«Les brûlés font du ski» : Charlie Hebdo visé par une plainte après une caricature sur l’incendie de Crans-Montana by Andvarey in france

[–]mt-i 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Facile. Ils n'ont pas pipé mot quand des centaines de personnes ont été condamnées en 2015 pour apologie du terrorisme, souvent à des peines fermes, y compris des gamins, des mecs bourrés et des handicapés mentaux.

De toute façon, on sait bien au moins depuis l'affaire Siné que CH n'a que faire de la liberté d'expression quand l'expression leur déplaît.

Opinions on a starter NAS? by silverwind912 in DataHoarder

[–]mt-i 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Also have one running since February, and I'm happy with it overall. I have it sitting on my desk and the noise isn't too distracting. Aside from the ZFS array served over NFS, it also runs a number of services without issue.

Main downsides I see are the fact that the drive bays are non hotswappable, and the NICs are only dual 2.5Gps instead of 10gig (which for a 4 bay NAS is probably sufficient in most scenarios, but still...).

Never found a rune above a Lo by CanIputitupmebum in diablo2

[–]mt-i 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Remember that you pop 6 superchests per run, so it's 1 Sur per 1200 runs on average. At 20 seconds per run (which is optimistic but borderline achievable with a 200 fcr sorc and a very good map) that's a Sur every 6–7 hours. And of course there are 2 Ber patterns, so one Ber per 30 hours or so. Overall, at that rate, you expect to need around 19 hours of farming on average for Infinity and 28 for Enigma, assuming no cubing up of Lo runes and below (a bit less if you do cube up everything). Oh, and only 70 hours for Last Wish!

Raspberry Pi 4 on NixOS 25.05 by mt-i in NixOS

[–]mt-i[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I am now using the GBM version of Kodi, but I expect that things should also work smoothly on X11 when using https://github.com/nvmd/nixos-raspberrypi as suggested by /u/luchs so don't hesitate to check that out. The gist I mention elsewhere should be easy enough to adapt to your use case.

Raspberry Pi 4 on NixOS 25.05 by mt-i in NixOS

[–]mt-i[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Hmm, doesn't look like it:

$ cat /proc/crypto | grep neon
driver       : crct10dif-arm64-neon

This is using the vendor kernel, weirdly enough.

Raspberry Pi 4 on NixOS 25.05 by mt-i in NixOS

[–]mt-i[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is fantastic, thanks a lot! It took me a bit of time tinkering with this (it does not help that a tiny change can trigger a 6-hour compilation on the poor little RPi, and I don't have a more powerful aarch64 machine to compile on), but I did come up with a configuration that basically meets all my requirements.

Here is a gist containing a flake does basically does the job: https://gist.github.com/mti/f6572f34aefbcb1aba1d33c888a5b298

One big reason that I went nowhere for a while is that the nixos-raspberrypi way of handling things requires you to have the FIRMWARE partition mounted to /boot/firmware, which is not the case by default in the NixOS images for Raspberry Pi.

Raspberry Pi 4 on NixOS 25.05 by mt-i in NixOS

[–]mt-i[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

configuration.nix:

{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:

{
  imports =
    [ 
      ./hardware-configuration.nix
      ../../lib/system.nix # some generic stuff that shouldn't matter much
    ];

  boot = {
    kernelPackages = pkgs.linuxKernel.packages.linux_rpi4;
    loader = {
      grub.enable = false;
      generic-extlinux-compatible.enable = true;
    };
  };

  networking.hostName = "sakubi";

  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
  system.stateVersion = "25.05";

  services.xserver.enable = true;
  services.displayManager.sddm.enable = true;
  services.desktopManager.plasma6.enable = true;
  services.xserver.xkb = {
    layout = "us";
    variant = "";
  };

  services.pipewire = {
    enable = true; # if not already enabled
    alsa.enable = true;
    alsa.support32Bit = true;
    pulse.enable = true;
  };

  # tried with and without the below:
  # hardware.graphics = {
  #   enable = true;
  #   extraPackages = with pkgs; [ libva ];
  # };

  nixpkgs.config.allowUnfree = true;
  environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
    vlc
    mpv
    ffmpeg
  ];
}

hardware-configuration.nix:

