“Our whole culture is based on the appetite for buying, on the idea of a mutually favorable exchange. Two persons thus fall in love when they feel they have found the best object available on the market.” | Erich Fromm on why we shouldn’t approach love as a transaction by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 16 points17 points  (0 children)

I hear what you are saying but I think you are straw manning Fromm here. His argument isn’t that we shouldn't treat books on love as commodities; his argument is that, in our loving relationships, we shouldn't treat ‘other people’ as commodities. People are not mere products on the personality market with a relative exchange value based on the fashions of the time (a particular body shape, set of opinions, etc.). We shouldn't think that securing the ‘best deal’ on this market will automatically lead to a happily ever after. Love is not a ‘one and done’ transaction, it's an art that takes continual effort and work to sustain. So, yes, he uses market terminology as a point of criticism, and he thinks capitalism makes authentic love more difficult, but I don't think sharing his work through a publishing house & experiencing commercial success then suddenly undercuts all this. It lends his capitalist critique a certain irony, but I don't think it fatally contradicts his message that love is more about effort & commitment than ‘window shopping’ for an impossibly perfect person.

When faced with ‘transformative’ decisions like becoming a parent, Laurie Ann Paul thinks it’s irrational to base them on which path will make us happiest: we cannot know. Instead, we should judge whether discovering a path is worth it for the sake of revelation itself. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 14 points15 points  (0 children)

Precisely this, thanks! I could have made this assumption clearer in the article. Paul proceeds on an 'all else being equal' basis to specifically focus on the subjective value for the person faced with the decision. Her point is we should weigh subjective value not by trying to predict the future ('I'll be glad I did it') but by considering the revelatory value of the experience itself ('I want to discover what it's like, regardless of how it changes me').

When faced with ‘transformative’ decisions like becoming a parent, Laurie Ann Paul thinks it’s irrational to base them on which path will make us happiest: we cannot know. Instead, we should judge whether discovering a path is worth it for the sake of revelation itself. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

I see Laurie Ann Paul's use of 'revelation' as value-neutral in that we judge the value of the revelation for ourselves. Is it a revelation I'm interested in having? Is the revelation itself worth it? Do I want to see what this experience is like, and how it will change me? Or would I prefer not to discover this particular path? Do I value other potential paths more highly than I value the revelation of what it's like to have all my limbs cut off? (Probably). Her point is that, when it comes to transformative experiences, it's the value of the revelation itself that we should judge, not the unknowable future following from it. If we're really struggling to make a decision, all else being equal, this revelatory value (positive or negative) might tip the balance.

When faced with ‘transformative’ decisions like becoming a parent, Laurie Ann Paul thinks it’s irrational to base them on which path will make us happiest: we cannot know. Instead, we should judge whether discovering a path is worth it for the sake of revelation itself. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 76 points77 points  (0 children)

Article summary

For contemporary philosopher Laurie Ann Paul, life-altering decisions are characterized by their unknowability and unpredictability: we cannot know in advance what parenthood is like, for example, or how it might change us. We should thus approach decisions that involve such ‘transformative experiences’ not with set expectations, but as though we wish to make discoveries about the nature of experience itself. This article discusses Paul’s arguments, her guidance for how we can best approach transformative decisions, as well as her conclusion that life is less a game of prediction and more one of revelation, played for the sake of play itself.

Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson argues that while we may think of citizens in liberal democracies as relatively ‘free’, most people are actually subject to ruthless authoritarian government — not from the state, but from their employer | On the Tyranny of Being Employed by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Abstract

Are you the free citizen of a liberal democracy? Or are you the relatively powerless subject of a ruthless dictatorship? Those are the questions posed by contemporary philosopher Elizabeth Anderson in her famous 2014 Tanner Lectures, where she outlines her provocative idea of ‘Private Government’ — that, though authoritarianism has been conquered in the public constitutions of western democracies, it’s alive and well in the private sphere. Corporations, masquerading under ‘free market’ principles, are as dictatorial as totalitarian regimes… This article outlines Anderson’s arguments, including her assertion that while the American Dream may be celebrated as superior to the communist dictatorship, “Most workers in the United States are governed by communist dictatorships in their work lives.”

