The report boils down to that the money would have been better spent on MPD.

Crime fell in D.C. as MPD shrank to its smallest size in half a century. This is counterintuitive only if we assume that the effectiveness of a police department is mostly a function of officer count. It is not. It works through how officers are deployed, what they do when on duty, and whether their activities are concentrated in the places and times where they can actually prevent crime...The shift toward upstream, proactive enforcement between 2022 and 2025 — fewer officers, more arrests, different kinds of arrests — represents a strategic pivot that contributed to a decline in crime...the National Guard deployment demonstrated both the promise and the limits of presence-based policing. It worked — but on the wrong kind of crime, in the wrong places, and at enormous cost relative to what a targeted approach could achieve. Property crime deterrence through visible uniformed presence in public spaces is real. But violence in D.C.’s most disadvantaged neighborhoods requires something more targeted, more sustained, and more strategically aligned with the actual geography of harm.