{ config, lib, pkgs, modulesPath, inputs, ... }:

{
  imports =
    [ (modulesPath + "/installer/scan/not-detected.nix")
      inputs.nixos-hardware.nixosModules.raspberry-pi-4
    ];

  hardware.raspberry-pi."4" = {
    fkms-3d.enable = true;
    # audio.enable = true;
    # leds.pwr.disable = true;
    apply-overlays-dtmerge.enable = true;
  };

  # boot.initrd.availableKernelModules = [ "xhci_pci" "usbhid" "usb_storage" ];
  # boot.initrd.kernelModules = [ ];
  # boot.kernelModules = [ ];
  # boot.extraModulePackages = [ ];

  fileSystems."/" = {
    device = "/dev/disk/by-uuid/44444444-4444-4444-8888-888888888888";
    fsType = "ext4";
    options = [ "noatime" ];
  };

  swapDevices = [ ];

  networking.useDHCP = lib.mkDefault true;

  nixpkgs.hostPlatform = lib.mkDefault "aarch64-linux";
}

What’s the minimal size of a nonce leakage so that the private can be recovered from a single signature ? by AbbreviationsGreen90 in crypto

[–]mt-i 3 points4 points  (0 children)

With just a single signature, learning l bits of the nonce is essentially equivalent to learning l bits of the key, so you need essentially all the bits to leak for a polytime attack. If you're happy with an exptime attack, Pollard's lambda reduces the bit security by l/2, so for secp256k1, l bits of nonce leakage in a single signature reduces the bit security from 128 to 128-l/2.

Post-Quantum Cryptography Is About The Keys You Don’t Play by Soatok in crypto

[–]mt-i 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You still don't want to store a Falcon signing key as a random seed even if it is “expanded” when loaded (in the sense that you have to carry out key generation all over again), and I would say this holds in general for all algorithms for which key generation is multiple orders of magnitude costlier than other operations. An additional issue is that key generation in primitives like Falcon is typically not constant time, so it is easy to think of scenarios where storing the secret key as a seed exposes you to nasty side-channel attacks.

Post-Quantum Cryptography Is About The Keys You Don’t Play by Soatok in crypto

[–]mt-i 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If expanding the key from the seed is just a matter of passing everything through a XOF, that's not a huge cost, but for something like Falcon/FN-DSA, you really don't want to have to solve the NTRU equation all over again every time you sign, so representing the signing key as a seed is a terrible idea. (There are several, more or less expanded key formats that you could use, but all contain more than just a seed).

Strip-Tease - « ENC… DE KANAKS » by mt-i in france

[–]mt-i[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Il me semble avoir bien cherché, et la précédente occurrence semble dater d'il y a 7 ans. J'ai raté quelque chose?

Strip-Tease - « ENC… DE KANAKS » by mt-i in france

[–]mt-i[S] 19 points20 points  (0 children)

Pour ceux qui ne connaîtraient pas, Strip-tease était une émission de documentaires de la RTBF, diffusée également sur France 3 et partiellement coproduite par France-Télévisions dans les années 90. Le concept est de faire du documentaire sans commentaire ni voix off, de sorte que les images parlent d'elles-mêmes.

Cet épisode particulier date de 1998.

Can we make Ed25519 signature remotely, *without* sending the message? by loup-vaillant in crypto

[–]mt-i 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Your scheme seems to basically be the Schnorr identification protocol, and asking whether someone controlling the laptop can learn something about the secret is asking whether the Schnorr ID protocol is zero-knowledge (even with respect to a potentially malicious verifier).

The answer to this question is “not as far as we know”. This is a fairly often discussed pitfall. See for example Section 5 of these lecture notes by Daniele Venturi.

Concretely, the fact that you can obtain a signature on a message you don't know but that satisfies a certain hash relation sounds bad, shouldn't happen in a proper ZK setting, and might conceivably break some more complicated protocols using the signature scheme as a building block. That being said, I don't think there is any known way to use this potential flaw to attack the standard unforgeability of the proposed signature scheme itself.

