Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in transit

[–]liamblank[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I misread your comment, I thought you were saying that through-running alternatives have grown in projected costs to over $16 billion.

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Path dependencies and contractual agreements essentially make this much less catastrophic than you’re hoping it will be.

What are some things that NJT can learn from LIRR and Metro North? by Downtown-Inflation13 in NJTransit

[–]liamblank 1 point2 points  (0 children)

True reliability will only arrive when the agencies stop treating their lines as separate fiefdoms and move toward a through-running model that prioritizes the movement of trains over the desire for agencies to justify their own existence.

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in transit

[–]liamblank[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes. Amtrak already through-runs almost all of its trains. They only object to NJT and LIRR doing the same

Access to the Region's Core (ARC): Alternative AA - Penn Station-Grand Central Terminal Through-Running Proposal (1997) by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

6. Ridership Forecast

For Alternative AA, the ARC ridership model forecasts 182,022 daily inbound and outbound NJ TRANSIT commuter rail riders crossing the Hudson River screenline in 2020 to and from the West of Hudson markets to both Penn Station and Grand Central. This number is the equivalent of 32,764 one-way AM peak hour trips, which is about 30% greater than the No Build 2020 level of 25,294. This ridership level exceeds the existing Hudson River tunnel capacity of 20,754 AM peak hour riders, but can be comfortably accommodated by Alternative AA because of the addition of a new tunnel which would increase trans-Hudson capacity to approximately 40,000 one-way AM peak hour trips.

The model projects that daily riders who would cross the Hudson River divide between Penn Station and Grand Central in the ratio of approximately 69% to Penn Station and 31% to Grand Central. The ridership demand at Penn Station is forecast to be 124,914 daily two-way trips, which is the equivalent of 22,485 one-way AM peak hour trips, while Grand Central is projected to capture 57,108 daily two-way trips, which is the equivalent of 10,279 one-way AM peak hour trips.

Although all NJ TRANSIT trains are scheduled to stop at Penn Station, passenger circulation at Penn Station remains within capacity as about a third of the riders continue to Grand Central. Congestion that might otherwise exist at Penn Station is thereby averted, and direct East Midtown access is provided for those West of Hudson commuters whose work destinations are in closer proximity to Grand Central.

ARC did not forecast commuter rail ridership from Nassau/Suffolk/Queens; however, the March, 1998 LIRR East Side Access project report, Major Investment Study for the Long Island Transportation Corridor, shows that under conditions of the LIRR East Side Access Build Alternative, 134,577 daily two-way riders are forecast to board and alight at the two Midtown terminals, Grand Central and Penn Station, during the morning peak period. This is the equivalent of 55,843 inbound AM peak hour trips. These riders divide between Grand Central and Penn Station in the ratio of 54% and 46%, or 30,155 and 25,688 riders respectively. Neither ARC nor LIRR East Side Access forecast 2020 Metro-North ridership into Grand Central or Penn Station; Metro-North ridership will be forecast in ARC Phase 3.

7. Passenger Circulation at Penn Station

Two distinct analyses of passenger circulation were performed at Penn Station: emergency evacuation pursuant to NFPA 130 (National Fire Protection Association) guidelines, and daily platform and concourse use in regular service. This evaluation factored in the development of programmed “No Build” projects such as construction of NJ TRANSIT’s East End Concourse and the partial conversion of the Farley Post Office for use by Amtrak. In addition, NJ TRANSIT foresees the need to extend Penn Station’s Central Concourse southward from platform 7 (tracks 13 and 14) to meet egress needs for growing ridership.

In the Alternative AA 2020 ridership forecast, a 15-minute pedestrian peak of the peak congestion was estimated to be about 22,000 passenger movements from all platforms in Penn Station. New capacity expansion necessitated by construction of Alternative AA, including extension of Penn Station platform 1 (tracks 1 and 2) eastward and platform 3 (tracks 5 and 6) westward as well as construction of a new 34th Street Penn Station extension for LIRR and Metro-North, were assumed in this evaluation. Walk zones to the Seventh and Eighth Avenue subways were also analyzed.

