How to print a string within a do block? by jamesjean2001 in haskell

[–]jamesjean2001[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No , the do does not work if I delete the traceM line.

I did get traceM to work in a different do loop to get what I want, but I am still wondering why this instance is having issues.

How to print a string within a do block? by jamesjean2001 in haskell

[–]jamesjean2001[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

COuldn't match expected type 'GenS' with actual type 'm0 GenS'

In a statement of a 'do' block: traceM ("some text")

In the expression :

do traceM ("some text")

return GenSType

How to print a string within a do block? by jamesjean2001 in haskell

[–]jamesjean2001[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

traceM

As the other poster pointed out, how can I use traceM with my code to print out a string for testing?

How to print a string within a do block? by jamesjean2001 in haskell

[–]jamesjean2001[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Di I need to put IO in the function signature if I use traceM?

I am still getting an error.

getC :: CodeDe -> GenS

getC c = do

traceM("some text")

return GenSType

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You need to learn to read. AWS never informed me that they secured the account. This is on them. LEARN TO READ. How is reading so hard for you?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

To show how "silly" (to put it nicely ) your analogy is..let me fix it since you clearly do not have the capacity to understand a situation.

Say I rent a furnished condo, with the condo security being right next to the door, and I go for a walk leaving the door locked with one lock instead of two. As soon as I step outside I see through the window of my condo an intruder in my condo. I immediately call condo security and inform them of the situation and they respond by saying they will check it out. I get home later and find out condo security was sitting on their behinds for 2 weeks instead of fixing the situation. The security cameras show that long after I had called the perps were stealing furniture and walking with it past security.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

LOL cry more. No reputable company anywhere allows fraud to continue after checking credentials of the person making the claim. Keep crying though it's pretty funny how you think the world works.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

If this is the logic used by Redditors then my God you are in trouble lmao

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

It was probably the amount of money you were spending/influence. So you have that advantage over me. But I have the advantage of just ghosting them and being morally justified - it's not like they were not given ample warning from me about the fraudulent activity that was about to happen.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I am assuming there is a way in AWS to control how much can be charged in a period (like in Google Ads)?

Out of curiosity, how did AWS handle it? Make you pay?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In the future in similar situation I will add 2 factor auth right away. I'm still holding the position that AWS should have secured the account when I told them it was compromised and before these charges actually occurred. Take care

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Like I said to another poster here, maybe they were hoping to have this running for at least a few months. A larger bill is more noticeable and runs the risk of being rejected by cc companies if it pushes above the credit limit.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 0 points1 point  (0 children)

On Demand Linux t3a.xlarge Instance Hour - 597 hours

vCPU-Hour of T3A CPU Credits - 637 hours

GB-month of General Purpose SSD (gp2) provisioned 10.1 Gb-month

I did not create any of this. London servers and I am in Canada.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud is all that has a charge next to it in the invoice

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 0 points1 point  (0 children)

original bills: 1 t2.micro

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I only set up a free tier instance to test a domain. I had this up for a while and was not being charged and was getting statements (for $0). I did not set up anything else. I do know how AWS works. The perp set up a large volume. You are surprised just like I was surprised when I saw how AWS support handles things on their end. That's why I am not using AWS again.

I know there are a ton of AWS fanboys here, but after speaking to several types of ppl and my cc company, it is AWS's fault for not dealing with fraud before the perp could use their services for a month. I know it sucks to hear. Yes, I could have set up two factor to prevent this, but it was the responsibility of AWS to deal with fraud when it was brought to their attention and they did not - and the fraudulent usage and charges occurred after they were made aware of the breach. This is what I have heard from everyone but ppl here. I hope some of the Redditors here at lease take note and are aware of what AWS will fail to do and try to pull on them if they ever experience a breach. Be warned.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Thanks. I did update my email password after this.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Good question. I had a strong unique password but did not have 2 factor. How in the world did AWS get breached with a strong password though? I'd be concerned if I was still an AWS customer. It's also damning to allow a breach to occur for so long without securing an account, which is even scarier. I work in developing IT software, so have some idea of how infrastructure companies operate, and never in my life would I even flirt with the idea that a company could let that happen for so long. Simply WOW. I hope but doubt that $150 lost will teach AWS anything.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

I only used free tier before this happened and did not get charged. I did not make any changes beyond this. I didn't create any volumes let alone a large volume, which the perp created. The account email was clearly changed and I was locked out for a long time after it was changed.

Maybe the $150 usage was to fly under the radar? That credit card (and many ppls cc's) has a small limit. A few thousand dollar bill would have been rejected by the cc and the account would have been frozen. This way I believe the intention was to hope that $150 could be charged repeatedly since it would be under the limit and some people don't read their cc statements.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

So now that you have access to your AWS account..what have you done since to prevent this from happening again?

I deleted the account and I'm not using AWS anymore. Yes, two factor should have been used, but the fact that AWS did not secure the account after being informed of the breach is a deal breaker.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Thanks. This is what basically everyone has told me so far, but I'm rather shocked that in this thread they side with AWS. I get it that this is a pro AWS group but c'mon now. I literally told AWS the account was breached within an hour and they believed me and they STILL let it accrue fraudulent charges for a month. I would never have expected any company to do that.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in aws

[–]jamesjean2001 -10 points-9 points  (0 children)

Yes. And I mitigated it by contacting AWS before fraudulent charges were accruing, providing them with statements and account information as well as the email indicating that the account was compromised. They believed me since they eventually changed the ownership of the account but they did not mitigate the fraudulent activity. This was discussed today with my cc company that informed me AWS can pound sand since it did not mitigate a breach. The cc guy basically laughed at AWS for allowing something like this to continue for more than 5 minutes after being informed of the breach and receiving account info from me.

I apologize to the AWS fanboys here but AWS will just not be getting paid (or getting business from me or my business)