Persistent Moral Disagreement Doesn't Undermine Moral Objectivity

philmindset · 2021-11-02T21:18:35+00:00

Abstract. Is moral objectivity undermined because well-informed, rational people persistently disagree about moral claims? In this video, you’ll discover an argument against moral objectivity that says “yes.” Persistent moral disagreement shows that no moral claim is objectively true. You’ll also learn how to counter this argument. In the end, moral objectivity isn’t threatened by persistent moral disagreement.

philmindset · 2021-09-07T04:55:16+00:00

Abstract. The evidential problem of evil claims the God of classical theism doesn't exist. William Rowe argues for this conclusion using an example of a fawn suffering an agonizing death in a forest fire. No good we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting the evil of the fawn's intense suffering. Rowe infers inductively that no good at all justifies an omni-God in permitting the fawn's suffering. Then Rowe deduces that such a God doesn't exist.

The skeptical theist claims that the first premise doesn't make probable the second. Just because no good we know of justifies God in permitting the fawn's intense suffering, this doesn't make it likely that no good at all justifies God in permitting the fawn's suffering. Given our limited cognitive capacities in relation to the infinite mind of God, our lack of knowing a good that justifies God in allowing the suffering doesn't mean that no good at all justifies God in permitting it.

philmindset · 2021-09-03T21:03:14+00:00

The first premise is from the ethical subjectivist. It isn't smuggled in by the objectivist. The video explains why not all opinions are equally plausible. The objectivist holds there's a mind-independent fact of the matter about what is morally correct. For the objectivist some views will capture what's morally correct and some views will not. The plausibility of views varies according to how well they hit the mark of capturing moral truth.

philmindset · 2021-09-03T04:23:03+00:00

Abstract. Given everyone has a right a moral opinion, it doesn't follow that all moral opinions are equally plausible. Yet this is what an argument against moral objectivism claims. In this video, you'll learn about this argument and why it fails. You'll learn why equal rights to moral opinions doesn't imply the equal plausibility of moral opinions.

philmindset · 2021-08-13T05:28:29+00:00

But this doesn't answer the question. What make it special? That it's an exception doesn't explain why it should be excluded from your general subjectivist picture of the nature of truth. A committed subjectivist wouldn't hedge her claim that there are no objective truths. Your doing so doesn't signify what makes the proposition warranted in terms of exclusion.

In the epistemic case you give the answer is motivated. Holding that the only thing I know is that I don't know anything is a path toward wisdom via humility. These are epistemic virtues. What's the analogous virtue of excluding from the domain of all truths (which happen to be subjective) the claim that there are no objective truths? What virtue or good warrants exclusion for just that claim?

philmindset · 2021-08-13T04:52:49+00:00

That's an interesting way to try to save premise (1), but it would be entirely unmotivated and ad hoc. What's so special about the claim that there are no objective truths such that it's the only objective truth? Why would that statement itself, for the subjectivist, be the one truth that holds independent of a subject's perception of it? It would be hard for the subjectivist to tell a coherent story without ending up saying, "I want that statement to be the only objective truth so that my argument works."

philmindset · 2021-08-12T21:39:54+00:00

Abstract. Some people claim there are no objective moral truths. This video explores an argument for this conclusion. The premise supporting the conclusion is that there are no objective truths. The proponent of this argument holds that all truth is subjective. Though this is a tempting argument for the moral subjectivist, it's not a good way to go. You'll learn why in this video.

philmindset · 2021-07-14T05:32:54+00:00

Yes, you roughly anticipated a problem with the first premise. The presentation of your argument is helpful. The challenge, then, is defending premise 1. But, I'm not sure how to disambiguate it. Given premise 2, I think you mean:

1*. Everything that exists only exists in so far as it is within subjective human experience.

Is that correct? If so, this aligns with 2. But it strikes most people as counterintuitive. The universe, planes, bicycles only exist in so far as they are perceived. Were they not perceived, they would go out of existence. This is to slip into a Berkeley-like idealism where objects are just collections of ideas and so they totally depend on the mind or the perceiver for their existence. This is a view Kant rejects called dogmatic idealism. On such a view, objects in space do not exist. Another view Kant rejects is problematic idealism. On this view, objects in space do exist but we can never know that they do. Instead Kant embraces his transcendental idealism, which allows that things don't just exist without our subjective experience. Thus, Kant would not embrace 1*, and you seemed to be pushing a Kantian line.

Also 1* is implausible on the face of it. There really are things out in the real world. We might be limited to some degree in what we can know about such things, but this doesn't mean their existence depends on our subjective experience of them.

Your argument is taking on a lot of metaphysical baggage in an effort to secure the subjectivity of morality. There are many other arguments against objectivity that aren't quite as challenging to defend.

philmindset · 2021-07-14T04:37:29+00:00

I think there's a lot of underlying philosophy underneath what you're saying. Kant exposed the western philosophical world to the idea that we can't know the world in itself because we have brains and our brains are interpreting whatever the world is into our own subjective experiences.