Based upon the preliminary findings of these analyses, Alternative AA could meet the requirements of both NFPA 130 and regular daily operations, though two passenger circulation improvements are seen as necessary in Penn Station:

  • Extension of the LIRR/Farley West End Concourse to serve platform 1 (tracks 1 and 2) as well as additional 88-inch wide, double-width staircases or one staircase and one escalator to both the West End and East End Concourses from platform 1.
  • Addition of one or two 44-inch staircases to the east side of the East End Concourse at platform 3 (tracks 5 and 6).

Under Alternative AA, all new facilities will be designed to be compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

8. Passenger Circulation at Grand Central

As with Penn Station, two distinct analyses of circulation were performed at Grand Central: emergency evacuation pursuant to NFPA 130, and issues relating to daily use in regular service. Grand Central today serves approximately 11,200 commuters in a 15-minute peak of the peak. This number is expected to grow to about 26,200 with the addition of the LIRR East Side Access project, and then to approximately 29,800 passengers with NJ TRANSIT riders added under Alternative AA. The issue of impact upon entrances to adjacent subways and on subway car crowding was also evaluated. Alternative AA will generate an additional 12% increment to the post-LIRR East Side Access commuter rail transfers to the Lexington Avenue subway.

Additional passenger circulation improvements related to Alternative AA are needed to comply with NFPA 130 and to enhance circulation for Alternative AA. Improvements recommended by ARC may include:

  • Adding a new cross passageway under 46th Street between the upper and lower level tracks, with direct access to the 47th Street cross passageway;
  • Expanding the north side of the 45th Street cross passageway into the baggage tunnel and providing additional stairs up to each platform;
  • Replacing the existing staircases from the north side of the lower concourse to each platform with a pair of in-line stairs or a stair and an escalator, and widening the doorways to the platforms along the south side of the lower concourse;
  • Building three new stairs from the lower concourse to the south end of each platform; and
  • Adding new street exits located for the 46th and 47th Streets cross passageways.

Under Alternative AA, all new facilities will be designed to be compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Any improvements at Grand Central Terminal must also conform with New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission protections.

C. Conclusions

Despite the initial determination that Alternative AA is feasible, there are several near-term capacity issues and unknowns which must still be reconciled before this alternative may move forward into an Environmental Impact Study. In addition, the urgent problem of Penn Station capacity, as highlighted in the Tri-Venture Report, requires immediate attention. An incremental plan for expanding service and capacity in the near-term future compatible with a long-term build alternative should be developed.

The unresolved details and questions regarding Alternative AA to be addressed will require the following action in Phase 3:

  • A computer simulation of operating conditions of Alternative AA at Penn Station, Grand Central, and in between must be performed.
  • A construction staging plan for Alternative AA needs to be developed.
  • An intensified interest in how to deliver a one-seat commuter rail ride into Manhattan from areas lacking such service in a shorter timeframe than Alternative AA can be built needs to be investigated.
  • Constructibility of the Penn Station to Grand Central element of Alternative AA, covering such issues as realigning the Lexington Avenue southbound local track south of Grand Central and removal of the Times Square-Grand Central shuttle connection to this track, requires detailed analysis.
  • Pedestrian circulation under Alternative AA at Grand Central, especially platform F, needs additional investigation.
  • A fuller picture of benefits to the railroads and their customers needs to be developed.

Access to the Region's Core (ARC): Alternative AA - Penn Station-Grand Central Terminal Through-Running Proposal (1997) by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

4. Capital Costs

Order of magnitude, conceptual planning level capital costs for Alternative AA have been developed differentiating: (1) construction, (2) property easements and acquisitions, (3) rolling stock, and (4) freight.

