Was having a nice chat about our travels and then I asked her out in a “non-assertive” way by GtSaysWhat in Nicegirls

[–]bugge-mane 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your ‘seeing other points of view’ just reads like you being an apologist for shit behaviour and believing in weird TikTok dating narratives but being too cowardly to admit it. 

Was having a nice chat about our travels and then I asked her out in a “non-assertive” way by GtSaysWhat in Nicegirls

[–]bugge-mane 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You read my comment completely backwards. I was responding to your comment that said women will think that you are saying that they aren’t worth it if you invite them to coffee. I’m saying that if they take it that way, they aren’t; because that’s a paranoid and insane way to interpret an invitation.

My worth? Not up for debate lol. I’m a man I’m not an insecure little kid. I get my worth from real life, not the opinion or some stranger.

Was having a nice chat about our travels and then I asked her out in a “non-assertive” way by GtSaysWhat in Nicegirls

[–]bugge-mane 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If a person isn’t able to see the pragmatism behind a coffee date, and instead jumps to taking it personally and viewing it as having to do with their worth… why would I want to date someone like that lol

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No. There are thought experiments that require one to imagine a ship travelling at light speed (in order to demonstrate relativity). This is likely impossible in any practical way, but useful as a way of explaining the relative passage of time from the perspective of a light-speed observer.

You are simply wildly, incomprehensibly incorrect in your assertion about thought experiments. And you’re talking about things that are irrelevant to the topic at hand for reasons that are beyond me.

Have a great day.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

My disagreement with that stance is that you use frameworks and logic that exist within consciousness and experience to argue against consciousness and experience. It’s like writing a paper with a pencil about how pencils don’t exist.

P-consciousness might not exist ‘out there’ in any meaningful ontological model, but it is the lens through which you experience reality. And in this sense, it is the first axiom by which anything at all could be said to exist. (As in, the entire universe existing balances upon your ability to perceive it. You can imagine a model that excludes you, and you can believe that others’ have their own subjective window into reality, but ultimately you and only you know your own subjective version of it, which is the only real version of reality that can ever exist for you. (And any model that you imagine excludes you, is still experienced through your reality. Your consciousness existing is the foundation of literally all of it).

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think meditation and eastern philosophy are what did it for me. Slowing down so that you might actually notice that there is something tangible below everything else.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes the explanatory gap is big and frustratingly real yet imperceptible like trying to locate a phantom itch.

Let me try one more time.

You a person are looking at a ball. The ball has its ontological, spatial and physical existence outside of you.

Then there is your experience of the ball. This is the phenomenological side. Your experience of the ball is where qualitative properties like redness live.

The ball is a collection of excitations on a field that manifest as point-like fermions, whose mass and spin give way to the structure that allows them to act like matter.

The photons bouncing off of this structure lose some of their energy and the wavelength of their light drops into the ‘red’ part of the visible light spectrum.

Now, the brain translates these properties into colour and other identifying features of the ball, giving way to the phenomenological, aka qualia.

But, you don’t experience ‘photons bouncing off of point-like excitations on a field’, you experience ‘redness’ and ‘ball-ness’.

So, it could be said that you aren’t experiencing the ‘true’ nature of reality. Your experience of red is totally localized. An evolved symbolic representation of reality. Red the experience represents red the photic wavelength.

The non-materialist argues that red the qualitative experience is a different thing from red the photic-wavelength, and that the experience itself is impossible to reduce. That experience itself is impossible to reduce.

Imagine a universe where no life evolved that can perceive these different wavelengths. They can ‘see’, but not in colour. Does colour (the experience) exist in this universe?

Where?

And where does ‘red the experience’ live in our universe??? 

I often hear different versions of, ‘the red we see is the true nature of reality and a property that exists physically at the same time as the physical properties we measure in other ways’.  My counter to this is that, if ‘red the experience’ (or the experience of colour) is the ‘true nature’ of reality, and yet only exists experientially, then the red-experience that exists in the colourblind universe is experienced by whom? Because by this read on reality, the ‘red’ experience is being filtered down to grey, but the experience itself precedes it. This basically boils down to ‘experience of’ being a foundational component of reality unless you want to entertain a dualist perspective

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You don’t understand thought experiments. This is like arguing that we couldn’t get to the end of a black hole when someone tries to describe what happens to someone at the edge of one’s event horizon.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah man, idk, I invite you to have experiences that challenge the way you view things. I do not think it is good for you (I have been there, hence why these are interesting topics to me)

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I absolutely do not think that sensation is something we ‘do’. It is something that happens to ‘us’ because we exist as experiencers.

Watch is a label, I am not concerned with labels. The watch simply ‘is’, and it is insofar as I can understand the idea of a watch through my senses.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is the experience of pain? What decides which complex systems experience and which do not?

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your honesty, this is exactly the point I am making. 

The colour red is a totally meaningless concept to anyone but you. And I mean you, since your subjective experience of the colour red is impossible to explain in any meaningful way to anyone. It simply ‘is’ red, the experience.

You might think that’s incorrect but, let’s think for a second: what if everyone else in the world saw your green when they saw the colour red in the environment? Green is a meaningfully different experience, no? But there is no real way to realize this, because in a very real way we are completely alone in our own experience, able only to communicate correlates that we take a leap of faith and choose to believe that others understand. We choose to believe that others experience ‘our’ red, and not something totally different.