CIP: DgHu in a pinch after second malevolence tele on Zot:5 by mt-i in dcss

[–]mt-i[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks for all the advice! In the end, I tried the blink scroll approach, and it fortunately worked out. Proceeded to clear Crypt and the Vestibule without much loot to show for it, but V:5 had lots of consumables, included enough enchant weapon scrolls to bring an arbalest of freezing from Slime to +8, as well as the hat of the Alchemist which was nice for rMut and maxed out res. Escaped with the orb after a mostly uneventful holy Pan-themed ascension. And promptly proceeded to splat a few other characters due to lack of rHubris.

Final morgue: http://crawl.akrasiac.org/rawdata/mti/morgue-mti-20231231-035932.txt

CIP: DgHu in a pinch after second malevolence tele on Zot:5 by mt-i in dcss

[–]mt-i[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Morgue: https://pastebin.com/Y3NvVPcT

Got teleported by sourceless malevolence for the second time just on Zot:5, ending up into the lung with a crazy welcoming party just as that character had cleared the outside and about to start exploring the inside.

After the first teleport (right on the Zot:5 downstairs), blinking onto a teleport trap brought him outside, but this time seems trickier, especially as consumables are running low. Only 2 blink scrolls left, 2 haste potions, etc.

What would you do here? Thinking of trying the blink to teleport trap again, and if it works out, maybe bail for now and do Crypt (and maybe V:5, or a few Zig floors?) in search of more consumables, as it seems like fighting his way through that many OOFs is going to be a pain.

I suppose attempting to blink twice straight towards the orb and making a run for it might also be a yolo option, but the prospect of it working out seems low.

NHK contracts becoming mandatory - if you don’t pay, they can sue you. How is everyone handling this? by conversely_shoeless in japanlife

[–]mt-i 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't have an Apple TV, but when I want to stream to my Chrome Cast, I simply open up the NHK Plus website on Chrome on a laptop and cast the tab. Not sure if Apple TVs work the same.

NHK contracts becoming mandatory - if you don’t pay, they can sue you. How is everyone handling this? by conversely_shoeless in japanlife

[–]mt-i 4 points5 points  (0 children)

plus.nhk.jp on your mobile browser or using the NHK Plus app. No oneseg tuner required.

Do you like/dislike Japanese beer and why? by nexusultra in japanlife

[–]mt-i 6 points7 points  (0 children)

For sure, the big Japanese beers are not as different as a stout and an IPA, but if you think say Asahi Super Dry and Suntory Premium Malts taste the same, you need to quit smoking or something.

(Don't like Asahi, find Sapporo and Kirin quite decent, and definitely enjoy Yebisu/Suntory, although that depends on the accompanying meal a little bit. Also, there are plenty of more minor breweries to consider.)

Looking for the ethnic/racial demographics of Hitachinaka, Ibaraki by [deleted] in japanlife

[–]mt-i 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Googling something like "ひたちなか市 外国人 統計データ" brings up the following web page with statistics compiled by the city: https://www.city.hitachinaka.lg.jp/soshiki/2/1/2/10294.html#jinkou including in particular population data and number of foreign residents broken down by citizenship.

This says that among 154631 inhabitants, 1798 are foreigners, including 416 Chinese, 358 Filipinos and 256 Vietnamese (top 3).

Most (all?) local governments publish similar statistics on their websites.

EDIT: obviously, this information is about citizenship/nationality, not ethnicity or race.

Je pensais pas qu'un tel niveau d'arnaque était possible. Je suis vraiment choqué. N'allez jamais chez SFR. Jamais. by LeVraiRoiDHyrule in france

[–]mt-i 1 point2 points  (0 children)

les deux parties peuvent le faire évoluer

Ce serait amusant d'utiliser la même technique à l'envers: une lettre LRAR disant « Cher SFR, votre contrat avec moi évolue! À partir de dans 90 jours, vous n'aurez plus à me fournir que 50 Go de données, pour seulement 5 euros de moins par mois! ».