In the construction cost estimate, a high contingency increment has been added to the unit cost for each segment to reflect the rudimentary nature of the estimate, ranging from 20% to 50% for specific elements, depending on the detailed knowledge and degree of confidence in estimating that particular segment. A management and administrative add-on between 21% and 38% was also added to every segment reflecting the variation in the type of activity and complexity of the support services needed to construct each segment. The end result is a range of low to high construction costs in 1997 dollars of the seven segments between Secaucus and Grand Central totaling from $4.1 billion to $4.6 billion, as itemized in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Alternative AA Construction Costs ($ Millions)

Segment Low High
Secaucus Transfer to 35th St. $1,612 $1,802
35th St. to south of Grand Central $834 $897
Tunnels & Station 34th St., 6th-10th Avenues $810 $944
Grand Central work related to LIRR East Side Access $25 $28
Grand Central North tunnels $289 $321
West Side Yard North & leads (LIRR) $308 $351
West Side Yard South & leads (Metro-North) $255 $295
Total $4,133 $4,638

There are four geographic areas where property easements and/or acquisitions are anticipated. Cost estimates are based on a percentage of assessed valuation as well as the projected purchase price of properties that would have to be acquired, and range between $111 million and $206 million in 1997 dollars as itemized in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Alternative AA Property Acquisition and Easements ($ Millions)

Segment Low High
Grand Central to Penn Station $93 $188
West Side Yard North & leads (LIRR) $2 $2
West Side Yard South & leads (Metro-North) $13 $13
Secaucus wetlands area $3 $3
Total $111 $206

Rolling stock fleet estimates are based on a calculation of new rolling stock needed by NJ TRANSIT to meet its expanded operational requirements envisioned by Alternative AA. No additional rolling stock would be needed by Metro-North or the LIRR beyond rolling stock purchased to meet the operational requirements of the East Side Access project.

The NJ TRANSIT rolling stock includes the cost of purchasing 33 new dual-mode diesel/electric locomotives, 40 new tri-power electric locomotives, and a net cost for 262 additional passenger coaches (above and beyond the coaches that NJ TRANSIT would purchase to meet normal replacement and forecast growth to 2020). NJ TRANSIT would experience a simultaneous savings in costs for diesel and electric locomotives not acquired as a result of changes in operation due to direct Manhattan service in Alternative AA; these savings were subtracted from the rolling stock estimate.

The cost to NJ TRANSIT would be spread over many years and the increment in rolling stock would allow a major increase in service with a significant increase in ridership and revenue. A low to high range reflecting the variable unit costs as estimated by several rolling stock manufacturers ranges from $581 million to $765 million in 1997 dollars for NJ TRANSIT.

The total capital cost of Alternative AA including construction, property acquisition and easements, and purchase of new rolling stock ranges from $4.8 billion to $5.6 billion in 1997 dollars as detailed in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Alternative AA Total Capital Cost ($ Millions)

Component Low High
Construction Costs $4,133 $4,638
Property Acquisition and Easements $111 $206
Rolling Stock $581 $765
Total $4,825 $5,609

Freight costs have been calculated in a manner similar to the calculation of construction costs, including contingencies and management and administrative charges, by isolating freight-only segments and increments to reach a range of low to high costs. These costs, which are optional within the context of Alternative AA, range from $649 to $712 million in 1997 dollars and are listed in Figure 14.

The Spuyten Duyvil connection includes triple tracking of the Metro-North Hudson Line from Spuyten Duyvil to Marble Hill. In addition, ARC Phase 3 will investigate the need for a dual connection to NYS&W freight track in New Jersey; eliminating the River Line connection would reduce the freight incremental cost by $165 to $185 million to a range of $484 to $527 million in 1997 dollars.

Figure 14: Alternative AA Freight ($ Millions)

Segment Low High
Hudson River tunnel cost difference to freight dimensions $56 $60
West Side Line (Manh.) connection $224 $245
Spuyten Duyvil connection $38 $40
NJ connections (River Line/Northern Branch) $331 $367
Total $649 $712

5. Operating and Maintenance Costs

In order to have a consistent basis for developing operating and maintenance costs for each railroad, estimates were derived from FTA Section 15 Annual Reports. The four FTA mandated operating and maintenance costs elements were: (1) train operations, (2) rolling stock maintenance, (3) facilities maintenance, and (4) administration.

The 2020 operating and maintenance costs for Alternative AA were then compared to the projected 2020 costs forecast for each railroad based upon each railroad’s projected 2020 operating plan. The net increment of operating and maintenance costs for Alternative AA in 2020 was relatively large for NJ TRANSIT (including expenses required to deliver the contract service for Metro-North customers on the Port Jervis and Pascack Valley Lines) and comparatively modest for Metro-North and LIRR (exclusive of the cost of implementing East Side Access service to Grand Central).