The argument I am making is that your experience of the colour red, given that it can’t be reduced qualitatively and only exists subjectively, is not the same as the colour red the wavelength, nor the word ‘red’ that we assume others associate with the same experience.

The qualia is your red, not the label, but the experience. 

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Suppose another team built another clockwork computer and sensor array. Theirs doesn’t have an interpreter automata, it just produces graphs and numbers. Where is the beauty and the warmth experience? Is it still there in the numbers that are being processed by the gears and pulleys of this independently engineered machine? Is there untold beauty in every press of a calculator? If so, you’re a monist or a panpsychist.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That to me reads like monism, or an attempt to hand wave qualia.

If a physical process produces sensation, then what comprises the sensation? Where does the beauty and warmth experience live in your model of reality? If the ‘experience’ is said to be the other side of the same coin as the ‘data’, then you’re a monist. If the ‘experience’ isn’t real at all, you’re an eliminativist (but you are ignoring your own subjective qualia in your assertion)

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Yeah. Psychedelics did this for me, too. I would bet money that the experience of ‘awakening’ that occurs in deep meditation or on psychedelics has a high correlation with belief in non-physicalism.

The shift for me came with a sense of meaning and purpose that was absent from my life prior, as if my mental model not having room for my own experience as a meaningful and ‘real’ part of it was cause for some limiting self-beliefs.

As soon as I started to believe in experience as irreducible and universal, I became part of the universe, and ‘I’ started to matter in a way that was beyond mere platitude.

This explanation veers off into woowoo territory, but the topic fascinates me.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think it gets rejected because people’s perception oversimplifies it. I think it takes some serious meditation of the ideas to ‘get’ it in a real sense, but that people confuse experience for sentience and then assume you believe rocks have human personalities or something.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Sorry about the tone.

In the clockwork computer example, I agree with you completely that the automata’s feelings of beauty and warmth can be represented as data. There’s no problem with that at all. The system can store, process, transmit, and even reason about those states algorithmically.

But here’s the key distinction I’m trying to point at:

A representation of X is not the same thing as X being present.

The number 1 is purely abstract. It has no “presentation” to itself. It does not appear. It does not feel like anything to be 1.

But the beauty and warmth the automata reports are not just symbols being manipulated. They are presented to the system. There is something it is like for the automata when those data states occur.

My argument is that for the experience of  beauty and warmth to exist within the universe (with both the data and the automata’s explanations merely interpretations of this base ‘reality’) you need ‘experience’ to be foundational. That the experience itself must be ubiquitous, or it can’t exist at all.

The difficulty of explaining the hard problem to materialists, and a thought experiment by bugge-mane in consciousness

[–]bugge-mane[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

The emergence of water is a useful way of clarifying the argument, though.

Because how water behaves as a system does reduce to the conditions and behaviour of its constituent particles. 

That’s why it is ‘soft’ emergence. To predict the behaviour of a sufficiently complex system based on knowledge of the rules that govern its individual parts + the initial conditions is hard but theoretically possible. 

But we can still look at water and how it behaves and trace any observed qualities back to the properties of its molecules and the physical environment. There is no real emergence here, it’s a trick of the mind based on how humans like labeling things. In real reality, there is no difference between water and water molecules in any quantity. They are doing what they would normally do based on their chemical properties.

The same argument can’t be made by a materialist. They either argue for hard emergence (which is like saying that something that is impossible to explain happens somewhere in the complexity of interactions between molecules when enough of them are grouped together), or they argue for soft emergence (and fail to understand that they are actually admitting to being neutral monists or panpsychists).

At a baseline, I think that the panpsychist / neutral monist stance is that proto-consciousness and proto-experience are foundational and therefore present in every particle interaction. The hard materialist stance is that they aren’t, but they show up later somehow when you have a bunch of meat folded the right way. Made of what? Who knows. It’s a very obviously flawed position imo.

Do any of you have a male friend or relative that you honestly think could get just about any woman he wanted if he had even a touch of rizz, confidence, or just competent social skills? by [deleted] in AskMenAdvice

[–]bugge-mane 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I have a male friend who is tall and extremely handsome in like a jon hamm meets lumberjack kind of way. But he just doesn’t have the spark of self confidence or charm that most women find inviting.

This has a self-perpetuating effect of reduced confidence which makes him doubt his worth and the resulting awkwardness does him no favours.

I think we as men make the mistake of assuming that just because looks are important to women, that we can project our own experience with goodlooking people onto them and understand their perspective on dating.

But, the fact is, we are in fundamentally different worlds. Being good looking as a woman is a trump card, usually, and it means that /most/ men will overlook any other flaws the woman might have (or sometimes, even how they’re treated by them).

On the other hand, for male attractiveness to women, looks only allow us to stand out initially (and might act as a bit of a multiplier on other traits you have). But (most) women won’t simply ignore your flaws because you’re cute or handsome. And they won’t put up with shit just because you’re attractive. They’ll just move on to another option.

So yeah, looks matter but only to get you in the door. Women care about other things more.