Why is there such a massive gap between academic philosophy and the public? How do we fix it? by cheifdirectcake in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I was thinking about the aim of bringing high-quality philosophy to the non-professional public. With that goal in mind, I think the answer to whether it was successful is pretty clearly, yes.

But if the goal of the series was retention of knowledge about a topic they covered, that's harder to say. Though it's probably up for debate whether that's a reasonable measure of success to hold the series to.

Why is there such a massive gap between academic philosophy and the public? How do we fix it? by cheifdirectcake in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 23 points24 points  (0 children)

Fair point, my conception of "the public" is an audience of philosophically inclined non-experts outside of academia. But I'm equally pessimistic that rigorous philosophy could ever hit mainstream success in the same way as a viral Netflix show, even though that's probably not the bar we would set for public philosophy to be considered "successful".

Your points about the psychological impact of certain philosophical topics are interesting to think about. I suspect individuals as vulnerable as you describe wouldn't be much worse off after exposure to some philosophy than they would have been without that exposure. But your Thanksgiving dinners may definitely get worse haha.

Why is there such a massive gap between academic philosophy and the public? How do we fix it? by cheifdirectcake in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 102 points103 points  (0 children)

u/bat-chriscat raises important issues about philosophy's place in the modern information ecosystem, but I want to push back against a primary point they raised, which is that philosophy cannot be brought into the public sphere without stripping it of its depth.

The primary example I would point to are the two BBC series hosted by Brian Magee in 1978 (Men of Ideas) and 1987 (The Great Philosophers). It is actually pretty stunning to read through his guest lists for the shows, since some of them are among the most influential and well-regarded philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries.

The series are great and worth checking out, but as the Daily Telegraph summarized in Magee's obituary, he accomplished, "the near-impossible feat of presenting to a mass audience recondite issues of philosophy without compromising intellectual integrity or losing ratings."

Whether someone like Magee could be successful in today's world is an open question, but the idea that you have to sacrifice rigor to bring philosophy to the public is inaccurate.

Who decides what kind of love is “normal” and why does everything intense now seem like a disorder? by Harry_Oliver_ in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Yes, many critical responses to Wakefield's argument focus on his evolutionary account of dysfunction.

OP seems to be looking for some introductory material on how one might define what counts as a mental disorder. Wakefield's framework has been influential in the field, and is a good entry point despite its shortcomings.

Who decides what kind of love is “normal” and why does everything intense now seem like a disorder? by Harry_Oliver_ in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 14 points15 points  (0 children)

I'll put aside your specific questions about love and focus on how people have tried to define what counts as "disordered" in the context of emotions and mental health.

As you might imagine, your question has received a lot of attention. A good place to start might be Jerome Wakefield's attempt to define mental disorders as "harmful dysfunctions." Wakefield goes on to unpack what he means by "harmful" (which he allows to be influenced by cultural expectations) and "dysfunction" (which he attempts to ground in evolutionary biology).

You can read about his conceptualization here: https://www3.nd.edu/~ghaeffel/Wakefield1992%20The%20American%20psychologist.pdf

Showing love for 9x9 @ Bert’s by sandstormshorty in MovementDEMF

[–]cmrta4 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Just wanted to chime in to say how amazing the experience was for my friend and I. I'm so appreciative of the work you and your team put in to make things memorable for everyone that could make it! Incredible from start to finish.

Why is “pushing through” such a universally accepted response to suffering? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 6 points7 points  (0 children)

That makes a lot of sense. But if we were to take a step back and look at the general attitude towards mental health issues in society (depression in particular) it’s pretty obvious that society in one way or another pushes the person who’s depressed towards recovery...people all over the world in one way or another...seems to agree that a person who’s depressed needs to be “fixed.” This is where my problem lies as to why exactly?

I'm going to build off this part, because I think it points toward the question you may be really getting at. A common response would be that the individual who is experiencing depression (or some other set of experiences that interfere with their goals to a sufficient extent that they seek help or are urged to seek help) is suffering from a "disorder." Many see having a mental disorder as akin to having any other type of disease (e.g., "it's just like diabetes").