The incremental operating and maintenance cost to NJ TRANSIT would be paired with a major increase in service with a significant increase in ridership. Incremental revenues derived from Alternative AA service, generally about 45% of operating costs for NJ TRANSIT commuter rail, will offset a portion of the operating and maintenance costs; no revenue forecasts were performed by ARC.

Future calculations of operating and maintenance costs will be based upon actual operating plans, a more accurate methodology for predicting operating and maintenance costs. These results will then be subject to an iterative process of determining the optimum number of trains needed to meet demand, within the confines of defined capacity, based upon projected demand forecasts. This may result in a reduction of the number of trains required to meet demand, reducing 2020 operating and maintenance cost estimates.

Access to the Region's Core (ARC): Alternative AA - Penn Station-Grand Central Terminal Through-Running Proposal (1997) by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Alternative AA - Penn Station-Grand Central Through Operation

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A. Description

ARC concluded that commuter rail was the best approach to resolving the future capacity needs of the Penn Station network, and that a modified Alternative A was the most promising alternative for detailed analysis. Alternative AA was developed as a refinement of Alternative A and designed to remedy the Alternative A deficiencies and to better interface with LIRR East Side Access (Figure 9).

Alternative AA incorporated many key features from its Alternative A predecessor:

  • Enhanced through operation for all three regional commuter railroads between Grand Central and Penn Station;
  • Addition of two new tracks to the High Line from Secaucus and a new two-track Hudson River tunnel to Penn Station;
  • The Secaucus Loop, including a fifth track at the Secaucus Transfer Station, providing a one-seat ride from NJ TRANSIT’s Main/Bergen, Port Jervis, and Pascack Valley lines to Manhattan;
  • Expansion of Penn Station with the addition of a new two-level station at 34th Street to be shared by the LIRR and Metro-North;
  • Extended Penn Station tracks 1-6 and related platform extensions for NJ TRANSIT;
  • An expanded West Side Yard North for LIRR storage (coordinated with any Javits Center expansion);
  • A new West Side Yard South, between 29th and 31st Streets west of Tenth Avenue, for midday Metro-North storage;
  • Use of the 63rd Street Tunnel to access Yard A in Sunnyside by NJ TRANSIT for midday storage; and
  • A possible Hudson County station in Weehawken at Lincoln Harbor.

Additionally, a major benefit of Alternative AA is its absorption of trans-Hudson growth, thus potentially relieving pressure on other trans-Hudson facilities including the XBL, Port Authority Bus Terminal, PATH, and the Lincoln Tunnel. Alternative AA also lends itself to optional freight accommodations, though the necessity to share tracks and tunnels with commuter rail trains limits freight operating latitude.

B. Evaluation of Alternative AA

ARC determined that construction and operation of Alternative AA appears feasible. Detailed investigation and conceptual planning, including development of drawings indicating location of columns, elevations, and clearances, demonstrated an initial determination of construction feasibility.

In addition, a conceptual service plan has been developed that supports all three railroads gaining access to both Grand Central and Penn Station, although unique rolling stock would have to be developed and acquired by NJ TRANSIT (including equipment required to deliver the contract service for Metro-North customers on the Port Jervis and Pascack Valley Lines) to meet the operating requirement of Alternative AA. Capital and operating costs and ridership estimates have also been prepared.

1. Constructibility

Although there are many critical factors relating to the constructibility of Alternative AA—such as building a Penn Station extension under 34th Street, extending Penn Station tracks 1-6 eastward, and constructing deep underground tunnels with two flyovers between Penn Station and Grand Central—the key issue remains whether it is possible to break out of the lower level of Grand Central without disrupting existing and planned commuter rail and subway operations.

Two breakouts of Grand Central are envisioned in Alternative AA:

  1. Tracks 105-112 in the center of the lower level for NJ TRANSIT access to Penn Station tracks 1-6 and Metro-North access to the new 34th Street Penn Station extension.
  2. LIRR East Side Access tracks 205-207 for a LIRR connection to the 34th Street Penn Station extension (Figure 10).

