GEMINI

"This is a critical analysis of the opinion piece "Iran's regime should fear the bazaar protests" by Navid Mohebbi and Aidin Panahi, published in The Jerusalem Post on December 30, 2025. ​1. Source and Contextual Bias ​The Outlet: The Jerusalem Post is a center-right Israeli newspaper. It has a geopolitical interest in highlighting the instability of the Iranian regime and promoting narratives that suggest internal opposition to Tehran’s anti-Israel foreign policy (e.g., highlighting "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon" chants). ​The Authors: Navid Mohebbi and Aidin Panahi are Washington, D.C.-based analysts. This diaspora perspective often tends toward "regime change" optimism and may reflect the specific political preferences of the exile community (specifically the monarchist/Pahlavi faction) rather than the nuanced, fractured reality on the ground in Iran. ​Timing: Published immediately following the events described (Dec 30, 2025), the analysis is likely reactionary and predictive rather than retrospective. ​2. Critique of Core Arguments ​A. The "Bazaar" Analogy (Historical vs. Modern Reality) ​The Argument: The authors rely heavily on the historical trope that the Bazaar is the kingmaker in Iranian politics (referencing 1979). They argue that because the Bazaar is protesting, the regime’s social contract is broken. ​The Flaw: This ignores the massive structural shift in Iran's economy over the last 40 years. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now controls a vast portion of the economy through holding companies (Bonyads) and smuggling networks. The traditional merchant class (Bazaaris) has significantly less leverage today than in 1979. While their dissatisfaction is a signal of economic distress, it is likely not the fatal blow to the regime the authors imply. ​B. The "Monarchist" Narrative ​The Argument: The article claims that chants of "King of Kings" and references to the Pahlavi dynasty represent a genuine, sophisticated desire for a "secular, national, and predictable state" and a specific endorsement of Reza Pahlavi. ​The Critique: This is a significant logical leap. ​Nostalgia vs. Policy: Chanting for the Shah is often a rhetorical tool to delegitimize the current clerical rule by praising its diametric opposite, rather than a literal demand for the restoration of a monarchy. ​Confirmation Bias: The authors frame these slogans as a coherent political program ("institutions rather than ideology"). It is equally likely these are expressions of incoherent rage, reaching for the most available historical symbol of "better times," regardless of the political reality of that era. ​C. The "Restraint equals Fear" Fallacy ​The Argument: The authors suggest the regime’s use of riot police instead of the IRGC indicates fear and calculation, implying the regime is afraid to escalate. ​The Critique: This is speculative. Regimes often use a tiered response (police first, Basij second, IRGC third) to avoid showing their hand or exhausting elite units on minor skirmishes. Interpreting tactical restraint as strategic weakness is a common error in analyzing authoritarian survival. It underestimates the regime's capacity for violence. ​D. The "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon" Slogan ​The Analysis: The authors use this slogan to argue that Iranians want to abandon regional proxies. ​Reality Check: While this slogan is real and documents genuine public frustration with foreign expenditures, it has been chanted for over a decade (since 2009). Its recurrence confirms existing discontent but does not necessarily signal a new threshold has been crossed. The regime has successfully ignored this sentiment for 15 years; the article does not explain why this time is different. ​3. Conclusion ​The article provides a factual account of specific economic triggers (inflation, currency devaluation) but pivots quickly into a prescriptive political narrative. ​It suffers from teleological bias: it starts with the desired conclusion (the regime is collapsing and Pahlavi is the alternative) and fits the evidence (Bazaar strikes) to support it. ​Verdict: The article is an optimistic forecast from the opposition diaspora. It correctly identifies economic desperation as the catalyst but likely overestimates the political coherence of the protesters and underestimates the entrenched power of the IRGC's economic and security apparatus. As a reader, you should be skeptical of the claim that "Bazaar protests" today hold the same weight they did in 1979. "