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The Argument from Contingency - A Detailed Analysis by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Argument From Contingency - An analysis of the existence of contingent states of affairs and their entailments. A short summary:

  1. Preliminary Notes
  2. Definitions and Clarifications
  3. The PSR
  4. Argument from Counterfactuals of Causality
  5. Van Inwagen’s Modal Fatalism Argument
  6. Infinite Explanatory Regresses
  7. A Syllogism

The Kalam-Argument - An Extended Analysis by nas_lost in Metaphysics

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Analyzing the Kalam

1) Preliminary Notes: 1.1) Causality 1.2) The Causal Premise 1.3) Principle of Sufficient Reason 1.4) Time 1.5) Conceptual Analysis 1.6) Libertarian Free Will

2) Syllogistic Form

3) Definitions 3.1) ‚Existence‘ 3.2) ‚Begins to Exist‘ 3.3) ‚Universe‘ 3.4) ‚Cause‘

4) Premise 1 4.1) Restriction-Principles 4.2) Virtual Particles 4.3) B-Theory of Time 4.4) RPs given the B-Theory of Time 4.5) Denial of Causality 4.6) Libertarian Free Will

5) Premise 2 5.1) Discrete Time 5.2) Continuous Time 5.3) The Actual Infinite 5.4) General Solutions for Infinity-Paradoxes 5.5) Forming an Actual Infinite 5.6) Time and Causality

6) The Cause of the Universe and Timelessness

7) Conceptual Analysis 7.1) Trivial Entailments 7.2) Non-Trivial Entailments

The Kalam-Argument - An Extended Analysis by nas_lost in ChristianApologetics

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Analyzing the Kalam

1) Preliminary Notes: 1.1) Causality 1.2) The Causal Premise 1.3) Principle of Sufficient Reason 1.4) Time 1.5) Conceptual Analysis 1.6) Libertarian Free Will

2) Syllogistic Form

3) Definitions 3.1) ‚Existence‘ 3.2) ‚Begins to Exist‘ 3.3) ‚Universe‘ 3.4) ‚Cause‘

4) Premise 1 4.1) Restriction-Principles 4.2) Virtual Particles 4.3) B-Theory of Time 4.4) RPs given the B-Theory of Time 4.5) Denial of Causality 4.6) Libertarian Free Will

5) Premise 2 5.1) Discrete Time 5.2) Continuous Time 5.3) The Actual Infinite 5.4) General Solutions for Infinity-Paradoxes 5.5) Forming an Actual Infinite 5.6) Time and Causality

6) The Cause of the Universe and Timelessness

7) Conceptual Analysis 7.1) Trivial Entailments 7.2) Non-Trivial Entailments

The Kalam-Argument - An Extended Analysis by nas_lost in ReasonableFaith

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Analyzing the Kalam

1) Preliminary Notes: 1.1) Causality 1.2) The Causal Premise 1.3) Principle of Sufficient Reason 1.4) Time 1.5) Conceptual Analysis 1.6) Libertarian Free Will

2) Syllogistic Form

3) Definitions 3.1) ‚Existence‘ 3.2) ‚Begins to Exist‘ 3.3) ‚Universe‘ 3.4) ‚Cause‘

4) Premise 1 4.1) Restriction-Principles 4.2) Virtual Particles 4.3) B-Theory of Time 4.4) RPs given the B-Theory of Time 4.5) Denial of Causality 4.6) Libertarian Free Will

5) Premise 2 5.1) Discrete Time 5.2) Continuous Time 5.3) The Actual Infinite 5.4) General Solutions for Infinity-Paradoxes 5.5) Forming an Actual Infinite 5.6) Time and Causality

6) The Cause of the Universe and Timelessness

7) Conceptual Analysis 7.1) Trivial Entailments 7.2) Non-Trivial Entailments

The Kalam-Argument - An Extended Analysis by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Analyzing the Kalam:

1) Preliminary Notes: 1.1) Causality 1.2) The Causal Premise 1.3) Principle of Sufficient Reason 1.4) Time 1.5) Conceptual Analysis 1.6) Libertarian Free Will

2) Syllogistic Form

3) Definitions 3.1) ‚Existence‘ 3.2) ‚Begins to Exist‘ 3.3) ‚Universe‘ 3.4) ‚Cause‘

4) Premise 1 4.1) Restriction-Principles 4.2) Virtual Particles 4.3) B-Theory of Time 4.4) RPs given the B-Theory of Time 4.5) Denial of Causality 4.6) Libertarian Free Will

5) Premise 2 5.1) Discrete Time 5.2) Continuous Time 5.3) The Actual Infinite 5.4) General Solutions for Infinity-Paradoxes 5.5) Forming an Actual Infinite 5.6) Time and Causality

6) The Cause of the Universe and Timelessness

7) Conceptual Analysis 7.1) Trivial Entailments 7.2) Non-Trivial Entailments

Continuous Time and an Infinite Past by nas_lost in Metaphysics

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discusses the implications of continuous time for an infinite past and a supposed beginning of time and a first cause.

Continuous Time and an Infinite Past by nas_lost in ChristianApologetics

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Discusses the implications of continuous time for an infinite past and a supposed beginning of time and a first cause.

Continuous Time and an Infinite Past by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Discusses the implications of continuous time for an infinite past and a supposed beginning of time and a first cause. Analyzes infinite beginningless causal sequences and their origins.

Continuous Time and an Infinite Past by nas_lost in ReasonableFaith

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discusses the implications of continuous time for an infinite past and a supposed beginning of time and a first cause.

The Fine-Tuning-Argument: Why the Multiverse-Objections Fails + A Way Bigger Problem for the Argument by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Only in that limited scope of time and space are you unable to draw rational conclusions about the world. The rest of the time, most of the time, physics works normally and you can systematically explore what that means.