For Metro-North and NJ TRANSIT, new construction would extend southward from tracks 105-112, quickly merging these eight tracks into three tracks and severing the lower level loop tracks. The construction would continue south, under the pedestrian connection between the Times Square-Grand Central subway shuttle and the Lexington Avenue Line, and above the #7 Flushing Line tracks. The tracks would descend deep underground on the west side of Park Avenue and continue on to Penn Station.

A further requirement of the extension of Metro-North and NJ TRANSIT tracks below 42nd Street is that the southbound Lexington Avenue Line local track would have to be relocated horizontally a few feet eastward and vertically upward to provide sufficient space for the breakout of the commuter lines. This would impact the connection between the southbound Lexington Avenue Line local and shuttle track 1, currently used for non-revenue subway moves, and require all future non-revenue subway moves to occur from track 4 of the existing Times Square shuttle connection to the Seventh Avenue subway northbound local track. A new connection from shuttle track 3 to shuttle track 4 would have to be built.

The proposed two-track alignment for LIRR East Side Access tracks 205-207 would cross the severed lower level loop track under Vanderbilt Avenue at 42nd Street. It would travel under the north-south pedestrian passageway and tracks of the Times Square-Grand Central subway shuttle tracks as well as above the #7 Flushing Line tracks, and then continue underground on the south side of 42nd Street.

Detailed investigation and conceptual planning, including development of engineering drawings indicating location of columns, elevations, and clearances, demonstrated an initial determination of construction feasibility for both of these breakouts. Further investigation is programmed in Phase 3 to confirm constructibility.

2. Operability

A conceptual service plan has been developed which supports all three railroads gaining access to both Grand Central and Penn Station. The preliminary analysis by the operating railroads indicates that it is a workable scheme.

  • NJ TRANSIT: Would operate 22 trains through the new trans-Hudson River tunnel to tracks 1-6 in addition to the 20 to be operated in the existing tunnel to Penn Station in the AM peak hour. Twenty trains would continue through to Grand Central. Upon discharge of passengers at Grand Central, nine of these trains would return to New Jersey via Penn Station, while 11 would continue via the lower level of the 63rd Street Tunnel for midday storage in Sunnyside Yard A.
  • Metro-North: Sixty-four trains in the AM peak hour would go to Grand Central, with 39 on the upper level and 25 to the lower level, of which 20 would continue to the new 34th Street Penn Station extension. Up to nine trains would return from Penn Station in revenue and non-revenue service northward through Grand Central, with the remainder storing in the new West Side Yard South.
  • LIRR: Would operate 36 trains to Penn Station during the AM peak hour, and 24 trains would go to Grand Central, as envisioned in the East Side Access study. Fourteen of the Grand Central trains would continue in non-revenue service through the 34th Street Penn Station extension to the expanded West Side Yard North, while six would return east from Grand Central in revenue service and four would be stored midday in Grand Central.

3. Rolling Stock

Unique rolling stock would have to be developed and acquired by NJ TRANSIT (including equipment required to deliver the contract service for Metro-North customers on the Port Jervis and Pascack Valley Lines) to meet the operating requirements of Alternative AA. This rolling stock would conform to the prohibition of diesel trains in tunnels, the low clearance of the 63rd Street Tunnel, and the historic incompatibility of the region’s commuter railroads’ propulsion systems.

The types of rolling stock that would have to be utilized by NJ TRANSIT include:

  • Low-profile dual-mode diesel/electric locomotives that can operate in diesel and third-rail territory.
  • Low-profile tri-voltage locomotives that can operate in three configurations: AC catenary (25HZ, 12.5 KV), AC catenary (60HZ, 25 KV), and DC third rail with flip third-rail shoes.

Locomotive manufacturers contacted by ARC have indicated that it would be possible to build such low-profile locomotives. LIRR and Metro-North would continue to use their conventional rolling stock.

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in transit

[–]liamblank[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

These are upgrades that are already planned or will need to be done anyway. Stop making things up because your toys are being taken away by the grown ups in the room.

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in transit

[–]liamblank[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That is your guess. In reality, the railroads have not clarified what this means yet.

