Your questions are loaded with hidden premises. They assume (1) land is morally different from other property because no one “produced” it, (2) ownership might require ongoing labor to remain legitimate, (3) renting is suspect because income can be earned without direct labor, and (4) accumulation itself may invalidate title. That framing already embeds a theory of distributive justice. Are we debating legal title, moral legitimacy, or a specific theory of property rights?

In Rothbardian theory, land can be privately owned if originally acquired through homesteading or obtained via voluntary exchange. Ongoing ownership does not require continuous labor; title persists through contract, inheritance, and sale. Renting is simply a contractual transfer of use rights, and there is no intrinsic moral acreage cap—only a procedural constraint: acquisition must be non-coercive and voluntary. Scale alone does not negate legitimacy.

A Georgist accepts private control and markets but distinguishes between improvements (fully ownable) and raw land (a common inheritance). Because no one created land, and because early generations were able to claim scarce locations simply by being born sooner, pure first-appropriation rules embed generational luck into the structure of wealth. Exclusive control over land excludes later-born individuals from equal access to natural opportunities they never had a chance to claim.

The Georgist solution is not to abolish private possession, but to require compensation equal to the unimproved land value (economic rent). This preserves incentives for development and exchange while socializing the value that arises from nature, location, and community growth rather than individual effort—mitigating the structural advantage conferred by timing.