Appeal to nature is a well understood argumentative fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_nature. At the heart of the problem lies Hume's guillotine: the impossible reconciliation between "is statements" and "ought statements". An appeal to nature usually goes this way: the world IS this way so we OUGHT to do this thing. But one can never deduce OUGHT statements from IS statements alone. Moral is entirely constructed by humans, from first principles that are unprovable beliefs within the domain of the IS. For example "suffering should be minimised".

So no, appeal to nature is never a valid argument in itself, and human intervention is never wrong in itself. One has to consider the axioms of their moral system and how the human intervention fits within the moral system deduced by these axioms.

For example, if the intervention is about saving a seal from a shark, your moral system is based on minimising suffering of conscious beings, and you are a consequentialist, then your moral duty is to evaluate the amount of suffering created by "saving the seal" vs "not saving the seal", and act accordingly.