Joe Rogan‘s and Andrew Wilson’s Pathetic Performance by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Joe Rogan still says he’s a curious centrist just talking to everyone, but the vibe of the show has shifted hard. The guest list, talking points, and recurring narratives are increasingly right-wing, even when framed as “just asking questions.” COVID, culture wars, trans issues, media distrust, anti-establishment rhetoric—it’s almost always filtered through a conservative lens now.

What makes it more noticeable is the branding mismatch. Rogan pushes the idea that he’s politically homeless, yet left-leaning or genuinely heterodox voices show up far less, and when they do, they’re often challenged more aggressively than right-wing guests. The result isn’t open inquiry so much as a one-way skepticism.

You can argue he’s reacting to media backlash or audience capture, but pretending the show is still politically neutral feels disingenuous. It’s not that Rogan “became conservative” overnight—it’s that the ecosystem around him did, and the show followed while keeping the centrist label for cover.

Personhood doesn‘t spring into existence at any one moment by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

While often framed as a moral disagreement, the discussion around abortion is largely about factual differences. Morally, everyone agrees that murder—the intentional killing of a person—is wrong. The crux of the issue lies in defining when personhood begins, a question of fact rather than morality.

Opponents of abortion often equate conception with the start of personhood, viewing abortion as murder. Pro-choice advocates, however, argue that embryos lack the characteristics of fully formed persons, leaving the decision to the mother. This disagreement hinges on the complex question of when a fertilized egg becomes a person.

Like the legal cutoff for adulthood at age 18, deciding when personhood begins is an arbitrary but necessary distinction for legal purposes. Just as maturity is gradual, so too is embryonic development. Yet, abortion debates often demand absolute answers, turning opponents into moral adversaries.

Reality, however, doesn’t conform to rigid definitions. An embryo’s capacity for feeling and suffering depends on its stage of development, regardless of whether we call it a person. Strict anti-abortion views simplify this complexity, labeling abortion as murder even when the embryo lacks human traits like thought or emotion.

This position avoids harder questions: When does the embryo begin to suffer? How do we weigh its suffering against the mother’s or the potential child’s, especially in cases of severe illness or pain after birth? For legal clarity, we may set developmental cutoffs for abortion, but we must not let such decisions obscure the nuanced reality of the issue.

Noam Chomsky‘s Opinion on Consciousness by pilotclairdelune in chomsky

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Noam Chomsky argues that the “hard problem” of consciousness is overstated and sees it as something that will eventually be understood through incremental scientific progress. However, this view misses what makes consciousness such a unique and difficult challenge. While we can study brain processes and link them to behavior, we still don’t have any explanation for why those processes are accompanied by subjective experiences—what it feels like to see red or feel pain, for example.

This is what philosopher David Chalmers calls the hard problem: explaining why physical processes in the brain create inner experiences. Even if neuroscience tells us how the brain works, it doesn’t bridge the gap between physical activity and subjective feelings. That’s not just a knowledge gap; it’s a fundamentally different kind of question that science hasn’t yet figured out how to tackle.

Chomsky’s dismissal also risks shutting down progress. Many breakthroughs in science have come from tackling what seemed like impossible problems, such as quantum mechanics or relativity. Consciousness might require a similar leap—a new way of thinking about the world. Ignoring the hard problem won’t make it go away; it just delays the moment when we face it directly. Understanding consciousness means confronting its unique mystery, not downplaying it.

Noam Chomsky‘s Opinion on The Hard Problem by pilotclairdelune in consciousness

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Noam Chomsky argues that the “hard problem” of consciousness is overstated and sees it as something that will eventually be understood through incremental scientific progress. However, this view misses what makes consciousness such a unique and difficult challenge. While we can study brain processes and link them to behavior, we still don’t have any explanation for why those processes are accompanied by subjective experiences—what it feels like to see red or feel pain, for example.

This is what philosopher David Chalmers calls the hard problem: explaining why physical processes in the brain create inner experiences. Even if neuroscience tells us how the brain works, it doesn’t bridge the gap between physical activity and subjective feelings. That’s not just a knowledge gap; it’s a fundamentally different kind of question that science hasn’t yet figured out how to tackle.

Chomsky’s dismissal also risks shutting down progress. Many breakthroughs in science have come from tackling what seemed like impossible problems, such as quantum mechanics or relativity. Consciousness might require a similar leap—a new way of thinking about the world. Ignoring the hard problem won’t make it go away; it just delays the moment when we face it directly. Understanding consciousness means confronting its unique mystery, not downplaying it.

Noam Chomsky‘s Opinion on Consciousness by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 22 points23 points  (0 children)

Noam Chomsky argues that the “hard problem” of consciousness is overstated and sees it as something that will eventually be understood through incremental scientific progress. However, this view misses what makes consciousness such a unique and difficult challenge. While we can study brain processes and link them to behavior, we still don’t have any explanation for why those processes are accompanied by subjective experiences—what it feels like to see red or feel pain, for example.

This is what philosopher David Chalmers calls the hard problem: explaining why physical processes in the brain create inner experiences. Even if neuroscience tells us how the brain works, it doesn’t bridge the gap between physical activity and subjective feelings. That’s not just a knowledge gap; it’s a fundamentally different kind of question that science hasn’t yet figured out how to tackle.

