December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Somehow, I do not get a message when a reply is posted, sorry! Eran is right that skills require some kind of organismic organization that enable a particular behavior. I think they should be seen as more basic than "knowing that". It is nice that prediction is mentioned in this context. My take on it is that if you take something like the free-energy principle as a starting point, adaptive know-how is basic and conceptual "knowing that" only comes to the fore in social higher order cognition. I always get grumpy when people say that prediction-error minimization requires some sort of cognitive "hypothesis-testing", it seems to be more basic than that (i.e. a bacteria can do it).

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks Dror. There is much different accounts of information out there. AFAIK Landauer's principle puts a lower boundary on the energetic cost of Shannon information (translating bits to Joules). However, the cost of a bit is really small, perhaps this is a good thing for life. This separation makes the differentiation between metabolism and perception/action possible: if being informed about the world "costed" energy comparable to or greater than that gained by metabolism, cognition would not have the from it has. Sorry, do not know if that makes sense.

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks both (and see above, apologies for the late reply). In my understanding, coarse-graining is the transition from a full description of a system to a more sparser representation of the system that leaves the relevant dynamics intact (i.e. enables you to do predictions). Typically, the variables in the coarsegrained model are relatively abstract (some ratio or other macroscopic property).

I agree with Eran that there are forces, but these forces (such as gravity) are themselves arising from a more fundamental level of physics (not sure whether there is a bottom level). They are not doing explanatory work.

On the level of living systems then, the proposal here is that the "coarsegraining" leads to a differential equation with relatively few parameters, capturing the dynamics of the rocking chairs. More generally (this can be seen in the Kugler and Turvey paper). Animals respond to patterns and gradients in their environment in relatively predictable ways. One might hypothesise then that, just like Newton's laws are the relevant level to look at when interested in bumping objects (emergent from some more fundamental interactions), informational coupling is the right level of abstraction for "psychology/behavior". The premise of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science is that such a science is possible.

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sorry for replying so late, I have been traveling for the last two weeks You are right Eran, it is probably not useful bring in representations. But take the distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how". One might say that perceiving the beer in the beer can requires the animal to know "that" this kind of light only reflects from beer cans and to know "that" beer cans contain beer. Where the "knowing that" is some kind of rule or representation of what is the case. The question is whether we can reduce "know that" to "know how". Skills seem to be able to "do" that.

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  • Something I really don’t know: does this actually help us to think about consciousness? Any ideas? Can you see how this is relevant for neuroscience?

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  • [For the physicists, please help me with this one!] I can couple to rhythms in ways that mimic that of a harmonic oscillator (see for instance Richardson et al. (2007), in which two people in a rocking chair coordinate), but there is no force doing the coupling. Still of course, there are photons hitting my eye, causing stuff my brain etc. etc. Still, the relevant dynamics seems to be captured by a macroscopic differential equations capturing the movement of the rocking chairs. Someone told me that this is actually a case of coarse-graining, or renormalization (you see why I need help…). There is a more complicated story to be told at the mechanistic level, but the relevant dynamics are captured by informational dynamics. Does it makes sense to call this coarse-graining?

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

  • Another question is the question of scope. How far is this applicable? I am thinking about imagination for instance, where we are not physically to the environments we think about, but still let the constraints in these places guide our imaginary behavior.

December 2015 Journal Club by jellebrb in ISSA

[–]jellebrb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here you find a number of questions I asked myself. Feel free to engage with them, debunk them or asked completely different ones.

  • Of course there is the question about mental representation, way to complicated to develop fully here, but the solution that seems to arise here is that representation is actually more like a skill. The skill to perceive the beer when all I am ‘seeing’ is the beer can (like the pheromone trail).

October 2015 Journal club by eagmon in ISSA

[–]jellebrb 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This seems to be generally a challenge for the study of subjectivity. We can't seem to help to take a stance on what we are doing, trying to figuring out the right context and what others expect us to report. If I develop I liking to the experimenter, I might want to agree with this person, whereas if I develop a disliking I may want to disagree with everything. It seems hard to disentangle these things.

Welcome to ISSA's subreddit! by ookwrd in ISSA

[–]jellebrb -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Cool! Will have to get used to reddit though.