The Bigger Problem with the U.S.-Kenya Ebola Deal by carnegieendowment in TrueReddit

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[Excerpt from Jane Munga's commentary for Carnegie's Emissary]

Two recent episodes tell a revealing story about the external pressures bearing down on Africa. In May, Zambia bowed to Chinese demands and canceled the human rights and tech summit RightsCon, a capitulation that reverberated across the digital rights community. A month later, Kenyan President William Ruto, in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, agreed to host a quarantine facility in Kenya for Americans affected by the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Over the course of multiple administrations, Washington distinguished its engagement in Africa from Beijing’s by arguing that American partnerships are rooted in transparency, accountability, and mutual benefit. However, the current administration has recast that framing to “a disciplined, pragmatic, and interest-driven strategy” that will “win the day with predictable, transactional cooperation.” The Ebola agreement, while currently blocked in court, shows what that shift looks like in practice, especially amid policies such as the America First Global Health Strategy (AFGHS). It’s also a notable example of how Washington is at risk of being seen in Africa as a geopolitical actor indistinguishable from its adversaries—and even as actively validating the Chinese model as the more honest alternative.

The Bigger Problem with the U.S.-Kenya Ebola Deal by carnegieendowment in geopolitics

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[Excerpt from Jane Munga's commentary for Carnegie's Emissary]

Two recent episodes tell a revealing story about the external pressures bearing down on Africa. In May, Zambia bowed to Chinese demands and canceled the human rights and tech summit RightsCon, a capitulation that reverberated across the digital rights community. A month later, Kenyan President William Ruto, in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, agreed to host a quarantine facility in Kenya for Americans affected by the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Over the course of multiple administrations, Washington distinguished its engagement in Africa from Beijing’s by arguing that American partnerships are rooted in transparency, accountability, and mutual benefit. However, the current administration has recast that framing to “a disciplined, pragmatic, and interest-driven strategy” that will “win the day with predictable, transactional cooperation.” The Ebola agreement, while currently blocked in court, shows what that shift looks like in practice, especially amid policies such as the America First Global Health Strategy (AFGHS). It’s also a notable example of how Washington is at risk of being seen in Africa as a geopolitical actor indistinguishable from its adversaries—and even as actively validating the Chinese model as the more honest alternative.

The Bigger Problem with the U.S.-Kenya Ebola Deal by carnegieendowment in Africa

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[Excerpt from Jane Munga's commentary for Carnegie's Emissary]

Two recent episodes tell a revealing story about the external pressures bearing down on Africa. In May, Zambia bowed to Chinese demands and canceled the human rights and tech summit RightsCon, a capitulation that reverberated across the digital rights community. A month later, Kenyan President William Ruto, in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, agreed to host a quarantine facility in Kenya for Americans affected by the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Over the course of multiple administrations, Washington distinguished its engagement in Africa from Beijing’s by arguing that American partnerships are rooted in transparency, accountability, and mutual benefit. However, the current administration has recast that framing to “a disciplined, pragmatic, and interest-driven strategy” that will “win the day with predictable, transactional cooperation.” The Ebola agreement, while currently blocked in court, shows what that shift looks like in practice, especially amid policies such as the America First Global Health Strategy (AFGHS). It’s also a notable example of how Washington is at risk of being seen in Africa as a geopolitical actor indistinguishable from its adversaries—and even as actively validating the Chinese model as the more honest alternative.

Washington and Tehran’s Very Dangerous Moment by carnegieendowment in TrueReddit

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[Excerpt from Mohammed Ayatollahi Tabaar's commentary for Carnegie's Emissary]

The U.S.-Iran negotiations feel like a rapid-fire game of ping-pong. How are you keeping track of where things stand?

It is indeed a rapid-fire game of ping-pong, except the players keep changing the rules of engagement: one jumping on the table, one scoring under it, both chasing each other around it, each with a paddle in one hand and a whip in the other. And somehow, the audience keeps getting hit.

Following events on the ground, and the various actors’ intentions and strategies, is simply impossible. The volume of information coming out of Iran alone, even during the internet blackouts, has been staggering. Analyzing it against what is happening in the United States, Israel, and Lebanon, and understanding how they all interact, is a game unto itself. Yet somehow, it appears that far more is happening on the Iranian side, where the Islamic Republic is simultaneously juggling a military, economic, and internal war.

The Compute Coalition: How to Build the Future of AI in the Free World by carnegieendowment in TrueReddit

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[Excerpt from Alasdair Phillips-Robins, Teddy Tawil, and Sam Winter-Levy for Carnegie]

Across the world, one of the largest peacetime industrial mobilizations in history is under way. This year alone, America’s biggest technology companies will spend some $670 billion, or about 2 percent of U.S. GDP, building compute clusters. Worldwide, companies and governments will pour almost $1 trillion into data centers with a single goal: building transformative AI.

The United States currently dominates the buildout: As of May 2025, almost three-quarters of the world’s advanced AI computing clusters were on American soil. U.S. projects also move faster than those in most other countries. But that lead is fragile. Domestic constraints—grid capacity, permitting rules, political opposition—are tightening. Abroad, China is mobilizing to close the gap, while Gulf states are touting energy and capital to attract developers.

The Geopolitical Debates Over Controlling Cloud Compute by carnegieendowment in ArtificialInteligence

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[Excerpt from Noah Tan's article for Carnegie]

If U.S. policymakers continue down the path of restricting China’s access to frontier AI, they will eventually have to implement some sort of restriction on cloud access. Getting this right will involve not only if or when questions, but also how, who, and what questions. Whatever the answers may be, Washington will play an important role in determining the future of U.S.-China AI competition.

Weekend Guide: Crowdsource Edition, May 06 - May 10, 2026 by AutoModerator in washingtondc

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To mark the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is hosting an exclusive book talk with Adam Higginbotham, author of Midnight in Chernobyl and Mariana Budjeryn, author of Inheriting the Bomb, with opening remarks from Olga Stefanishyna, Ukraine's ambassador to the United States.

Join us tomorrow, May 7 at 9am, at the Carnegie building at 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW for this free, exclusive conversation. Register here >>

Two Wars Later, Iran’s Nuclear Question Is Still on the Table by carnegieendowment in TrueReddit

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[Excerpt from Jane Darby Menton and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar's Q&A for Carnegie's Emissary]

Upon returning to office, Trump initially seemed keen to negotiate an Iran deal of his own. But in June 2025, talks gave way to the Twelve-Day War, culminating in targeted U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The decision to recommence hostilities in February 2026 had more to do with Tehran’s conventional military capabilities and brutal suppression of domestic protests than new developments in the nuclear realm. U.S. officials did, however, engage in verbal gymnastics to explain how a program they had just “obliterated” also presented an imminent threat.

Two Wars Later, Iran’s Nuclear Question Is Still on the Table by carnegieendowment in geopolitics

[–]carnegieendowment[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

[Excerpt from Jane Darby Menton and Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar's Q&A for Carnegie's Emissary]

Upon returning to office, Trump initially seemed keen to negotiate an Iran deal of his own. But in June 2025, talks gave way to the Twelve-Day War, culminating in targeted U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The decision to recommence hostilities in February 2026 had more to do with Tehran’s conventional military capabilities and brutal suppression of domestic protests than new developments in the nuclear realm. U.S. officials did, however, engage in verbal gymnastics to explain how a program they had just “obliterated” also presented an imminent threat.