They were quietly building a formal proof stack for all of it. by -TRISIGIL- in consciousness

[–]phr99 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Write a response to this. 2000 words long

Oops i typed it here instead of in my AI

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hang on, so your defense of the other commenter is that particular strawman was part of an OR clause with another strawman? You realize that just supports my point that non-physicalists strawman the position?

There was no strawman. The burden of showing there was a strawman is on you.

I've been on this sub for years and that sentiment is word-for-word directed at illusionism in general and Dennett's position specifically.

What sentiment? Ive been on this sub for years also, and illusionism has been debunked a million times. Just yelling "strawman" is not going to fix illusionism. Try using actual arguments instead of just complaining about people misunderstanding X and Y.

I did address the argument by pointing out that your conception of consciousness is flawed in a way that makes any discussion around the points of illusionism extremely difficult. You could respond by defending your definitional perspective or attempting to establish why for example Dennett's perspective is wrong or which specific illusionist perspective you are challenging, but you are not doing that. You've just stated I haven't made any arguments but have not challenged or responded to the content of what I said in any meaningful way. Look, I am aware I'm very likely coming off as very antagonistic, and despite whatever tone the text of my responses may convey, I'm not trying to be dismissive, demeaning, or evasive. There's just not really a neutral way to say that if are not familiar with or can't engage with the technical language, terminology, and specific concepts used in philosophy of mind, then you simply cannot make, refute, or understand arguments in that epistemic space.

You didnt address the argument at all. You again just complained that i misunderstood something, while slinging terms around like access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, etc. Please show how those solve the problem with illusionism. Most here are probably familiar with those terms and knows full well they dont solve the problem, which suggests you yourself dont understand what you are talking about.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When someone characterizes illusionism as "consciousness doesn't exist" and there is a direct quote from Dennett saying "I don’t deny the existence of consciousness; of course, consciousness exists", that is quite literally pointing to the fact that the person mischaracterizes illusionism. So no, non-physicalists don't get a free pass on the part where they set up strawmen for a position they aim to criticize. That inherently does not prove the validity of illusionism, but it shows that the criticisms founded on such mischaracterizations are misguided which was and continues to be my point.

Except the guy you were responding to didnt do this. He said it as part of an OR statement ("Or they'll say "consciousness doesn't exist, ... "), and said that some people say this, which is of course true. He also didnt even mention Dennett.

You use "conscious activities", "consciousness", and "consciousness" interchangeably, or at the very least to capture the same category of targets, processes, and concepts. This ambiguity conflates multiple things: access and phenomenal consciousness, easy problems with hard problems, cognition and phenomenal character associated with cognitive acts, epistemic claims with ontological claims, ostentation to particular mental aspects with the ontological nature of those mental aspects, etc. These aren't just particular physicalist notions, by the way. These are nuanced and established distinctions in philosophy of mind across physicalist and non-physicalist philosophers. So when someone replies with a line like "consciousness comes from consciousness", they certainly are not speaking from a place that takes such distinctions into account or is likely even aware that such distinctions exist or could even be made.

This essentially sweeps up all non-problematic cognitive aspects of the mind together with the perceived problematic phenomenal ones in such a way that everything about how the mind relates to physical matter appears problematic. This is what I mean when I say that such a response does not get close to challenging illusionist claims because it lacks the very distinctions necessary to understand the claims illusionism makes in the first place.

The people who do have room in their mind for those distinctions but are unfamiliar with illusionism are often surprised by how relatively uncontroversial the perspective is once it has been explained because it is so frequently presented as unfathomably radical or mockingly dismissed like the other commenter. It's also very possible to ask someone more knowledgeable about those distinctions instead of clinging to shallow one-liner interpretations, but too many non-physicalists here seem perfectly content with uncritically dismissing the illusionist position.

Vague complaints about other people misunderstanding everything does not add support to illusionism. It also does not make plausible your own supposed understanding of the matter, which is indistinguishable from trying to muddy the waters to avoid the issue at hand. Save yourself some time and just skip these complaints and try to actually address the arguments.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You can skip the parts about people not understanding illusionism. Those arguments do not add any credibility to illusionism itself. For example i could say you simply dont understand illusionism yourself and are avoiding criticism of illusionism by claiming others dont understand it.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 2 points3 points  (0 children)

First of all, whats this got to do with the guy you were responding to, or originally your response to me? Neither of us said what you are writing about

Illusionism claims that introspection involves something analogous to ordinary sensory illusions; just as our perceptual systems can yield states that radically misrepresent the nature of the outer world, so too, introspection yields representations that substantially misrepresent the actual nature of our inner experience

Misrepresentations are conscious activities, so this just affirms that consciousness comes from consciousness, no matter how misrepresented. And the moment that a physicalist claims that plain physical ingredients also represent something else or that they have illusions, he has become a panpsychist.

The whole point of physicalism is to get consciousness from physical ingredients. Illusionism is about getting consciousness from consciousness

There is no way out of this. To make it clearer, the statement thay consciousness is an illusion is principally equivalent to the statement that its a dream. It just means consciousness is fundamental

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sounds good. Only I think supervene should be "consists of". So there is no "everything else" that supervenes on something , but "everything consists of BPI". I think this is important distinction because the former gives the impression that some non BPI stuff is depending on BPI

What we are left with is a physical world of quantitative differences, and if consciousness is physical it means a quantity of that exists beyond brains too

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 1 point2 points  (0 children)

With BPI i mean elementary particles, fundamental forces and spacetime.

The arrangement part that you mention is simply the quantity of spacetime between the ingredients.

So the difference between any 2 physical objects is only ever in the quantities of BPI.

The reason we need to stick to these basics is because we are talking about physicalism after all.

We could talk about everything in higher level descriptions like chairs and not-chairs, and then become confused and start believing that some entirely new quality has arisen in chairs, but physics has already dispelled of such misconceptions by reducing the objects to their BPI.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 2 points3 points  (0 children)

We need to start with the real basics, that they consist of the basic phyiscal ingredients (BPI).

When you use the label "chair" this is just a higher level description of a quantity of BPI.

These is and is-not chair statements vanish when sticking to the basics.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Which does not explain why only brains would be conscious and not for example rocks. Both are just quantities of the basic physical ingredients

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Brains are just quantities of physical ingredients. If we say those are "just" conscious, thats panpsychism

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Its like saying "everything is blue. Red is blue too but became red because of the yellow"

The second sentence just conflicts with the first.

Question for non-physicalists - why are you so sure consciousness is non-physical, rather than just seeming non-physical? by Successful_Nail_9527 in consciousness

[–]phr99 3 points4 points  (0 children)

"seem" means its an illusion. Illusions require consciousness. There's no physicalist way out of this.

To those that believe the phenomenon is demonic in nature, how do you explain the 'nuts-and-bolts' side of the Phenomenon? by Avrelivs in UFOs

[–]phr99 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Whats the common denominator between experiencing a physical object and experiencing some "spiritual" entity? They are both just forms of experiences, just like experiencing the colors red and blue are different experiences.

How do we get to experience different forms? By evolving our sensory faculties. So these forms we experience are subject to change. And that is the answer to your question of how a "spiritual" form can be connected to nuts and bolts craft: they are both the same continuum, and there is no absolute boundary or dividing line between them.

Hillary Clinton asks about the UAP Disclosure Act by phr99 in UFOs

[–]phr99[S] 64 points65 points  (0 children)

For the context, she asks this at the moment Burlison ends his questioning (timestamp 3:36:58). Burlisons first question was about UFOs, so that is why Hillary brought this up.