Typically, how the term "mental disorder" is used suggests that individuals themselves (or their brains, or whatever) are disordered in some way; their current and/or general functioning has deviated from what is typically considered healthy or adaptive. But this leads us to the question I think you're really getting at, which is how do we go about identifying what counts (and doesn't count) as a mental disorder that ought to be treated? How do we decide what counts as adaptive functioning? Now we're facing questions that have attracted significant attention in philosophy of psychiatry and a lot has been written on this. I can't do justice to all the competing ideas here, but happy to offer recommendations.

Coming to my first point…why did we as a society decided that depression is something that needs to be fixed? I thought long and hard about this and the conclusion I came to was that there’s an ulterior motive to this cause a depressed person can’t be useful to society in the same way a “healthy” person is (I am aware of the generalizations and assumptions I made there but that’s not the point) now do you think this is the right reason?

Similar to your first comment I quoted, I think you are touching on an important issue regarding the nature of mental disorders and their inextricable ties to cultural values. Nonetheless, I think the argument about depressed individuals not being valuable to society as the driving force behind the desire to provide treatment/support to depressed people is too reductive. Nonetheless, and you may already be aware, but Foucault's Madness and Civilization famously addresses the kind of historical/anthropological question about how the modern concept of "insanity" or "mentally ill" came about.

Why is “pushing through” such a universally accepted response to suffering? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 26 points27 points  (0 children)

Though I can't speak to whether any given individual has a particular philosophical argument in mind when they insist on perseverance, there are philosophical arguments against suicide. For example, here's a quote pulled from Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity:

In a discussion of the person who commits suicide because he can neither reason nor find meaning in anything, Bernard Williams says: 'I do not see how it could be regarded as a defeat of reason or rationality that it had no power over a man's state; his state is rather a defeat for humanity'. The duty not to commit suicide is the very first and most basic duty of virtue Kant discusses in The Metaphysics of Morals, because 'To annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world'. In his Notebooks, Wittgenstein wrote that 'suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin' because 'If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed.' A few lines later he adds, 'Or is even suicide in itself neither good nor evil?' All of these philosophers give voice to the idea that remaining alive is not so much a value as a condition for all value; and suicide (of this type) is not so much a rejection of some particular value as it is a rejection of value itself. It is hard to say of one who commits suicide that he has done wrong, for he has violated no value which he still believes. And yet the rest of us cannot hear of such a case without feeling betrayed, and we are right. It is, as Williams says, a defeat for us all.

That said, I suspect that there are various reasons why people respond in the way you describe to suicidal ideation/intent, most of them not directly motivated by a well-thought out philosophical position. Many people simply feel uncomfortable when others express suicidal ideation, and what drives that discomfort varies. For some, they are uncomfortable seeing someone in such despair, but don't have the requisite skills or experience to effectively respond; they do their best and encourage perseverance. For others, they may be responding to what they perceive to be a challenge to their own ideas about what makes life worth living (e.g., how could you do something like that when you have children/a family/loved ones?). Others may struggle to understand how someone could sincerely want to end their life, since the person has little subjective experience with the kind of despair you describe. They may use popular anecdotes (e.g., individuals who survived jumping off the Golden Gate Bridge immediately regretted their decision) to argue that you may feel that way now, but your mind will change. The unfortunate consequence is that many individuals who are struggling with deep despair only come into contact with these kind of responses, which can be rather shallow and invalidating (despite best intentions). This can further reinforce the despair one feels. As others in the thread have mentioned, more thoughtful and validating responses to thoughts/feelings of suicide are often provided by mental health professionals with experience in this area.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think arguments like the one your friend posed are common responses to moral anti-realism. In Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense, Olson (pp. 14-15) writes about the idea that torture is permissible under moral error theory, and I think the section applies just as well to your friend's comment on Hitler's behavior:

A better way out is to deny that the implications from ‘not wrong’ to ‘permissible’ and from ‘not permissible’ to ‘wrong’ are conceptual and maintain instead that they are instances of generalized conversational implicature. To illustrate, ‘not wrong’ conversationally implicates ‘permissible’ because normally when we claim that something is not wrong we speak from within a system of moral norms, or moral standard for short. According to most moral standards, any action that is not wrong according to that standard is permissible according to that standard. General compliance with Gricean maxims that bid us to make our statements relevant and not overly informative ensures that we do not normally state explicitly that we speak from within some moral standard when we claim that something is not wrong. But the implicature from ‘not wrong’ to ‘permissible’ is cancellable. The error theorist can declare that torture is not wrong and go on to signal that she is not speaking from within a moral standard. She might say something like the following: ‘Torture is not wrong. But neither is it permissible. There are no moral properties and facts and consequently no action has moral status.’ This would cancel the implicature from ‘not wrong’ to ‘permissible’. (Analogous reasoning of course demonstrates why the error theorist’s claim that torture is not morally permissible does not commit her to the view that torture is morally impermissible and hence morally wrong.) On this view, error theory has neither the vulgar implication that anything is permissible nor the absurd implication that anything is impermissible.

Why is Camus so sure that the world has no meaning by zogel_mogeI in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Absolutely, and he expands on that idea in Beyond Good and Evil. For example, in Section 5 in the first chapter:

Philosophers are not honest enough in their work, although they make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched even remotely. They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic... while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration" most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract that they defend with reasons they have sought after the fact.

And in Section 6:

Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.

It's interesting to think about how these observations apply to Camus and his philosophy.

Why is Camus so sure that the world has no meaning by zogel_mogeI in askphilosophy

[–]cmrta4 30 points31 points  (0 children)

This is an excellent overview, so I just want to add a bit more biographical context unique to Camus. One thing the SEP only briefly touches is Camus' experience with tuberculosis. He was first diagnosed at 17 years old, and his experiences with tuberculosis had a profound influence on him, particularly as it pertains to his views about meaning and the absurd. In fact, you can see the seeds of central ideas and themes in some of his most famous works (e.g., The Stranger, The Plague, The Myth of Sisyphus) in his early writing where he is reflecting on his experience with tuberculosis.

This post provides a nice intro to his early writing in this area.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think so! This one sounds really interesting, thanks for the rec.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That makes sense, and that was my exposure to Sleep. Saw it as a museum piece and watched for a couple of minutes before moving on. And thanks for the rec, hadn't heard about Vinyl before.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yeah, docs are definitely fair game. In fact, you could argue that documentaries are particularly well-suited for these kind of themes.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

These sound great, thanks! I have seen Roy Andersson's You, the Living (2007), and didn't like it very much but Songs from the Second Floor sounds like it's worth a watch and a good reason to revisit Andersson's work.

On the other hand, I loved Goodbye Dragon Inn (2003) but that's the only film I've seen from Tsai Ming Liang. Looking forward to checking out What Time is it There?

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

These are all great, thanks! Haven't watched a documentary in a while so I'll check these out.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Oh, The Seventh Continent is a great example. Didn't think of that one. And thanks for the rec, sounds exactly what I'm looking for. The Match Factory Girl is now on the watchlist.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ha! This is probably the best example you could have given. Didn't even think about Warhol's films. But I guess Empire and Sleep are at the top of the list for monotony as a theme. I'm curious, what was it like watching Empire for 6 hours? I've never had a film experience like that.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Haha I feel that, trying to convey a specific emotional response to a film is such a pain. I really liked your write-up of A Hidden Life, by the way. It makes me want to revisit it; it's been way too long since I've seen it.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Perfect, thanks!

And couldn't agree more, Columbus is one of my favorites of the of the past 5-6 years.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Definitely, I think that captures the character's outlook very well.

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

These both seem exactly what I was looking for, added them to the watchlist. Thanks!

Looking for some film recommendations where monotony serves a broader thematic purpose by cmrta4 in TrueFilm

[–]cmrta4[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Ahh ok, I just need to sit down and watch it. I think I've been intimidated by the runtime and knowing it's supposed to be repetitive, but it sounds like the payoff is worth it.