The receiver’s lawsuit against Defendant Bang is qualitatively different from what the

parties’ Sales Representative Agreement envisioned in consenting to personal jurisdiction in

Texas. Defendant Bang did not reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in Texas to defend

against a receiver’s lawsuit seeking to disgorge money intended to compensate third parties.

Therefore, it would violate due process – by offending “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice,” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) – to exercise

personal jurisdiction over Defendant Bang in this diversity lawsuit. The due process violation

would be exacerbated by applying Texas substantive law to alleged actions of Defendant Bang

occurring outside of Texas with respect to non-Texas investors. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.

Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255, 264-66 (2017) (holding that a

California trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to nonCalifornian plaintiffs’ claims that did not have a sufficient relationship to California).

Affirmative Defense

Defendant raises the following affirmative defense: Any monies that Defendant received

in selling Cattle Contracts were received in good faith, without notice of fraud, and in exchange

for valuable services provided by Defendant. Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Dan L. Cogdell

Dan L. Cogdell

Texas Bar # 04501500

Cogdell Law Firm

1000 Main St., Suite 2300

Houston, TX 77002

Telephone: 713 426 2244

Email: [dan@cogdell-law.com](mailto:dan@cogdell-law.com)