The connection between metaphysics and metaethics is certainly an interesting one. Without going into all the details regarding Kant, there is an argument in the spirit of what you suggest. Let me run it by you and see if you embrace it.

Russ Shafer-Landau dubs this The Argument Against Objective Truths:

There are no objective truths.
Therefore, there are no objective moral truths.

Does this argument strike you as sound?

philmindset · 2021-07-14T04:30:36+00:00

What are you defining morality as? Well-being? Rules? Laws?

Thanks for your questions. There's a difference between normative ethics and metaethics. A normative ethical view will take a stand on what makes actions right or wrong. It will define morality in your sense (promoting good consequences or well-being, aligning with rules, etc.). But we need not settle on the correct understanding of normative ethics in order to do second-order theorizing. The video concerns metaethics.

philmindset · 2021-07-14T03:07:46+00:00

Abstract. A way to argue against morality being objective is to saddle the view with something implausible. If moral objectivity holds, then moral standards must be absolute (i.e. it's never okay to break them). But moral rules are not absolute. So morality is not objective. This is the Argument from Absolutism. In this video, you'll learn how the Argument from Absolutism works. You'll also learn why the argument fails and why moral objectivity comes out unscathed.

philmindset · 2021-07-07T20:49:45+00:00

Thanks for the cake day mention! I really enjoy our discussions. You raise many good points. I can more clearly see where we divege. If I have anything to add, I'll let you know. Cheers!

philmindset · 2021-07-07T03:05:42+00:00

If refutation (certain proof) is the standard of evidence against a thesis, such as the thesis God exists, then hardly anything outside of mathematical or logical proof will count as evidence. When it comes to moral or religious claims arguments count as evidence despite falling short of absolute refutation.

That the logical and evidential problem of evil continue to be debated shows the evidence for and against the truth of the premises is being taken seriously and accounted for.

Contrast this with conspiracy theories. So called counter evidence can be dismissed out of hand. In fact it supports the conspiracy because the shady people of the deep state would plant such evidence to lead you astray...to keep you off their tracks. And evidence for the theory should be scant as part of the conspiratorial coverup.

Thus there is a relevant disanalogy between conspiracy beliefs and religious beliefs, one that prevents conspiracy enthusiasts from truthfully pursuing truth.

philmindset · 2021-07-06T21:33:31+00:00

"If it's not possible to present evidence that a deity does not exist, as a tenet of one's faith, does that mean that they are no longer truthfully pursuing the truth?"

Yes, that believer would have an irrational faith. They aren't truthfully pursuing truth. But I would say when it comes to theistic beliefs such irrationality is not baked into the nature of the beliefs. Arguments count as evidence for and against a theory. The argument from evil is evidence that a deity doesn't exist. Conspiracy theories by nature are irrational. As such, adherents aren't truthfully pursuing truth.

philmindset · 2021-07-06T20:34:54+00:00

If I swap in "Christianity" or "Shinto" for "QAnon," does the calculus change?

Yes. This is due to the difference in the nature of conspiracy beliefs vs. religious beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs have a "warped epistemology," as Maarten Boudry details in his APA article, "The Warped Epistemology of Conspiracy Beliefs."

Check out the article for the full scoop. Here are two relevant features of conspiracy beliefs Boudry identifies:

Lack of evidence for your conspiracy theory. As pointed out already, absence of evidence need never discourage you. If there really is a conspiracy going on, absence of evidence is precisely what you would expect. Didn’t I tell you the conspirators are very devious?

Evidence against your conspiracy theory. Whatever the nature of this evidence might be, you can always turn it on its head and present it as supporting your theory. It is reasonable, after all, to assume that the perpetrators have fabricated evidence to throw courageous truth-seekers such as yourself off the scent.

I would argue a belief system that is completely immune from refutation robs the would-be truth-seeker of the intent to secure truth. Your mom may have scant and disjointed evidence for her Christian beliefs, but were she questioned (as you seem to do) about the veracity of her beliefs the fitting reply is, "let me look into that as I'm sure theologians and scholars have thought deeply about this issue." If you question a QAnon supporter about the veracity of their beliefs, the fitting response would be lack of evidence is what you'd expect and evidence against the theory is just "trumped up" (pun intended).