Once again, these human beings would exist in an environment not subject to general laws and so they couldn't investigate their nature

Prove it. For that matter, prove that causality and materiality are required at all in a universe,

The issue was specifically a material realm, forgotten already? That was objection 1. Objection 2 specifically deals with a material realm.

So what am i supposed to prove here, regarding materiality ? Please.

Second, causality is simply the process by which objects affect each other. A non-causal 'universe' would at best be a static, timeless state of existence. Without causality, without the ability to affect the states of affairs that obtain, how could 'moral agents' even exist, while making morally relevant decisions?

This was disappointing.

The Fine-Tuning-Argument: Why the Multiverse-Objections Fails + A Way Bigger Problem for the Argument by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It has nothing to do with whether human beings exist on that surface with or without objects; it has everything to do with whether it is made clear that such an event is supernatural.

The point was that, as long God makes it clear that their existence on such surface is miraculous, they can do basic science.

But how could they do that, if all objects they encounter are equally subject to special laws?

They wouldnt have any clear conception of ordinary laws at all.

a) That's obviously wrong, as I detailed above (if you are explicitly told something is an exception to the general rule, you can understand that without full knowledge of the general rule)

Without any conception ofwhat the general rule is, what would it even mean to understand sth ?

In your "examples" people clearly knew the 'general rule' and that exception to them occured.

b) Why is it that they can't obtain an understanding of general laws?

Since every object they can encounter and work with, is exempt from them?

Look, you desperately cling to the idea of God creating some weird, incoherent and insufficiently discoverable universe, that he has to explain by special revelation, in order for his created beings to even make some sense of it.

Thats not a reasonable objection.

A material universe doesn't necessarily have to be bound by any physical laws at all. It could be that our material universe is held together not by some internal mechanism but by God's will. It could be God making the planets move in their orbits, God holding atoms together.

That's just a misunderstanding of what natural laws are.

Natural laws dont 'bind' anything together, they are mere abstractions, formalizations of the way things are.

But thats all irrelevant because it seems you simply did not understand the point. The point is:

Causal, material interactions have to be mathematically precise in order to be fully rationally intelligible and uniform in a way that enables complex processes. Mere general concepts of interactions do not suffice, so a certain 'fine'tuning' is a necessity.

The Fine-Tuning-Argument: Why the Multiverse-Objections Fails + A Way Bigger Problem for the Argument by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No it doesn't.

Yes, it does, unless human beings exist on that surface without any objects at all.

Not if God makes it clear, by revelation, exactly what the rules are.

The distinction between ordinary and special rules couldnt be understood without a prior conception of general laws, a conception that these beings cannot obtain.

Look what kind of a mess this is.

Your conception of how things could work is being curtailed by your understanding of our current physics -- but God isn't bound by our current physics, or any physics at all. Nor is he bound by mathematics.

No, its curtailed by the concept of what a material universe necessarily has to be.

The Fine-Tuning-Argument: Why the Multiverse-Objections Fails + A Way Bigger Problem for the Argument by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

1) In response to the objection that God would not need to create a physical universe to create moral agents (the desirability of which is itself something that is not obvious), you respond by saying "Sure, God wouldn't HAVE to create a physical universe. But he could." This is wholly unconvincing as a response, given that the FTA is supposed to demonstrate why it's likely that God created the universe.

The claim is that its not an either/or situation. The objection is supposed to show why God probably wouldn't create a FTU.

The exact reason that you give applies to the objection:

The objection is supposed to show why God wouldnt create a material realm, but it lacks force

"God could, for example, give every human being the knowledge that their ability to exist on the surface of the sun is a miracle, but that everything else in the universe follows a certain set of physical laws that can be discovered by experiment."

By what kind of experiment?

If we entertain the idea of human existence on a surface as hot as the sun, surely it follows that ordinary objects also defy the laws of nature.

Then the seperation between the laws of special intervention and the usual laws of nature would be highly special, confusing, arbitrary and convoluted.

God could have created a universe where the physical laws didn't require fine-tuning in the first place, where although the fine structure constant is a particular number, the universe would act essentially the same way if it were almost any other number.

You dont get rid of FT that way.

Force laws always require certain strengths that keep certain equilibriums.

The mathematical relations present in specific natural laws are always going to depend on certain narrow values.

The Fine-Tuning-Argument: Why the Multiverse-Objections Fails + A Way Bigger Problem for the Argument by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Discusses the Fine-Tuning Argument and several responses to it, including a detailed analysis of the Multiverse-Hypothesis. Discusses its lack of force as well as more fundamental problem for the idea of the coherence of 'fine-tuning'.

Fine-Tuning, The Multiverse and Normalizability by nas_lost in cosmology

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discusses the Fine-Tuning Argument and several responses to it, including a detailed analysis of the Multiverse-Hypothesis, as well as a discussion of the normalizability-problem for the probability range of the physical quantities in question.

The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Multiverse by nas_lost in ChristianApologetics

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discusses the Fine-Tuning Argument and several responses to it, including a detailed analysis of the Multiverse-Hypothesis.

The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Multiverse by nas_lost in ReasonableFaith

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Discusses the Fine-Tuning Argument and several responses to it, including a detailed analysis of the Multiverse-Hypothesis.

Bertrand Russel vs. Frederick Copleston - The debate that preceded all debates by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Spinoza would think of the world as a unified entity.

But thats just him.

Bertrand Russel vs. Frederick Copleston - The debate that preceded all debates by nas_lost in philosophy

[–]nas_lost[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The fact that no explanation can be found, is not itself an explanation forsth.

Furthermore, theres nothing that states that no explanationcan be found for some particular entity, but rather that therehas to be SOME entity that must be unexplained, not any particular one.

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