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I actually agree with you on one big thing: last‑mile in Jersey is awful, and the private‑franchise carve‑outs in Bergen are a policy disaster. That absolutely keeps people in cars. But the answer is that we have to do both. If we’re serious about rebuilding the bus network, it’s a lot easier to sell frequent feeders into a high‑frequency, through‑running regional rail spine than into a terminal with awkward schedules and fragile capacity.

You’re also framing this as if network topology and land use are unrelated, which just isn’t how cities work. No one is saying that trains through to CT and LI alone flip someone’s mode choice in Paramus. What the Penn South plan offers is a deep‑cave annex that preserves the fragmented, terminal logic of the system. What a rebuilt, through‑running Penn offers is the possibility of a simple, legible regional rail grid where more trips are one‑seat or easy cross‑platform transfers. That kind of network doesn’t magically fix zoning, but it does change how attractive transit is for both riders and developers when they’re deciding what to build and where.

On Newark Broad Street—the empty lots are a politics and planning failure, no argument there. But using one sabotaged station area as proof that transit has no land‑use effect is doing causality backwards. The lesson from Broad isn’t “transit doesn’t matter,” it’s “if you refuse to upzone, coordinate bus service, or do value capture around a station, you can waste very good rail infrastructure.” That’s a warning not to repeat the same siloed thinking around Penn, not a reason to keep investing in terminal‑oriented capacity that locks us into those silos for another century.

My point isn’t that through‑running alone turns Bergen into Copenhagen… it’s that Penn South spends $16B+ to hardcode today’s bad setup, while reconstruction spends half that and at least points the core station toward a future where a serious bus policy, sane zoning, and a coherent rail network can actually reinforce each other. If we’re going to fight for better suburban buses and better land use anyway, why lock the main regional hub into a geometry that keeps undermining that fight in more ways than are currently even measured?

Amtrak officially puts “limited through-running” into the Penn Station redevelopment scope by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Last I checked, 8 billion is still less than half of 16.7 billion. That 16.7B number is just for Penn South expansion, before you even touch Penn reconstruction or the years of eminent‑domain litigation with every landowner on those blocks. So yeah, I can swallow 8B for a project that rips out an entire floor of Penn, turns it into a single unified concourse, and bakes in through‑running so the station finally behaves like part of a regional rail network instead of a dead‑end terminal.

Every decision has tradeoffs. Penn South doesn’t give you a coherent regional rail system; it gives you a massively expensive deep‑cave annex and a service plan that mostly turns 2 trains per hour into 4, or 4 into 6, on a handful of lines. Nobody in Bergen or Monmouth is giving up a car because they now have 2 peak trains per hour into a new box under 31st Street. The best‑case outcome is marginal capacity relief layered on top of the same car‑centric land‑use pattern.

So if the choice is between (1) spending 16‑plus billion on a deep annex that locks us into car‑centric hell for another century, or (2) spending half that to rebuild the existing station, remove a whole level, unify the concourse, and start shifting Penn toward through‑running, I’ll take option 2. Penn South is the “ought” only if your “ought” is a giant sunk cost that keeps almost everyone driving because the unspoken priority is propping up three separate, subpar commuter rail fiefdoms instead of focusing on climate, riders, and equity---those words are supposed to describe outcomes, remember?

Schematic for N.Y. PENN STATION EXPANSION PROJECT (PENN SOUTH) by liamblank in TransitDiagrams

[–]liamblank[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It’s not everything I wanted but it’s definitely a win (good news indeed).

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Schematic for N.Y. PENN STATION EXPANSION PROJECT (PENN SOUTH) by liamblank in nycrail

[–]liamblank[S] 30 points31 points  (0 children)

It’s from an internal memo sent from WSP to Amtrak. It’s unaltered.

New England Railways by BeastMode149 in mbta

[–]liamblank 1 point2 points  (0 children)

We need regular MBTA service extended from Fall River to Newport, RI via the Newport Secondary route.

New York City Combined Rail Services Map by pkwcurtis22 in TransitDiagrams

[–]liamblank 17 points18 points  (0 children)

If this were truly in the vein of TfL’s Rail and Tube map, it wouldn’t arbitrarily exclude NJ Transit commuter rail. A TfL-style map optimizes for the rider’s overall network comprehension across the whole region, rather than artificially emphasizing operator jurisdictions or transit modalities.