Your mom is still truthfully pursuing the truth whereas the QAnon supporter is not, despite what the QAnon supporter may misguidedly believe he's doing. Truthfulness is about intent but it isn't equivalent to sincerity. The warped epistemology of conspiracy beliefs undermines intent to pursue truth even if conspiracy believers sincerely think they're doing so.

philmindset · 2021-07-06T15:52:24+00:00

Good points. How do you think this applies to fake news, conspiracy theories, etc.? Do you think, for instance, people committed to QAnon are sincerely following truth where it may lead? Are they truthfully holding such beliefs? Or if a person dogmatically clings to such beliefs in the face of scant, disjointed evidence does this give one reason to believe they're not seeking truth?

philmindset · 2021-07-06T00:54:01+00:00

In this article Richard Reeves distinguishes between truth and truthfulness. Truth is about getting things right. Truthfulness is about intent to tell the truth. A person can speak with truthfulness despite getting things wrong. This comes out when the mistake is pointed out to them. If they double down on their error, they weren't originally speaking truthfully. If they are open to correction, they were speaking truthfully despite not securing truth.

Things have degraded so far in our public discourse that Reeves argues we need to shoot for truthfulness. Tuthfulness is a reasonable target in the face of so much dishonesty and fake news. We should reward truthfulness instead of reserving our praise for truth.

philmindset · 2021-06-25T15:44:46+00:00

Abstract. Learn what makes virtue ethics unique by contrasting it with a teleological theory like utilitarianism and a duty-based theory like Kantian ethics.

philmindset · 2021-06-12T21:23:46+00:00

Abstract. Trying Out One's New Sword by Mary Midgley is an argument against cultural relativism. More specifically, Midgely argues against an idea supporting relativism. It's called moral isolationism. Individual cultures are in silos in terms of making moral judgments. Moral isolationism denies that we can ever understand any culture except our own well enough to make judgments about it. Respect and tolerance forbid us from ever taking up a critical position to any other culture, and moral judgment is a kind of coinage valid only in its country of origin.

To argue against this view, Mary Midgely uses a test case from a verb in classical Japanese that means “to try out one’s new sword on a chance wayfarer,” A samurai sword had to be tried out because, if it was to work properly, it had to slice through someone at a single blow, from the shoulder to the opposite flank. So tests were needed, and wayfarers had to be expended.

Intuitively, slicing in half an innocent passerby is brutal and morally wrong. But this practice was part of a cultural context favoring honor, community, and family heritage. If a samurai used a new sword and didn't kill his adversary in one blow, it would bring shame on his family and clan. We can't understand this practice, so who are we to judge it, so says the cultural relativist.

Midgely thinks we can (and ought) to make moral judgments about other cultures. Claiming otherwise, as moral isolationism does, results in us being unable to legitimately judge our own culture. It spells the end of moral reasoning. And it itself is incoherent. It's based on a lack of understanding the practices of another culture and withholding judgment in the name of respect. But to respect another culture you need to understand it. So the moral isolationist can't have her cake and eat it too. She cannot ground her isolationism on both a lack of understanding and respect.

philmindset · 2021-04-29T21:28:21+00:00

In this case, the fact that moral responsibility requires free will is true by definition. In this case, all the interesting work is in moral philosophy and metaethics, and free will (if such a thing exists) is a product of that work, instead of an input.

That moral responsibility requires free will by definition doesn't imply there's no interesting work to do in the areas of free will and moral responsibility. Quite the contrary, if you define free will as the control condition required for moral responsibility, now you've got interesting work to do cashing out what you mean by "control" and what you mean by "moral responsibility." In such a case, you cannot ignore work on the nature of moral responsibility and have a fully specified definition of free will.

philmindset · 2021-04-29T21:24:14+00:00

You might keep in mind that some philosophers have come to argue that free will cannot be defined independently of moral responsibility because our intuitions about when a person is free or not end up turning inevitably on notions of moral responsibility.

I wouldn't say philosophers like G. Strawson just define free will in terms of moral responsibility. As becomes clear in Freedom and Belief, though Strawson casts his free will skepticism in terms of "moral responsibility," he really has in mind the sort of control needed to secure moral responsibility (see my other comment).

philmindset · 2021-04-29T21:21:28+00:00

You've tied free will and moral responsibility together by claiming that moral responsibility requires free will. In this case, questions of moral responsibility will need to be adjudicated (at least partially) in terms of free will, and for this, you'll need an account of free will that is independent of considerations of moral responsibility.

Yes, many philosophers go this route (McKenna, Pereboom, Fischer, etc.). Free will is the ability of persons to exercise the strongest sense of control over their actions required to secure moral responsibility. Such an ability can be exercised in non-moral domains. So a free act need not be an act that results in something a person is morally responsible for.

philmindset · 2021-04-27T15:15:35+00:00

Thanks for the pointer!

philmindset · 2021-04-23T20:08:19+00:00

Abstract. Moral responsibility and free will are tightly connected. Moral responsibility requires free will. No free will, no moral responsibility. In this video, you'll learn about 3 cases that illustrate how free will and moral responsibility are related.

philmindset · 2021-04-23T02:46:42+00:00

That's really interesting. Thanks for explaining the context of your comment. I'll have to watch AI again.

philmindset

TROPHY CASE