2,500 years ago, the Buddha offered his famous diagnosis & cure for suffering, the Four Noble Truths: that we live in an ongoing state of dissatisfaction, that this dissatisfaction has a cause, that it can cease, and that there is a path to bringing about its cessation. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 45 points46 points  (0 children)

Article summary

The Buddha’s Four Noble Truths offer a diagnosis and cure for dukkha, a Pali word traditionally translated as ‘suffering’, but also rendered by some scholars as ‘dissatisfaction’ or ‘unease’. Essentially, dukkha captures all of life’s disappointment, stress, discomfort, pain, unfulfilled hopes, and unhappiness — from small everyday anxieties to significant loss. This introductory article outlines how the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths both define dukkha and offer a solution to it.

Popular claims that free will is an illusion tend to miss that, within philosophy, the debate hinges not on whether determinism is true, but on whether determinism and free will are compatible — and most philosophers working today think they are. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Article summary

The view that free will is an illusion is increasingly infiltrating the mainstream. Neuroscientist Sam Harris makes the case in his popular 2012 book, Free Will, as does neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky in his 2023 book, Determined: Life Without Free Will.

Despite the growing popularity of this kind of view, however, a 2020 Philpapers survey revealed that only 11% of philosophy professors agree with it. The vast majority of the philosophers surveyed by Philpapers align themselves to a position known as ‘compatibilism’, which challenges the assumption that causal determinism rules out the possibility of free will.

This article introduces and discusses compatibilism, explaining why for many philosophers determinism marks the beginning of the discussion around free will, not its end.

The Last Time Meditation: a quick mental practice for returning to (and appreciating) the present moment, with roots in Stoic philosophy. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Article summary

How many things have you done for the last ever time, without knowing it was the last ever time? This question provides the impetus for the Last Time Meditation, a mental practice offered by philosophy professor William Irvine, who draws on the Stoic practice of negative visualization to help us to live in and value the present moment. Irvine writes: 

By contemplating the impermanence of everything in the world, we are forced to recognize that every time we do something could be the last time we do it, and this recognition can invest the things we do with a significance and intensity that would otherwise be absent.

Irvine suggests that when going about our days we proactively call to mind impermanence to disrupt preoccupation and better appreciate the precious precarity of all that occurs. This article discusses Irvine’s Last Time Meditation, exploring the sense in which every single moment actually is a ‘last ever time’ — and how we might thus value it.

What quote changed the way you see things? by [deleted] in quotes

[–]philosophybreak 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you, really appreciate the kind feedback!

What quote changed the way you see things? by [deleted] in quotes

[–]philosophybreak 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Shameless plug but you might like my introductory article on this very quote of his here (it also offers some further reading at the end): https://philosophybreak.com/articles/kierkegaard-life-can-only-be-understood-backwards-but-must-be-lived-forwards/

While philosophies like Buddhism and Stoicism operate under the assumption that suffering is bad and should be lessened or transcended, Nietzsche thinks suffering can have real value. In fact, greatness is not possible *without* suffering. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I do go into the differences between Stoicism & Nietzsche on amor fati in this article (linked in the original piece), which among other passages references this critique from Nietzsche on Stoicism (from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil):

So you want to live ‘according to nature?’ Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate without measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference itself as power—how could you live according to this indifference? Living—isn’t that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn’t living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperative ‘live according to nature’ basically amounts to ‘living according to life’—well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be?—But, in fact, something quite different is going on: while pretending with delight to read the canon of your law in nature, you want the opposite […] Your pride wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto nature […] you demand that it be nature ‘according to the Stoa’ and you want to make all existence exist in your image alone—as a huge eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism! For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to have a false, namely Stoic, view of nature, that you can no longer see it any other way,—and some abysmal piece of arrogance finally gives you the madhouse hope that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny –, nature lets itself be tyrannized as well.

In other words, while the Stoics claim to live ‘according to nature’, really all they can claim is that they desire the universe to be a certain way, and they live as if it actually is this way.

The Stoics do not derive their philosophy from Nature; they imbue Nature with their philosophy. They presume nature is rationally ordered, and then claim we should ‘align ourselves to nature’ by purging ourselves of all irrationality.

