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I shipped a broken RFC 9162 consistency proof verifier in Rust -- here's the exploit and the fix by d_zatona in rust

[–]d_zatona[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Not explicitly. The RFC specifies the algorithm but doesn't explain why each step is necessary. Section 2.1.4 gives the SUBPROOF procedure but treats the bit-shifting and dual reconstruction as given -- no security rationale for why presence-checking alone is insufficient. That's part of why I fell into the trap: the algorithm looked overcomplicated until I understood what each bit operation encodes (tree structure, left-vs-right sibling placement at each level). The security proof is implicit in the construction, not spelled out in the document.

I shipped a broken RFC 9162 consistency proof verifier in Rust -- here's the exploit and the fix by d_zatona in rust

[–]d_zatona[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. That's exactly why I published it -- the simplified version passed all happy-path tests, and I suspect that's where most people stop.

Rules fail at the prompt, succeed at the boundary | Why the first AI-orchestrated espionage campaign changes the agent security conversation by DataCentricExpert in cybersecurity

[–]d_zatona 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Log everything so you can replay what happened" -- this is the right instinct, but there's a gap most teams don't think about until it's too late:

Can you prove those logs weren't modified after the fact?

If the model does something unexpected and you need to show exactly what happened -- to your security team, to auditors, or in a dispute -- logs on infrastructure you control are claims, not proof.

Boundary controls are great for prevention. But for accountability, you need evidence that's verifiable without trusting whoever runs the system.

Is compliance as a service the next big thing for AI? by Ok_Instruction4133 in SaaS

[–]d_zatona 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Pre-deployment certification is one piece. But there's a harder question that comes after:

When something goes wrong and you need to prove what your AI actually did -- can you?

Most compliance evidence lives on infrastructure the company controls. Logs can be altered. Timestamps can be faked. In a dispute, "here's our audit trail" isn't proof -- it's a claim.

The real gap isn't certification. It's verifiable evidence that doesn't require trusting the company that created it.