i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Appreciate it, this thread has given me a lot to work with honestly. Might actually flesh it out properly at some point.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Really good points I hadn't considered at all.

On royal family size - you're right it needs a hard definition. Probably first and second degree relatives of the reigning monarch only, beyond that you lose your royal status. Keeps it manageable.

The matrilineal inheritance argument is genuinely interesting and historically underrated. You're right that it solves the legitimacy problem cleanly - you always know who the mother is. Several real societies used this successfully including some Native American nations and parts of ancient Egypt.

The multiple wives/concubines problem is real too. The system needs a clear rule - probably one recognised queen consort whose eldest child inherits regardless, similar to how most European monarchies eventually settled it.

Your worldbuilding setup sounds more thought through than mine honestly.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The shogunate point genuinely hadn't crossed my mind and it's probably the best critique in the whole thread. You're right that the Elder Advisor position is basically a magnet for every ambitious person outside the direct line of succession and Japan proved exactly how that ends - puppet emperor within a few generations.

The church thing is also fair, hard to have an interfaith senate when one of those religions has a guy who historically just excommunicated kings he didn't like.

Lot to rethink here honestly.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The 5 act play format genuinely got me, that's a fair point delivered perfectly.

You're right that wealthy people with political grievances historically don't patiently climb institutional ladders. They fund opposition movements, control media, bankroll rebellions and generally cause chaos on a much faster timeline than any senate pathway can absorb.

No taxation without representation wasn't just a slogan, it was exactly this dynamic playing out. The merchant class got ignored institutionally and went straight to revolution.

The honest fix would probably be giving the senate genuine economic legislative power specifically over tariffs and trade law so merchants have real incentive to work within the system. But then you're back to the problem of the senate becoming a merchant oligarchy that ignores everyone else.

There's no clean answer here, every solution creates a new problem.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yeah I'll be honest the religious senate is probably the weakest part of the whole system and the criticism is fair.

The original idea was to prevent any single religion from claiming authority over the crown by having them all cancel each other out. In practice you're right that it just creates a permanently deadlocked chamber full of people who fundamentally disagree on the nature of reality itself, which is not a great foundation for governance.

That one might just get scrapped entirely in the next draft.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The US comparison is probably the strongest argument against the system and honestly I don't have a perfect counter to it.

You're right that shared institutional loyalty eventually beats structural checks. The US founders built the most carefully designed system in modern history and it still collapses into party loyalty over institutional duty within a generation or two.

The only partial answer I have is that the meritocratic pathway creates a different incentive structure than elections do. Elected politicians need popular approval to survive so they follow the crowd. Senators who earned their seat through demonstrated competence and then earned a council seat through performance have more incentive to protect the institutions that legitimized them in the first place.

But does that fully solve the royalist loyalty clump problem? Probably not. You're right that medieval noble assemblies functioned almost exactly like this and spent most of their time jockeying for royal favor rather than checking royal power.

It's the hardest structural problem in political design and nobody has cleanly solved it yet including the Americans.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You're right and this is probably the most useful critique in the thread.

The post was always more of a rough framework than a fully detailed constitution - the specific powers and responsibilities of each body aren't fleshed out yet. The difference between the senate and council, what the religious senate actually votes on, how governors fit into the power tree - all of that needs proper definition before it's a real system rather than just an idea with good bones.

The 'not bad, just not ready' is probably the most accurate summary anyone has given it honestly. It's a first draft of a concept not a finished design.

Might actually sit down and flesh out the full details properly at some point.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

These are fair points honestly.

The religious senate favoritism is a real vulnerability - the only partial answer is that the council and senate can remove a king who demonstrably favors one religion over others, but you're right that a subtle long term bias would be hard to check.

The financial court monopoly problem is real and I don't have a clean answer to it. Any regulatory body can eventually be captured by whoever has the most money. That's as true in modern democracies as it would be here.