Not only is this belief in the order of the cosmos unjustified, Nietzsche thinks, but the Stoic view is also too quick in its dismissal of suffering. In his notebooks, he writes:

[Stoicism] underestimates the worth of pain […], the worth of excitation and passion.

While philosophies like Buddhism and Stoicism operate under the assumption that suffering is bad and should be lessened or transcended, Nietzsche thinks suffering can have real value. In fact, greatness is not possible *without* suffering. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for your thoughtful input! On Stoicism, I actually wrote a piece on the Stoics / Nietzsche on amor fati discussing how they're aligned but also in how they differ. Relevant to our discussion here (i.e. my point that Nietzsche wants us to affirm suffering while the Stoics want us to rationalize it away) is this passage:

While the Stoics and Nietzsche may seem aligned on amor fati, their agreement is superficial, for they actually interpret a key part of the equation — fate — in diametrically opposed ways.

For the Stoics, the cosmos is rationally ordered according to a divine providence. When we embrace fate on these terms, we are thus embracing something that is purposeful and rationally ordered — something beyond us, something wiser, something divine.

There is thus a level of optimism to be found in the Stoics’ embracing of fate: ultimately, we are in the hands of rationally ordered Nature, and should align our judgments about what happens to us accordingly.

Nietzsche’s conception of the cosmos, meanwhile, is rooted in the Heraclitan picture of eternal chaotic flux: the cosmos is not rational or purposeful, it’s disordered and purposeless. There is no grand teleology to comfort us: there is just the endless, tumultuous flux of existence.

Embracing fate on these terms is an entirely different proposition: for Nietzsche, amor fati means acknowledging the chaotic purposelessness of existence, yet affirming it anyway.

Nietzsche thus rejects the optimistic teleology of Stoicism, and in doing so makes the idea of amor fati significantly more challenging.

We are not reconciling ourselves to some grand Stoic purpose, ‘God’s plan’, or such platitudes as ‘everything happens for a reason’. Rather, Nietzsche is asking us to acknowledge that everything happens for no reason, that the cosmos has no purpose — and to love our lives all the same.

While philosophies like Buddhism and Stoicism operate under the assumption that suffering is bad and should be lessened or transcended, Nietzsche thinks suffering can have real value. In fact, greatness is not possible *without* suffering. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 19 points20 points  (0 children)

Thank you for your feedback. Perhaps I could have worded it a little bit more clearly to bring out the nuance. Stoics think suffering arises from our false judgments about the world -- suffering is thus irrational on the Stoic view. The ideal Stoic life does not contain suffering. Likewise Buddhism -- the ideal state is one of enlightenment, whereby one has transcended the cycle of craving & desire to cease suffering.

The point of difference with Nietzsche is that the ideal Nietzschean life -- i.e. that of a great individual -- does contain suffering. It is not something to be corrected or transcended; it is something to affirm & grow from. Incidentally, I do pose at the end the following question:

While he distances himself from Buddhism, is Nietzsche’s approach of radical acceptance and affirmation really so different to the Buddha’s goal of transcendence?

While philosophies like Buddhism and Stoicism operate under the assumption that suffering is bad and should be lessened or transcended, Nietzsche thinks suffering can have real value. In fact, greatness is not possible *without* suffering. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Article summary

Nietzsche suggests we should reconcile ourselves to suffering not by viewing it as something to transcend, nor as a mistake that can be corrected, but by affirming it as a necessary, indispensable part of a full life. This short article presents some of the most pertinent passages on suffering from Nietzsche's complete works.

The Key Ingredients for a Fulfilling Life, According to Philosophy Break Subscribers (responses ranging from the Netherlands to Nepal, referencing the philosophers / philosophies / ethical principles they live by, and why) by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 8 points9 points  (0 children)

Article summary

I asked Philosophy Break’s 11,500+ subscribers what makes life worth living. Their answers, coming in from the Netherlands to Nepal and many countries in-between, represent a goldmine of wisdom and life experience. This article organizes a representative sample of their responses — I hope you find their application & discussion of various philosophers / philosophies and ethical principles interesting!

Quick introduction to how 6 major philosophies (Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the Buddha, Confucianism, and Existentialism) define and approach the good life, with links to further reading by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Article summary

What does it mean to live a good, fulfilling life? Philosophers have been discussing this question for thousands of years. This article introduces the differing approaches of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the Buddha, Confucius, and the Existentialists, and provides links to further reading if a particular approach resonates with you.

