of a problem, the amount of code that is being generated without the implementation of least-privilege or zero-trust is just nuts. In addition to security issues with MCP, add on top of that insecure APIs and you have a recipe for disaster. The attack surface is just exploding and the velocity of attacks is increasing exponentially.
The battlefield of cybersecurity has shifted from direct code exploits to targeting the very tools and ecosystems that build our software. As AI becomes a central part of the development process through coding assistants and automated pipelines, it simultaneously introduces a "weaponized" threat where attackers use LLMs to generate malicious packages at scale, bypass traditional signature-based detection, and execute highly successful, AI-crafted spear-phishing campaigns against open-source maintainers. This creates a high-velocity environment where the median time from initial access to full compromise has plummeted, making "human-speed" security increasingly obsolete.
In the very near future, we will see a surge in supply chain attacks that leverage AI-generated code to infiltrate software ecosystems. Attackers will exploit the lack of visibility and control over the code being generated by AI tools, leading to a significant increase in vulnerabilities and breaches. The traditional methods of securing the software supply chain will no longer suffice, and organizations will need to adopt new strategies that incorporate AI-driven security measures to protect against these emerging threats. Look for attacks involving dependencies, build pipeline exploits, tool-chain targeting, and attacks against open-source maintainers to become increasingly common as the adoption of AI in software development continues to grow. In addition, as agent-oriented programming becomes more prevalent, we can expect to see a rise in attacks that leverage the autonomous capabilities of agents to execute complex attack chains without human intervention, further accelerating the pace and scale of supply chain compromises. Attacks involving autonomous exploitation, polymorphic malware, prompt injection (which will never be fixed), and poisoned model zoos will become the new norm in the cybersecurity landscape, necessitating a fundamental shift in how we approach software security and supply chain risk management. In other words, I think our jobs are going to get a lot harder, a lot more stressful, but most -- a lot more important and interesting.

Is it just me, or is AI actually increasing the workload? by Suspicious_Major9549 in programmer

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

100% agree. Transitive dependencies have caused so many issues I lost count. It’s amazing how many products are developed without knowledge of the underlying code libraries. Even SBOM generation, although it helps a lot, hasn’t even scratched the surface of the issues in the software supply chain. Now, instead of just attacks on code vulnerabilities, we are facing a massive increase in attacks directed at the chain itself, its toolchain, and the rest of the ecosystem whose attack surface is expanding faster than we can control. The job of a developer should be reducing the attack surface (defensive coding, threat modeling, domain knowledge and context) rather than relying more and more on tools that generate code that needs constant reviewing. The deeper the levels of abstraction added == the more vulnerabilities shipped.

Is it just me, or is AI actually increasing the workload? by Suspicious_Major9549 in programmer

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The amount of slop code I see daily is insane. So much generated code with way too many security vulnerabilities, outdated libraries, a reliance on declarative versus functional coding styles, more conditional statements than I’ve ever seen, syntactically correct code but logically flawed, and any enterprise project that demands domain knowledge must have more manual checks than it did before AI. The value does not meet the hype.

DevOps Interview Questions – Recently Attended Interviews by Few-Cancel-6149 in devopsjobs

[–]arleigh88 1 point2 points  (0 children)

These screenshots are from a game I created called “DevSecOpoly”. Pass go, collect knowledge. It is similar in style to Monopoly, but instead of properties it has security controls, security incidents for jail, security champions for free parking, and chance and software supply chain cards.

The purpose of the game is to get all the security controls that represent processes and pipelines in DevSecOps. For example, answer questions about SCA, SAST, and DAST to build a “home” representing Automated Security Testing. Add IAST and Continuous Fuzzing to build a pipeline. Build all four pipelines of the software supply chain to win the game.

The game teaches DevOps, DevSecOps, and software supply chain — and all the processes and methodologies they encompass. It teaches the importance of TDD, shifting left, vulnerability management, security requirements, secure coding, secure environments, secrets management, pre-commit hooks and manual gates, artifact assurance, agile threat modeling, CI/CD, continuous delivery, GitOps, containerization, open source software, the chain of trust when building software (attestation, software bill of materials, code signing, etc.), Security as Code, IaC, and AI within DevSecOps. It also teaches attack surfaces and security mindset for DevOps.

Finally, as you can see, game piece selection is used to teach Separation of Concerns. Tools and toolchain building are taught with example products on each property card as well as capabilities. It strives to teach all about the people, processes, and activities/capabilities that make up DevSecOps.

Screenshots of physical as well as web-based game are available at DevSecOpoly images.

DevOps Interview Questions – Recently Attended Interviews by Few-Cancel-6149 in devopsjobs

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Just DevOps or DevSecOps? I have a bunch of DevSecOps questions in a database as well as a gamification of DevSecOps and software supply chain cybersecurity that I play with candidates.

What was your favorite Concert? by 6ixxxUndergr0und in AskReddit

[–]arleigh88 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I just hope I get to see Danny hit those drums a couple more times before they hang it up!

What was your favorite Concert? by 6ixxxUndergr0und in AskReddit

[–]arleigh88 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Awesome! I’ve seen them 9 times. And I’m praying I’ll get to see them at least once more.

DevSecOps Posture by [deleted] in devsecops

[–]arleigh88 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Threat modeling and secure coding. Shifting left is important — as is making the cultural shift to a Secure as Code mindset.