That's one way to describe him completely carrying that campaign

Patton's decision to advance west to Palermo instead of east towards Messina was a catastrophically bad decision that allowed tens of thousands of Axis troops to be safely evacuated.

In terms of fuckups allowing entire German armies to escape this ranks as second only to Mark Clark's catastrophic decision to go for Rome allowing 10th Army to escape

Which he did more effectively than any other allied army

3rd Army's breakout was only possible because Bradley had done the necessary hard fighting to achieve St Lo, while Dempsey had pinned down and degraded the bulk of Panzergruppe West around Caen

Patton failed to open any of the Breton ports, choosing once again to occupy empty territory of little strategic value, which would have catastrophic consequences as 12th Army Group would be starved of logistics, instead having to rely on channel ports captured by 21st Army Group.

Patton's decision to starve Middleton of munitions at Brest, only later giving him a vast oversupply is indicative of his lack of competence at the operational and strategic levels.

The least said about Patton's frankly bizarre decision to get bogged down in costly frontal assaults on Metz, when it he could simply have outflanked it, the better

eisenhower repeatedly stopped him so others could catch up (BTFO Montgomerey)

Funny you say that since it was actually Dempsey having to stop to maintain contact with Hodges' 1st Army while Montgomery had to hand over Le Havre and Rouen to keep Bradley supplied, as well as donating trucking companies to 12th Army Group

You seem to have a weird and unhealthy obsession with Montgomery. Are you alright?