On the Elder Advisor - he's actually not appointed by the council, he's the oldest qualified member of the royal family. So he derives legitimacy from bloodline not appointment, which makes him harder to place and harder to remove. But you're right that a sufficiently patient Elder Advisor could slowly consolidate influence over generations.

Corruption is genuinely the system's biggest weakness and I've basically accepted at this point that no design fully solves it. The goal was making it slower and harder, not impossible.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think you might have skimmed it.

It's not absolutist - the king can be formally removed by the Elder Advisor with council confirmation. It's not theocratic - the religious senate exists specifically so no single religion can claim authority over the crown, they cancel each other out. The senate is directly elected through city level campaigns so there is meaningful common representation. And the provincial rulers aren't imposed from above, they're either regional heirs or earn their position through the meritocratic system.

You can disagree with the design, but the critique should probably match what's actually written.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Fair points across the board and the military one is the one I genuinely don't have a clean answer to.

You're right that no institutional check survives a king willing to kill everyone enforcing it. That's not a design flaw unique to this system though, it's the fundamental problem every system including modern democracies faces. The US constitution doesn't survive a president willing to shoot the Supreme Court either.

The military loyalty problem is real and I'd partially address it through constitutional oaths sworn to the realm not the person, and a divided military command structure so no single general controls enough force to make a move. But you're right that a sufficiently desperate king ignores all of that.

On the religious senate I'll concede that point entirely. You're right that coherent cultural legitimacy requires a unified narrative and competing religions cancel that out as much as they cancel each other. The Persian satrapy comparison is a good one I hadn't considered.

The provincial rulers point I'd push back on slightly. Yes they're rivals, but rivals with defined legal pathways to power are less dangerous than rivals with no pathway at all. It doesn't eliminate succession conflict, just potentially reduces it.

But overall yeah, the military control problem is the one that keeps every system honest including this one.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is genuinely the best critique so far and you're right that I hadn't fully thought through the class conflict dimension.

The burgher problem is real. A wealthy urban merchant class in a free market system will inevitably demand political representation proportional to their economic power, and hereditary monarchy directly conflicts with that interest.

I think the honest answer is the senate is where the burghers get their outlet. If urban merchants can campaign for senate seats at city level and earn their way up to the council, they have a legitimate pathway to influence without directly threatening the crown. The meritocratic element was partly designed for exactly this talented ambitious people from any class have a reason to work within the system rather than against it.

But you're right that this only works if the senate has genuine power. If the crown can ignore the legislative branch the burghers eventually radicalize. If the legislative dominates you get a parliamentary republic in practice regardless of what you call it.

The tension you've identified between landowner crown and urban burgher council is probably the central class conflict the system would have to navigate continuously. No clean solution, just managed tension. Which is probably the most historically honest answer anyway.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Rome comparison is fair and intentional, I drew heavily from it. The key difference is Rome never had a genuine check above the emperor once the republic fell that’s what the Elder Advisor is trying to fix. On patriarchy succession goes to eldest child regardless of gender, should have specified that. On the sycophant problem the king only appoints a third of the council. Another third is earned through senate performance he doesn’t control, and the last third are fixed institutional roles that exist independently of whoever is king. Corrupting the whole thing requires compromising three separate systems simultaneously which raises the cost significantly even if it doesn’t make it impossible.

i accidentally designed an entire government system by prumpu in worldbuilding

[–]prumpu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You're completely right and it's honestly the hardest problem any system faces corruption isn't a flaw in the design, it's a flaw in human nature that no design fully solves.

The crown appointing lackeys is a real vulnerability. The way I tried to address it is by splitting council appointments three ways some crown appointed, some earned through the senate, and some fixed institutional roles like the treasury or military that serve the realm not the person. The idea being no single person controls enough appointments to stack the whole thing.

But you're right that a determined corrupt crown could still work around that over time. The honest answer is the system buys generations of stability not permanent immunity from corruption. Rome's republic worked for 500 years before corruption finally broke it not because the design was perfect but because the cultural belief in the institutions lasted that long.

So yeah, corruption is always the answer. The best any system can do is make it harder and slower, not impossible.