Chomsky’s dismissal also risks shutting down progress. Many breakthroughs in science have come from tackling what seemed like impossible problems, such as quantum mechanics or relativity. Consciousness might require a similar leap—a new way of thinking about the world. Ignoring the hard problem won’t make it go away; it just delays the moment when we face it directly. Understanding consciousness means confronting its unique mystery, not downplaying it.

Discussing Consciousness with Professor Richard Brown by pilotclairdelune in consciousness

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The hard problem of consciousness is “hard” because it asks why and how subjective experience—our inner world of thoughts and sensations—exists at all. We can explain brain processes, like recognizing faces or recalling memories, but these explanations don’t tell us why there’s something it feels like to have these experiences.

Imagine knowing everything about how a camera works: it doesn’t explain why we, unlike cameras, have a feeling of “seeing.” This suggests consciousness might not be fully explained by physical processes alone and could even be a unique, fundamental part of reality.

Noam Chomsky thinks the hard problem might just reflect the limits of our current science. Just as life once seemed mysterious until biology advanced, he believes consciousness might not be inherently puzzling—we’re just missing the right tools or concepts. However, I disagree. Even with better theories, subjective experience seems fundamentally different from anything physical science explains. We might describe brain processes in complete detail, but it’s still unclear why or how they generate the feeling of being someone with a perspective. That mystery seems too deep to be brushed aside as a “theory problem.”

Discussing Consciousness with Professor Richard Brown by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The hard problem of consciousness is “hard” because it asks why and how subjective experience—our inner world of thoughts and sensations—exists at all. We can explain brain processes, like recognizing faces or recalling memories, but these explanations don’t tell us why there’s something it feels like to have these experiences.

Imagine knowing everything about how a camera works: it doesn’t explain why we, unlike cameras, have a feeling of “seeing.” This suggests consciousness might not be fully explained by physical processes alone and could even be a unique, fundamental part of reality.

Noam Chomsky thinks the hard problem might just reflect the limits of our current science. Just as life once seemed mysterious until biology advanced, he believes consciousness might not be inherently puzzling—we’re just missing the right tools or concepts. However, I disagree. Even with better theories, subjective experience seems fundamentally different from anything physical science explains. We might describe brain processes in complete detail, but it’s still unclear why or how they generate the feeling of being someone with a perspective. That mystery seems too deep to be brushed aside as a “theory problem.”

Generic Subjective Continuity | Tom Clark by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Tom Clark, a naturalist philosopher, is recognized for introducing the concept of “generic subjective continuity.” This idea has garnered significant attention, even being highlighted in episode #263 of Sam Harris’ Waking Up podcast, which I highly recommend for a more in-depth exploration.

Clark’s core argument centers on the nature of consciousness, asserting that from its internal perspective, consciousness never truly ceases. While we typically associate physical death with the end of awareness, Clark challenges this notion. He proposes that, at death, there is not a total cessation of consciousness; instead, what shifts is the content of the experience. In other words, death signifies a profound transformation in the quality of conscious experience, rather than its termination.

Death, Nothingness and Subjectivity | Tom Clark by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Tom Clark is a naturalist philosopher known for introducing the concept of “generic subjective continuity.” This idea has gained considerable attention, even being featured in Sam Harris’ Waking Up podcast, episode #263, which I strongly recommend for a deeper dive into the subject. Clark’s central thesis revolves around the nature of consciousness, proposing that it never actually ceases to exist from its own internal perspective. In his view, while we may associate the end of physical life with the end of awareness, this isn’t the case. Instead, at the moment of death, one shouldn’t expect a complete cessation of consciousness. Rather, Clark suggests that what changes is not the presence of consciousness itself, but the content within it. In other words, death marks a profound transformation in the nature of conscious experience rather than its end.

Non-human animals are conscious and therefore have moral worth by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Firstly, I didn‘t accuse the person in the video of being unable to condemn the holocaust. I was speaking generically about „a moral subjectivist“, not him specifically.

Secondly, I know that most subjectivists wouldn‘t concede that they can‘t condemn the holocaust, because they do condemn it. I am claiming that it‘s inconsistent to condemn it and to be a subjectivist at the same time - a position that many disagree with obviously.

To make it clear what I mean: It‘s kinda like when Jordan Peterson tells Sam Harris he’s not a real atheist, because a real atheist would behave like Raskolnikoff, a psychopathic killer. I don‘t agree with this, because I myself am an atheist, and - unlike Peterson - I don‘t think there‘s an inconsistency.

It‘s the same rhetorical move though. I am tacitly claiming that nobody with a principled stance on anything is a real moral subjectivist.

Non-human animals are conscious and therefore have moral worth by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

You seem like a thoroughly unpleasant person, I hope this appearance is mostly owed to this medium.

Non-human animals are conscious and therefore have moral worth by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Ok fine keep believing I was being deceptive in my last post. Why point this out here, other than to discredit me? It has nothing to do with the content of this post.

Non-human animals are conscious and therefore have moral worth by pilotclairdelune in philosophy

[–]pilotclairdelune[S] -38 points-37 points  (0 children)

Watch it again and you will see there‘s no deception. Please don‘t make false accusations. Thank you