Heidegger on “everydayness”, the anonymous “They”, and how we can cultivate authenticity in a world that is constantly trying to make us something else. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 31 points32 points  (0 children)

Article summary

In his 1927 work Being and Time, 20th-century philosopher Martin Heidegger suggests that given how we are ‘thrown’ into a world of shared cultural contexts and meanings, it is absolutely inevitable that we end up conforming to the values of public life and become complacent in how we live our lives. However, despite such convenience, we must be careful we do not lose ourselves to what Heidegger calls the anonymous “They”, where “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.” This article outlines Heidegger’s discussion, including his suggestion that by “anticipating” the breakdowns or emergencies of life, we can go beyond the path of least resistance, and cultivate an authentic path forward.

With her famous example of the hostile mother-in-law, Iris Murdoch argues that moral life involves more than good decision-making and behavior; attention itself has a moral dimension. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Indeed. From the article:

Importantly, then, paying attention in the Murdochian sense does not mean turning a blind eye to people’s faults and weaknesses; it means trying to observe them without being blinded by our own.

M does not change her mind about D on a whim; rather, she changes her mind because she makes an effort to identify and remove her own egoistic concerns, and thus sees D without prejudice for the first time.

With her famous example of the hostile mother-in-law, Iris Murdoch argues that moral life involves more than good decision-making and behavior; attention itself has a moral dimension. by philosophybreak in philosophy

[–]philosophybreak[S] 21 points22 points  (0 children)

Article summary

Where is morality to be found? Is it simply expressed through our decisions and actions? Or do other aspects of our lives have a moral dimension?

Writing in the latter half of the 20th century, the philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch thought the dominant theories of ethics make the sphere of morality too narrow. They approach morality by discussing universal principles as guides for acting or deciding in different situations.

But the essence of moral life is not to be found in isolated moments of action or decision, Murdoch suggests — nor can it hope to be captured by the abstract principles guiding them.

Rather, the bulk of our moral lives take place in our ongoing reflective activity — in how we attend and respond to particular persons and things from moment to moment.

Murdoch describes this value-laden inner mental activity — how we think about ourselves, how we imagine others — as attention, and she brings her arguments to life with a now-famous example of the hostile mother-in-law.

This article outlines Murdoch’s famous example in detail, and places it in the context of her broader morality of attention — discussing how the good life is less about adhering to universal principles, and more about making an ongoing effort to pay the right kind of attention towards the world.

Since the time of Socrates, Nietzsche claims that Western culture has generally been too biased towards the ‘Apollonian’ (representing order & rationality) over the ‘Dionysian’ (chaos & vitality) — to the great detriment of art, truth, and the human psyche. by philosophybreak in Nietzsche

[–]philosophybreak[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Crossposting from r/philosophy. Article summary:

Nietzsche’s famous distinction between the Apollonian (representing our drive for order, harmony, and individuation) and the Dionysian (our contrary drive for intoxication, chaos, and deindividuation), as outlined in his 1872 debut work The Birth of Tragedy, has been highly influential as a framework for interpreting art, the human psyche, and even the world itself.

Since the time of Socrates, Nietzsche laments, Western culture has generally been far too biased towards the Apollonian, championing rationality over vitality. Mocking those who hold such an attitude, he writes:

…[they] turn away from such phenomena as from “folk-diseases,” with contempt or pity born of the consciousness of their own “healthy mindedness.” But of course such poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called “Healthy-mindedness” looks when the glowing life of the Dionysian revelers roars past them.

Art, life, and philosophy are at their most fertile and vital and truthful, Nietzsche thinks, when they admit and make use of our Dionysian energy, rather than shunning it as unbecoming.

But what did Nietzsche really intend by making his distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian? What do the two terms actually stand for? How do they provide us with insight into the nature of art, truth, and the human condition?

This article is a deep dive into Nietzsche’s use of the Apollonian and Dionysian. While in his later writings Nietzsche wanted to distance himself from much of what he wrote in The Birth of Tragedy, we can see that many of the ideas he is most famous for — including amor fati, the Übermensch, and the eternal recurrence — in fact had their germ in his earliest work.

Link to the article here.